PHILOSOPHY

THE JOURNAL OF THE BRITISH INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY

VOL. X. No. 39. JULY 1935

THE PRESENT NEED OF A PHILOSOPHY

(LETTER TO THE EDITOR)

MY DEAR EDITOR,

The interest which this subject has aroused, and the high and vivid quality of the letters which it has evoked show how difficult it is for philosophers to eradicate from their minds the traditional notion that philosophy ought to be of some use, that it ought somehow to apply. In spite of the admonitions of the logical positivists who, proclaiming that the business of philosophy is the clarification of thought, insist that it can throw no light upon the nature of things, and receive with a shocked horror the suggestion that it can assist in the business of living, in spite of the concentration of our fascinated attention upon the surgical operation which the philosophical analysts are performing upon common-sense sentences, many of us still, it seems, nourish somewhere at the back of our philosophical consciousnesses the presumption that philosophy, too, should make its contribution to the understanding and appeasement of our times, and that, with the world going from bad to worse, a clear duty falls upon contemporary philosophers to show what that contribution is. The facts that there is no more agreement among us as to its nature than there is upon any other philosophical issue, and that the mere avowal of a practical obligation which philosophy lays upon its students conveys in the present rarefied atmosphere of logical abstraction a suggestion of indefinable but, nevertheless, quite unmistakable crudity, do not, it seems, avail to rid us of the uncomfortable presumption that the times are crooked and that it is incumbent upon philosophy to do something towards their straightening.

I think that we are right to entertain this presumption and do

well to allow ourselves to be made uncomfortable by it. Unless I thought that philosophy had some contribution to make to the answering of such questions as "What sort of universe is this in which we are living?" and "How ought we to live in it?" I, for one, should have no interest in philosophy. I believe that many philosophers are in similar case. In spite of the scantiness of the light which philosophy has hitherto succeeded in throwing upon the mystery of human existence, in spite of the meagreness of the rules which it has succeeded in drawing up for the right conduct of life, we are, we feel convinced, not knocking at a door irrevocably closed when, in difficult times such as the present, we look to it for leading and guidance. It is in this conviction that I venture to make the two following observations.

First, as regards non-philosophers! I believe that the distinguishing characteristic of people to-day is their lack of a sense of values, a lack by which they are manifestly incommoded. Relativism and subjectivism are in the air. They are the distinctive acids of modern thought, and they have eaten into the structure of values in which most men have traditionally believed with such effect that by many the conclusion that no one thing is better or truer or more beautiful than another is taken for granted. The characteristic assertion of the modern world is that the human mind does not recognize value; it manufactures it, dignifying its own likes and dislikes with objective worth and projecting its tastes upon the empty canvas of a valueless universe. Things, then, are not approved because they are good; they are good because they are approved.

There are, I think, two main reasons for this current attitude. The first is the domination of the thought of the generation which has just reached maturity by an instinctive Materialism. Most of us have grown up in an age whose concepts have been formed, almost automatically as it were, by physical science. Now for physical science the criterion of reality is visibility and tangibility. The sort of thing that is real is, we instinctively assume, the sort of thing we can see and touch. Hence values, which cannot be seen or touched, tend to be dismissed as figments of a human mind, which is itself only a camouflaged version of the human brain. Thus two apples are real because they can be touched, but the number two is not; pictures are beautiful because they can be seen, but there is no value, Beauty. If Materialism dominates the unconscious background of the mind of this generation, Relativism occupies its foreground. The god of the intelligent young is Aldous Huxley—a friend, who recently conducted an unofficial census of the books in the rooms of a number of undergraduates, found that the novels and essays of Aldous Huxley were the highest common factor of contemporary undergraduate taste—and Huxley has said: "A

similar conjuring trick . . . draws the Good and the Beautiful out of the seething hotchpotch of diverse human tastes and sensibilities and interests, deduces Justice from our actual inequalities, and absolute Truth from the necessary . . . relativities of daily life. It is by an exactly similar process that children invent imaginary playthings to amuse their solitudes, and transform a dull, uninteresting piece of wood into a horse, a ship, a railway train—what you will." The conclusion of this line of thought is obvious; Huxley shall state it for us: "No psychological experience is 'truer,' so far as we are concerned, than any other. . . . Science is no 'truer' than common sense or lunacy, than art or religion. . . . For, even if one should correspond more closely to things in themselves as perceived by some hypothetical non-human being, it would be impossible for us to discover which it was."

Now all this is very disturbing to the mind. It means, for one thing, that there is no standard of value except the satisfaction of one's tastes; and it means also that of one's tastes no one is more worth while than another. As I write, there comes into my mind the picture of a Greats student with headphones over his ears reading Kant. I asked him what he was listening to, improbably suspecting a B.B.C. commentary on Kant. He said that he was listening to jazz music relayed by a dance band. I asked him whether the one activity did not interfere with the other, the jazz with the Kant, and suggested that he was putting the higher at the mercy of the lower. He replied that the words "higher" and "lower" were meaningless, since no one activity could be "higher" than another. The only relevant question was whether it produced more satisfaction. He had not, he said, as yet had enough experience to tell whether philosophy was more or less productive of satisfaction than jazz; he was engaged in trying to find out.

A real figure, but allegorical, I trust, rather than typical! For the practical consequences of value repudiation are only too often unfortunate. In the sphere of conduct, men and women are left to make up their minds on merits in regard to every difficult decision and every moral issue with no standard beyond their own estimate of the respective pleasures likely to attend alternative courses of action to guide them. In the sphere of belief, they are left with a universe which contains nothing but the physical facts which science investigates and the minds which psychology explores. Such a universe provides the basis neither for a code nor for a creed. Now most people, especially young people, have a need to believe, and are unable for long to tolerate an agnosticism which offers no legitimate basis for their moral aspirations, puts their ideals into cold storage and consigns their spiritual natures to a condition of suspended animation. A vacuum is abhorrent no less

in thought than in Nature. Is it matter for surprise that dictators rush in where philosophers fear to tread, offer as a substitute for morality the generation enthusiasm and supply the place of rational belief by converting conjectures into dogmas?

"The Present Need of a Philosophy" is, therefore, a need to re-establish the objectivity of values. In a sense, no doubt, this is also the task of religion. But, while the recipe for producing religious faith is not known, or, if it was once known, has been forgotten, the objective character of value can, I believe, be rationally demonstrated. It is, I conceive, the business of philosophers who share this belief to give a helping hand to a generation which, so far as its beliefs are concerned, has lost its way in a maze of conflicting theories, and so far as concerns its conduct, is left rudderless in the sea of its conflicting desires, by continuously applying their dialectical skill to the task of demonstration.

Secondly, for those of us who follow philosophy as a means of livelihood or a pursuit of leisure, there is a special service which, as I believe, philosophy may perform in relation to the needs and stresses of our times. It is, I believe, a fact that many of those who are normally engaged in research or creative work find it difficult to-day to pursue their ordinary avocations. Nor are their difficulties merely economic. Over many of the sensitive-minded men and women of this generation hangs the menace of a great fear; the fear of the destruction by war of such civilization as we have achieved. Because of it their minds are unable to escape from their preoccupations of the political scene. Even if their preoccupation cannot prevent or delay for the fraction of a second the catastrophe, they cannot withdraw their fascinated gaze from the spectacle of its slow approach. Physics and psycho-analysis, literature and art, the novel of the year, the latest experiment in poetry, So-and-so's "show" of paintings, such and such a performance of a symphony, these, which used to be the main staples of conversation in circles which in the long run form the taste and set the standards of the community, are now neglected for discussions of rearmament and dictatorship.

And, inevitably, first-rate literary and artistic production falters or ceases altogether. How can a man think, let alone dream, when the hills and valleys are filled with the echoes of marching feet? How can be command the serenity to conceive or the patience to create beautiful things, when he contemplates the prospect of those whom he loves being slowly asphyxiated by gas and the fruits of his effort being scattered with the ashes of the civilization which gave it birth? The creative artist demands a quiet background, if he is to produce his best work; he also requires an audience whose release from the more primitive preoccupations of the soldier, the

savage, and the gangster, enables them to turn their attention to the products of the spirit. He demands, in fact, a civilized environment, alert, interested, reasonably secure. Under the stresses and fears of our time such an environment is fast vanishing from the Europe of to-day, and, as a result, the interest of civilized people in the art and literature of their times shows a corresponding decline.

But, while men can no longer create, while they find it hard even to appreciate with serene minds, they can still pursue philosophy. Ever since Socrates philosophized on the threshold of death, philosophy has solaced men in times of misfortune. In philosophy men who are agitated can find peace, men who are wretched resignation, men who are afraid courage. The charge against philosophy that it makes us absent-minded is not wholly to be deplored. For to withdraw the mind from the things of this world is not in itself a good or an evil. It is an evil, if the things from which we are withdrawn are mainly good, a good if they are mainly evil.

Sincerely,
C. E. M. JOAD.

4, EAST HEATH ROAD,
HAMPSTEAD.
May 1935.

THE DUALISM OF MIND AND MATTER

Professor JOHN MACMURRAY

One of the most deeply engrained habits of the modern world is the habit of thinking in terms of a contrast, and indeed of an opposition, between something we call Mind and something we call Matter. This habit is obviously not confined to philosophy. It is built into the structure of our languages and of our ways of behaviour. It conditions our religious and moral attitudes, as well as our reflective thought in science and philosophy. It is not surprising, therefore, that much of modern European Philosophy has consisted in an effort to overcome the dualism to which this habit gives rise when we try to clarify and systematize our knowledge of Reality. This essay on the subject is an essay in scepticism. It will tend to the conclusion that the dualistic habit of thought is a bad habit; that it is, in fact, the formulation of an illusion. It does not attempt to prove this. It only asks a question, and seeks to examine such answers as seem likely to be given. The question is this: "What rational justification is there for accepting the dualism of Mind and Matter as a metaphysical hypothesis which deserves consideration?" If the habit of contrasting Mind and Matter is a bad habit, it will, of course, require a psychological explanation, and the attempt to explain it will be a study in the pathology of the modern consciousness. But it will have no *reason,* and if the attempt to discover a reason for it proves fruitless, that will in itself strongly suggest that the subject is one for psychological rather than for logical investigation. When a philosophical position commands wide acceptance and universal attention, and yet cannot be shown to have any rational justification, it is almost certain that it has a deep-seated source of an irrational kind. There can be no reason for believing an illusion, but there must be a reason why it is actually believed.

Of the philosophical works which have been published in recent years none has impressed me more than Professor Lovejoy's book called *The Revolt Against Dualism.* It is an elaborate and systematic examination of the dualistic *motif* in modern philosophy from Descartes to the present time. Whatever may be thought of the particular analysis which Professor Lovejoy gives, he at least succeeds in revealing that the problem of dualism lies at the basis of all modern philosophy, and that all modern philosophies are efforts to overcome the dualism. Professor Lovejoy's conclusion

is that none of these attempts (though some of the more recent ones, which rest upon the Theory of Relativity, are very subtle) have succeeded in escaping the dualism, and that, therefore, we must give up the revolt and accept dualism as inevitable. I mention this conclusion not in order to discuss its validity but in order to make quite clear the question which I am asking. It is not Professor Lovejoy's question, though it is very difficult to avoid confusing the two. I am willing to grant that all modern philosophy is dualistic and that all the attempts to overcome this dualism have failed. But I should give a very different account of the reasons for the failure. I should maintain that any philosophy which starts by contrasting Mind and Matter must necessarily fail to resolve the dualism which its starting-point involves. I ask, therefore, why any philosophy should start from this contrast. Is there any real necessity for thinking in terms of a dualism between Mind and Matter?

It may seem strange at first sight to say that the dualism of Mind and Matter is characteristic of all modern philosophy. With the qualified exception of the philosophy of Descartes, all the outstanding philosophical systems of modern times have been either monistic or pluralistic. Berkeley's philosophy, with its thoroughgoing denial of matter, is certainly not dualistic. It holds that the only reality is mind and its activities, so that everything is mental. But I had no intention to deny that most modern philosophical systems are monistic in their conclusion as well as in their intention. What I wished to assert was that these monisms are all *in terms of* the dualism of Mind and Matter. They start from the hypothesis of a *prima facie* contrast between the mental and the material, and reach their conclusion by unifying, in some way or other, the two sides of the dualism which they take as *prima facie* given. These philosophies could never arise except on the basis of dualism. The dualism forms the primary hypothesis which they set out to examine. They discover, by critical analysis, that this dualism raises insuperable difficulties which force them to attempt its resolution. The final denial of dualism is still the result of thinking in terms of dualism. Berkeley's philosophy, for example, is obviously founded, in this sense, on the dualism of Mind and Matter. Without that distinction it could never get started. Berkeley begins by examining the idea of a two-substance world and goes on to show that all the things which we usually put in the basket labelled "Material Substance" should really be put in the basket labelled "Mental Substance." In the structure of his thought there are still two classes, mental and material. But one of the classes turns out to be a null class. All the actual things in the world go into the mental class. When Berkeley says that everything is idea, the meaning of his statement depends upon the contrast that we draw

between *ideas*, which are mental, and *things*, which are material. If Berkeley and his readers were not equally thinking in terms of a significant distinction between mind and matter, Berkeley's conclusion would itself carry no meaning at all. Thus apart from the dualistic habit of thought Berkeley's philosophy would never have come into existence, and could not be understood if it had. The same is true of all the classical modern philosophies. Even in their rejection of dualism they depend upon dualistic thinking. My question is this: "Is there any rational justification for thinking dualistically?"

Our question, then, is not whether Reality is ultimately dualistic, but whether there is a *prima facie* case for suggesting that it may be; whether, that is to say, our common knowledge of the world suggests that a systematic attempt to understand it might naturally start by distinguishing two classes of things which seem at first sight to have nothing in common. Further investigation might then either confirm the dualism and so reach a dualistic conclusion or it might discover a way of resolving the dualism. But neither of these types of conclusion would arise unless there was a *prima facie* case for starting with a dualistic classification. Now a dualism, in the philosophical sense, is a metaphysical classification, a schema for dividing everything without exception into two sorts of things that have nothing in common, and which, therefore, exclude one another in their essential nature. If we consider that Reality may possibly be dualistic, we are considering the possibility that everything in Reality is either of one kind or of another, and that these two kinds have nothing in common and must be defined as mutually exclusive. If, for example, the dualism we are considering is the Mind-Matter dualism, then we are considering the possibility that everything in the Universe is either mental or material, and that nothing is both. We are considering that whatever is mental has none of the characteristics that belong to material things, and that nothing that is material possesses any of the characteristics that belong to mental things. A metaphysical dualism is, thus, both ultimate and absolute.

The history of modern philosophy shows that there is a deeply-rooted tendency in our minds to classify the constituents of Reality in this way. It also shows that such a dualistic classification raises great difficulties for the philosopher. It may be, of course, that no philosopher has yet hit upon the way to surmount those difficulties, and that we ought to go on making the attempt in the hope that we may finally be successful. But it may also be that the difficulties are of our own making, and that they really arise from the fact that the dualistic classification is merely an irrational tendency which we should attempt to overcome. It is between

these two possibilities that we have to make our choice. That is why it is necessary to ask what are the *prima facie* grounds for starting out with the hypothesis that Reality divides without remainder into what is mental and what is material.

Let us first appeal directly to common sense, that is to say, to our ordinary unphilosophical outlook upon the world. The question that we shall then ask ourselves is: "What kinds of things are there in the world as we know it which seem to be fundamentally different?" And the answer to that question would provide us with a natural *prima facie* classification of Reality. We shall begin (shall we not?) by distinguishing animate from inanimate things. This difference between things that are alive and things that are not alive is *prima facie* the obvious one. Whether it is ultimate or not is a different question, but not one with which we are now concerned. We shall then distinguish human beings, like ourselves, from both these classes. The main difficulty that we are likely to find will be in deciding whether to distinguish plant life from animal life. But on the whole we shall decide that this is really a subdivision of the class of animate but non-human things. It might be possible to argue for a different natural classification, but hardly without sophistication. The division of the contents of the world into inorganic, organic, and personal seems at least to be a universal one and to correspond to what we can discover about the development of the human being in childhood. One thing is quite certain. We should never dream of dividing the things that we know into material things and mental things. It requires, at least, a high degree of sophisticated reflection to arrive at that classification. It is obviously not a natural classification of the contents of the world in comparison with the division into inanimate, animate, and rational or personal. This brings to light the first *prima facie* difficulty of the Mind-Matter dualism. It is difficult to find in it any place for living things that have no minds. If the world consists exclusively of mental things and material things, where do cabbages come in?

There is one quite simple consideration that reinforces this natural threefold classification against the dualism of Mind and Matter. Suppose that in spite of its unnaturalness, there is some deeper reason for classifying real things as either material or mental. We should expect that the systematic effort to investigate the nature of the world would result in the development of two separate lines of inquiry. We should expect to find the results of the investigation grouping themselves into two sciences or two groups of sciences, one having material things as its field of research and the other mental things. We should expect to find a set of physical sciences concerned with the investigation of matter and a set of

psychological sciences concerned with the investigation of mind. Actually this was the expectation entertained by philosophers and scientists at the beginning of the scientific period under the influence of the dualistic habit of thought. Persistent efforts were made to develop two sciences concerned respectively with Mind and Matter. But the attempt has proved unavailing. The necessities of scientific development have forced another classification upon us, in spite of our prejudice in favour of dualism. We find ourselves with a set of physical sciences which are concerned with material phenomena. We find a set of sciences dealing with the phenomena of life, quite distinct from the physical sciences, but not concerned with mind at all. Finally, we find a special set of sciences, still rather unsure of themselves, which are concerned with psychological phenomena. In other words, the development of science reflects the natural threefold classification of reality and not the dualistic one, in spite of the fact that the dualistic tendency has exercised a continuous pressure upon the development of scientific investigation.

At first sight we might be inclined to draw the conclusion that the dualism of Mind and Matter was not exhaustive, and that what is required is the introduction of a third division into the classification. Instead of the twofold division into Matter and Mind, we might adopt a threefold division into Mind, Life, and Matter. Then we should look upon physical science as the science of Matter. Biological science as the science of Life, and Psychological science as the science of Mind. To do this would be to miss the point. Biology is not the science of Life, and Psychology is not the science of Mind in the sense that Physics is the science of Matter. Biology does not study Life in distinction from Matter. It studies the behaviour of living things, and living things are certainly material objects in some sense. Indeed, many biologists are of the opinion (wrongly, I believe), that as time goes on the biological sciences will become a special branch of physical science. As for Psychology, it is a commonplace of its history that it failed completely to develop so long as it was conceived as a science of Mind and that it has only achieved its recent qualified successes by deliberately abandoning this attempt and becoming a science of the behaviour of conscious beings and in particular of human beings. The importance of this lies in the fact that whatever a human being in the psychological sense may be, he is certainly not a mental constituent of Reality. In some sense he is just as much a material object as a brick or a penny whistle. Thus the appeal to common sense draws blank. The natural outlook upon the world provides us with no *prima facie* ground for classifying the constituents of reality into mental and material. Indeed, it suggests a different classification which is incompatible with the dualism.

I imagine that anyone who is at all familiar with modern philosophy might be inclined to retort that everyone knows that the grounds for the Mind-Matter dualism arise in another field altogether, and that I have been deliberately wasting time. Before turning to consider the field in which the ground for the dualism is supposed to lie, I should like to justify my appeal to common sense. If the dualism of Mind and Matter is to have a real *prima facie* basis, the field which we have been considering is the field in which it *ought* to arise. If it does not arise naturally from the straightforward attempt to classify the kinds of things—the specifically different natures—to be found in the world, then that is in itself evidence that there is something wrong with it. For any metaphysical dualism offers itself as a classification, exhaustive and ultimate of the constituents of Reality. If experience shows that it is not possible to organize the detailed investigation of Reality on the basis of this classification, that is strong empirical evidence that the classification is a bad one. Philosophy, like any other systematic inquiry, must start with a classification; and since there is no other way of making a preliminary classification than by an appeal to the obvious and noticeable distinctions in the field of study, philosophy ought to start from the natural classification which common sense provides, especially when that classification is reinforced by the grouping of the sciences which are concerned with the investigation of special parts of the same general field. Indeed, the field to which we must now turn and in which the supposed grounds for the dualism are to be found, is itself the product of the dualistic tendency and presupposes it.

The centre of this field is determined by the perfectly natural and legitimate question, "What am I?" For some reason or other, traditional philosophy does not like to ask this question in its natural form. It prefers to ask, "What is the Self?" This is not, in fact, the same question. It is quite possibly a meaningless question. It is quite certain that I exist, that there is *me*. It is equally certain I submit, that there is *you*. But is there such a thing at all as *the Self*? If there is, it must be something which is as much me as it is you, and therefore, I should have thought, it can be neither you nor me. So I prefer to stick to the natural question, "What am I?" Of course it is mainly in connexion with the Theory of Knowledge that the suggestion of the dualism of Mind and Matter has arisen. But that question is really only a part of the wider question, "What am I?" and it is worth our while to consider the wider question first before coming to that aspect of it which is concerned with our knowledge. Perhaps we can agree in general that the idea of dualism only arises when we consider our own nature. When we contrast Mind and Matter, we are primarily thinking about certain

characteristics which belong to ourselves and to beings like ourselves, and which we are inclined to deny to other things in the world, even to animals. Thus it is only in reference to persons that the dualism arises at all, and persons form a relatively small class of objects in the world as we know it. That in itself suggests that the dualism is not really a metaphysical one but rather a personal one. It is a distinction within one of the natural classes into which common sense divides the constituents of Reality. But let us put this aside, and ask ourselves what it is about persons that suggests a dualism of Mind and Matter? In the first place, they are material objects, at least they have all the characteristics which we usually associate with material objects. They have size and shape and weight and so forth. Incidentally, we should notice that they have all the characteristics of animate things as well. They grow and they reproduce their species. Even within the special class of persons our natural threefold classification insists on reappearing. But they have certain special characteristics which set them in a class apart. They have special ways of behaviour which do not seem to be covered by our ordinary conceptions of what material objects or living creatures are. We need not trouble ourselves at the moment to define or even to enumerate these special characteristics. We need only notice that people cannot be understood or investigated in the same way and through the same conceptions as material objects or even as living organisms, without leaving out something that is of the essence of their nature. Or, to put it more simply and more fundamentally, we cannot deal with people in the way in which we can deal with other things, without frustrating our own efforts and failing in our intentions. But in all this there is no suggestion of a dualism of Mind and Matter.

Indeed, the dualism would never suggest itself but for one fact, that we ourselves, who are carrying on the investigation, belong to this class of things, and that our knowledge of ourselves is very different from our knowledge of other people like ourselves. I know myself from inside, as it were, while I know other people only from outside. I know myself as a set of activities and energies to which I give the general name of consciousness. But I also know myself from outside in the same way as I know you, though not so well. It is worth while to remember that our external knowledge of ourselves is not so complete or satisfactory as our external knowledge of other people. But there is enough of it, perhaps, to enable it to act as a kind of middle term between our knowledge of ourselves and of them. It suggests to us that other people know themselves as we know ourselves, from inside, and that they know us as we know them, from outside. I do not wish to endorse this as an account of how we come to know other persons as persons, but it is certainly

a natural account and true so far as it goes. It indicates, however, how we come to think of ourselves in a dual way, as known from outside and from inside, or to put it in terms of the dualism, from the mental side and from the material side. Here, then, for the first time we come across a fact that seems to suggest a dualism between Mind and Matter so far as persons are concerned. It is not, I believe, the real root of the dualistic illusion, because the formulation of it as a distinction between mental and material aspects, presupposes that we have already adopted the Mind-Matter dualism as a basis of our classification. But we may let that pass for the moment.

Now, if we admit that this suggests a dualism, we must notice that it is not the metaphysical dualism of Mind and Matter. It could only lead us to credit the class of things that we call persons with a dual nature. At most it would suggest that persons consist of a body and a mind, and that these two constituents, as we experience them, are radically different and mutually exclusive. It may be psychologically natural to read this dualism into the nature of Reality as a whole. To do so would be a form of anthropomorphism, for it would consist in projecting what we take to be a characteristic of human beings into the field of objective Reality. The tendency to anthropomorphism, however, does not constitute a good reason for accepting the dualism of Mind and Matter as a metaphysical classification.

But is there any ground for thinking that the double way in which we are aware of ourselves suggests a dualism of mind and body as the proper analysis of persons? It arises only for each of us in one particular case, our own. If we were to forget ourselves and to think only of our experience of other people, we should conclude that they were living beings with certain special peculiarities of behaviour. There would be no *prima facie* suggestion that what we know when we know another person is some combination of a body and a mind. In other words, unless we had already accepted the dualistic classification of persons, we should never use it to interpret our experience of other persons. The dualism of body and mind could only arise through a reflection upon the two ways in which I am aware of myself, through external perception and through introspection. In this case, it is suggested that we are aware of our bodies in external perception and of our minds in introspection.

But are we? Let us examine the inference that is involved. The premiss which we take from our experience is the proposition, "I know myself both from outside and from inside." The conclusion is that "I know my mind and I know my body." It is surely impossible to infer the second from the first. The first implies that

one and the same entity is known in two different ways. The second implies that two different entities are known in one and the same way. The transition is obviously illogical. If introspection is myself knowing a mind, and the external perception is myself knowing a body, then I can be neither the body nor the mind, nor *a fortiori* the two together. If I can properly say that I have a body and also that I have a mind, what is it that has them? If I am a mind, then that mind might perhaps have a body; and if I am a body then possibly that body might have a mind. But I cannot both be a body and have a body, nor can I be a mind and have a mind. Surely if it is true that I know myself in two distinct ways—and that seems incontrovertible—then I cannot consist of a mind and a body which are mutually exclusive. I can properly generalize my experience by saying that it is a characteristic of persons that that have the capacity of knowing themselves in two different ways. To introduce a Mind-Body dualism is to deny this. Therefore, this fact provides no logical grounds even for a dualism of mind and body.

I should like, in this connexion, to draw your attention to a fundamental difference between the dualism of mind and body and the dualism of Mind and Matter. When we distinguish between our minds and our bodies, we are thinking of our bodies not as material objects but as animal organisms. We are contrasting our rational with our animal nature. By body in this antithesis, we do not mean what the physicist means when he says "all bodies gravitate," but when we use the Mind-Matter dualism this is precisely what we mean by "matter." Thus if we came to the conclusion that the Mind-Body dualism was a proper one, that would afford no logical ground for the Mind-Matter dualism. We could not logically pass from the one to the other. If we refer back to the natural threefold division of the constituents of the world into material objects, living beings, and persons, we can see that the Mind-Matter dualism arises, though illegitimately, through a contrast between the first and the third which omits the second, while the Mind-Body dualism arises, though again improperly, from the contrast of the second and third, which omits the first. That is why Descartes, for example, who started from the Mind-Matter dualism, was forced to consider all living beings, with the exception of persons, as automata.

We must now turn to the field in which the dualism of Mind and Matter has been most discussed in modern philosophy—the field of the Theory of Knowledge. If we reject, for philosophical purposes, our natural tendency to limit our thinking to the objective field of what we experience, leaving our experiencing of it out of account, and try to think of the total fact of ourselves experiencing the

world, we have to take a new distinction into account. We have to distinguish between that which knows and that which is known, between the subject and the object. The logical dualism of subject and object describes the fundamental form of any cognitional experience whatever. In any case of knowing, there must be a subject—that which knows, and an object—that which is known. Logically, subject and object are correlative terms which exclude one another. By definition, the subject is that in any instance of knowing which is not the object; and the object is that which is not the subject. Now, in actual fact, it is we who know, and, therefore, it is natural to identify ourselves with the subject in experience. But also we use the term "mind" as a generic term for that which knows, and, therefore, we tend to identify the subject with mind and so ourselves with instances of mind. This is, in fact, the normal way in which the dualism of Mind and Matter appears in modern philosophical discussions. "I am a thinking being," says Descartes, "that is to say, a knower. Mind, in general, is that which knows. Therefore, I am a mind." In other words, the term "subject," "mind," and "self," or "ego," or "I" are all in different references definable as "that which knows." And as soon as mind is identified with the subject it is natural, where the dualistic tendency is already in operation, to identify matter with the object. It is natural, I say, although it is completely illogical. The connexion is purely an association of ideas. If we are operating with a distinction between Mind and Matter and also with a distinction between subject and object, and if there is in the field which we are investigating a ground for identifying the subject with mind, there will be a psychological tendency to identify the object with matter. Thus there is a psychological explanation ready to our hand for the association of the logical dualism of subject and object with the metaphysical dualism of Mind and Matter.

There is, however, no logical justification for this association. In the first place, a logical dualism is formal. A metaphysical dualism is not. A metaphysical distinction is a distinction *in the object.* It is part of the analysis of what is known, and has nothing therefore to do with a logical distinction between what knows and what is known. What knows from a metaphysical point of view is part of what is known, and is, therefore, considered as object. If there is a reason for identifying the subject with mind, there is absolutely none for identifying the object with matter. Indeed, the association at once denies the possibility of metaphysics or even of psychology. For, unless mind can be the object in a case of knowing, there can obviously be no knowledge of mind, and if mind is a constituent of reality, there can then be no knowledge of Reality. But the identification of the object with matter is palpably grotesque, since

no one who makes it ever means (as he ought to mean) that the only objects of knowledge are material ones. The dualism of Mind and Matter is, indeed, the belief that the world which we know—that is to say, the world as object—consists of two kinds of objects, mental and material. To identify the object with matter implies, therefore, that the dualism of Mind and Matter is false, and logically must lead to a pure materialism in metaphysics. Any philosophy, therefore, which confuses the subject-object distinction with the Mind-Matter distinction, is inherently materialistic, however ideal may be the terminology in which it is expressed. The two distinctions have, in fact, no point of contact, and, therefore, the logical distinction between subject and object can never provide any reason for a belief in the dualism of Mind and Matter. Unless we already had the Mind-Matter dualism in our thoughts, the association of the two would never be set up. This in itself indicates that the source of the dualism of Mind and Matter cannot lie in the logical field.

There is another feature of the logical distinction which is, I believe, not usually appreciated, but which is very important for modern philosophy. It is that the distinction between subject and object, however essential it may be for logic, cannot be made the starting-point of any philosophical inquiry into the nature of Reality, because it cannot legitimately be generalized. When I begin to reflect upon my experience, I quite naturally draw a distinction between myself experiencing and what I experience. I have no objection to that distinction. It is quite a proper one. But it is a different distinction for each one of us. If I draw it, it puts me on one side of the line and everything else on the other. If you draw it, it puts you on one side of the line and everything else, including me, on the other. Each person is both subject and object; subject for himself and object for every other subject. If I try to use this distinction between myself and what I experience as the basis of a metaphysical construction (as Descartes did, for example) I imply that I am the only subject and that all other persons are parts of the object-world. I am, in the world, that which knows. Everybody else is part of what is known. I am, in fact, unwittingly committed to solipsism. Solipsism is the philosophical correlative of egoism or individualism. It corresponds to the practical attitude which says "I am the only agent. The rest of the world is material for the service of my selfhood." All individualist philosophy—that is to say, practically all modern philosophy—does illegitimately generalize the subject in order to escape the dilemma of solipsism. It does so by assuming that there are a large number of different "*I's*," yet that all of them, in some mystical sense, are really the same "I" repeated at different points in space and time. That is why it

is driven to talk of *the* Ego or *the* Self or *the* Mind or, in another connexion, *the* Will. For, if the different subjects were really different, they would all have to be credited with different objects, and there would be no common world or Universe for them to discuss or to belong to. But because of its starting-point such philosophy can only produce a pluralism of solipsisms,—a plurality of unrelated worlds—which is of course a blank absurdity. This point is so fundamental that it is difficult even to express it or to become aware of it, since we are all individualists with minds shaped by an individualistic tradition. But it shows itself in the fact that our modern philosophy completely ignores the second person. It is full of Ego and Meum, but it knows nothing of Tu and Tuum. Yet the terms "I" and "You" are strictly correlative, and their correlation is the proper truth in the familiar statement that human nature is essentially social. The "I" in isolation is non-existent. The real unit of rational experience on the subject side is not "I" but "I and You," in mutual relation.

The logical distinction, then, between Subject and Object affords no ground for accepting or even considering a metaphysical dualism of Mind and Matter. To argue that since I am a subject aware of objects, therefore what I am aware of must be divided into material entities and mental entities, is a palpable *non sequitur* of the crudest kind. Is there, then, any other field in which we can hope to discover a *prima facie* ground for entertaining the idea of a dualism of mental and material? There is only one other direction, so far as I can see, in which we may look. It is the distinction between things and images. But before examining this distinction, which comes nearer to suggesting a dualism than any of the others, I should like to dispose of a purely verbal confusion that might tend to blur the argument at this point. All persons have certain capacities, such as thinking, remembering, perceiving, imagining, deciding, and so on, which we are accustomed to describe as *mental* capacities. I can see no objection to this use of the term *mental* so long as we do not read the Mind-Matter dualism into it. We should do this if we implied by the term "mental capacities" that these were the powers of an entity called a "mind." The issue may become clearer if we compare an analogous case. We speak in a similar way of the "vital" functions of organisms. They have such vital capacities as assimilating food and reproducing themselves. But no one imagines that this suggests that "vital functions" means functions of something called "life," which is somehow dualistically conjoined with the bodies of organisms. Why, then, should anyone think that the phrase "mental capacities" means capacities of something called a mind. Surely only because they already have the dualism of Mind and Matter, or rather of Mind and Body in their thinking. This is indeed

characteristic of most arguments advanced in favour of the dualism as well as of a great number (such as Berkeley's) which are raised against it. They are themselves consequences of dualistic thought, and can therefore neither support the dualism nor refute it. They presuppose it.

But the distinction of things and images, or, more satisfactorily, of things that exist and things that are imagined, is on a different footing. In some sense we must admit that there are hosts of things which, as we say, exist only in idea, or are purely imaginary. If, then, we are to begin our philosophical task with a classification of all that there is, must we not start with the distinction between two classes of objects, one class which exists independently and one which exists only "in the mind"? And is not this distinction logically prior to what we called the "natural" classification of things into inanimate, animate, and personal, since that is a classification which refers only to the things which exist independently? Surely here we have at least a *prima facie* case for the dualism of Mind and Matter?

I do not think that it provides even a *prima facie* suggestion of the dualism. The reason why it seems to do so is that we are apt to state the distinction, as I have just done, in terms which are the product of the dualism. If we talk of objects which exist in the mind and objects which exist independently of the mind, we are obviously assuming the existence of the mind as an entity and therefore we have assumed the dualism. Any conclusion in favour of the dualism which we draw from this premiss will inevitably be circular and fallacious. We must first state the distinction in a form which does not assume the dualism. And this is not merely possible, it is the natural way to state it. For common sense the distinction is one between imaginary things and real things. The unicorn, for example, is an imaginary animal, while the horse is a real animal. In this form the distinction offers no *prima facie* ground for dualism; indeed it implies the opposite. For the dualism is a classification of Reality into its real components, while the distinction between real and imaginary things excludes the latter from Reality and implies that they do not exist in Reality and cannot therefore be constituents of it.

But we cannot leave the matter here, because someone will at once object that imaginary objects are part of our experience and that we cannot therefore merely ignore them in a philosophical account of the nature of things. That is of course true, and we must agree that a philosophy which took no account of the imagination and its activities would be ridiculous. But the question is only whether the facts necessitate a dualistic interpretation from the beginning. Now there is one peculiar difficulty which will arise if we answer this question in the affirmative. If we divide

the whole of what we experience into imaginary entities and real entities, and insist that this implies a dualism of Mind and Matter, on which side of the dualism will mind fall? Is my mind an "imaginary" or a "real" entity? If we answer that it is not an imaginary entity we shall have to conclude that every actual mind is a material entity; and that makes nonsense of the dualism. If we reply that mind is an imaginary entity—and that is in my opinion the proper answer—then we must assume that I imagine it, and that I am not an imaginary entity, but a real one; and therefore, in terms of the dualism, that I am a material entity.

Now, common sense maintains that *we produce* the objects of our imagination, and that therefore they depend on us for their existence. Their existence *is* their being imagined. But there is a stream of philosophical tradition which establishes another type of dualism by an implicit denial of this dependence of what is imagined on the person who imagines it. Why, it may be asked, should the objects we imagine (or to use an old phrase of Plato's, who is the main source of this thought), the objects we can only see with the eye of the soul, be more dependent upon us for their existence than the objects we perceive with our bodily senses? This may be taken in either of two ways. We may answer either that what we perceive and what we imagine are equally dependent upon us, or that both are equally independent. The first gives us the Platonic metaphysic with its dualism of two worlds, both independent of the persons who apprehend them; the second gives us modern Idealism in which both real objects and imaginary objects are considered to be equally mind-dependent. But the idealist solution presupposes the Mind-Matter dualism and so does not concern us now; while the Platonic dualism can find no place for the person who both perceives and imagines. He cannot be properly assigned to either of the two worlds and can only be included in the classification at all by the *tour de force* of supposing that he belongs to both at once. To suppose this is to suppose that the same entity is at once real and imaginary.

We must return, then, to our proper question, whether the distinction between real and imaginary objects provides a *prima facie* case for the dualism of Mind and Matter. Since it is a *prima facie* case that we are seeking, we must accept the *prima facie* dependence of imagined objects upon the person who imagines them. Now this provides a *prima facie* case against the dualism, unless we are prepared to make the ridiculous assumption that "I depend upon the activities of my own mind for my existence." The objects which I imagine, so far as they are imaginary objects, and not real objects apprehended through imagination, are functions of my imagining and dependent upon me. I myself am a real object, not an imaginary one, whether I am aware of myself from without or from within.

I recall here this dual self-awareness in order to emphasize the point that in introspection it is *myself* that is apprehended. If, therefore, I am aware through introspection of images or "objects of imagination," I am aware of them as dependent on me, as modifications of my own real nature. These images and ideas, then, if they are in any sense constituent parts of reality, can only be so because they are constituent parts of me. They can be elements in Reality only because I am an element in reality, and not in their own right. I can only contrast them with the rest of Reality by contrasting myself with the rest of Reality. The question about the nature of images is thus part of the question about the nature of persons, and it falls within the natural classification of Reality into inanimate things, living organisms, and persons. It follows that the distinction between things and images cannot provide a *prima facie* case in favour of a dualism of Mind and Matter. At the most it can be construed, and, illegitimately construed, in terms of the dualism, if the dualism has already been presupposed.

The effort to construe the distinction between imaginary entities and real entities as a dualism of Mind and Matter has a very curious corollary which may well form the conclusion of this essay. If by "my mind" I mean the complex of entities which are revealed by introspection, in contrast to the objects which are revealed by the bodily senses, then "my mind" must be a complex imaginary object. Now the characteristic of any imaginary object or mental entity lies in the fact that its "esse" is "imaginari." It exists, that is to say, only in and through the activity which apprehends it. If, then, I cease to think or imagine "my mind," it ceases to exist. If we all were to cease thinking that there is such a thing as mind, there would cease to be such a thing as mind. If, on the other hand, I mean by "my mind" my activities of thinking and perceiving and imagining and so on, if I mean, that is to say, "me thinking," then I am a real entity possessed of these capacities, and there is no need to suppose that I must have a mind in order to possess them. For common sense at least, the "I" that thinks—certainly the "you" that thinks—is an object that can be seen and heard and handled.

I cannot claim that this search for a reason for entertaining the dualism of Mind and Matter is exhaustive. There may be a field which has been overlooked. But it seems to me to reveal such egregious implications of that dualism as to justify a highly sceptical attitude, and to suggest the effort to describe the nature of Reality without assuming a dualistic classification as the proper starting-point of any new philosophical construction. The proper supplement of this essay would be an explanation of how the dualistic illusion arises. Such an inquiry, however, falls within the province of the psychologist rather than of the philosopher.

GREAT THINKERS

(V) AQUINAS

The Rev. LESLIE J. WALKER, S.J., M.A.

From the third century we pass to the thirteenth, from a century in which Europe is still pagan to a century in which Christianity has been so long established there that its paganism is wellnigh forgotten, from a century in which it is ruled by a Roman emperor to one in which ecclesiastically it is still ruled by Rome, but the empire has passed from the Roman to the Teuton.

In the interval until we reach the twelfth century Christendom has produced strangely few thinkers of a philosophical turn of mind. Augustine in the late fourth and early fifth century, Boethius in the late fifth and early sixth, John Scotus Erigena in ninth century are the only outstanding names, until we get to Anselm, Abelard, Gilbert de la Porrée, William of Conches, the Victorines Hugh and Richard, and John of Salisbury. This outburst of Christian thinking in the twelfth century was marked by much originality, but did not last long. By the middle of the century all its leaders were dead with the exception of Richard of St. Victor and John of Salisbury. In its attempt to recover Jerusalem from the Moslem Christendom had already exhausted itself. The warlike spirit of the returning crusaders, the long struggle between Empire and Papacy and between the Emperor and vassal states and republican cities, the wealth of the higher clergy and its attendant abuses conjoined to make the latter half of the century a period of decadence.

The old century closed with a prophet, Joachim of Flores, who inspired Europe with the hope of a new and more spiritual era shortly to begin. The new century opens with a distinguished Pope, Innocent III, who does much to restore papal prestige, to encourage learning, to correct abuses, and to suppress heresy, notably the Albigensian heresy, which at that time was so widespread that he could "exterminate" it only by appeal to the secular arm. To the imperial throne there succeeds an Emperor, notorious for pagan pomp and laxity of morals but eager to reform the Church, Frederick II. With their headquarters at Lyons, the Waldenses, like the Albigenses, whose headquarters were at Toulouse, were sending forth itinerant preachers into Southern France and Northern Italy, denouncing riches, criticizing indulgences, and preaching pacificism. In Paris Amalric of Bène, the friend of Philip Augustus

and tutor to his son, was teaching a pantheism in which the theory of John Scotus Erigena was combined with the doctrine that in the new epoch, foretold by Joachim, the Holy Ghost would become incarnate in all men. After Amalric's death his doctrines were condemned in 1209 and his body exhumed and reburied in unconsecrated ground. By the same Parisian Council that condemned Amalric the reading of Aristotle's *Natural Philosophy* was forbidden under pain of excommunication. Already the works of Aristotle were being eagerly studied in the universities, but thus far only in translations from the Arabic and in Moslem commentaries. They were suspect on that account, and in 1215 the Legate, Robert of Courçon, confirmed the ruling of the Archbishop of Sens, which was further confirmed by Gregory IX in 1231 until such time as new translations could be prepared. Meanwhile two new religious Orders had come into being. The Friars Minor, founded by St. Francis of Assisi, were approved by Innocent III in 1209. The Order of Preachers, founded by St. Dominic, was approved in 1216 by Honorius III.

In the very heart of this Europe a few years later, in 1225 or 1226, a third son was born to the Count of Aquino, the Emperor's cousin, in a castle which stood midway between Naples and Rome. At the age of five he was sent to the Benedictine monastery of Monte Casino, where he remained until the monks were expelled by the soldiers of an excommunicated emperor, on whose side his elder brothers were fighting. Thomas was then sent to Naples, the favourite city of the Emperor, who had recently founded there a university. In it the Dominicans were already established, and it was under them that Thomas studied until his eighteenth year, when he decided himself to join the Order, to the regret of his mother, who had hoped through papal influence to obtain for him the Abbacy of Monte Casino. In order to escape his irate family the young Dominican was hurried to Rome and thence set out for Paris, but was intercepted by his brothers and imprisoned in his ancestral home. Every inducement was employed, even that of a harlot, to dissuade Thomas from his purpose, but in vain. After some two years of confinement he escaped, and, after an interview with the Pope, travelled on foot with John the Teuton, the general of his Order, to Paris and thence on to Cologne, where Albert, the greatest light of the Dominicans, was then lecturing. The facts themselves testify to the esteem in which the new recruit was already held. Of him his Order expected great things.

During the thirty years that remained to him Thomas Aquinas more than fulfilled these expectations. He lectured continually in Paris both on the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard and on the text of Aristotle. In almost all the great controversies of the day he played

a leading part. His Order relied much on his experience in the organization of its studies, and he was frequently called upon to make long journeys to attend chapters or to visit the Curia in Rome. He was consulted by three successive Popes and was on his way to the Council of Lyons when death overtook him in 1274. Despite these activities, the works that come from his pen are so numerous and so long that they occupy in the Vives edition thirty quarto volumes. He wrote lengthy commentaries on the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard, on two of Boethius's works, on the Divine Names of the pseudo-Dionysius, on the treatise *De Causis*, which he recognizes as substantially identical with a work of Proclus, and on almost every one of the works of Aristotle. He wrote two *Summas*, a *Summa contra Gentiles*, and in later life the *Summa Theologica*. He also compiled several long treatises and a considerable number of shorter ones on various theological and philosophical topics. He is no less at home in discussing the ethics of trading, the theory of kingship, the nature of angels, and the beliefs of Islam and of the Greeks than he is in discussing the power of God, essence and existence, the problem of evil, the nature of truth, the function of the human intellect, the eternity of the world, or the hypostatic union of the incarnate Word. He is as familiar with the theories of Avicenna and Averroes, of Maimonides and Avicebron, as he is with those of Augustine or Aristotle himself. Of him Professor A. E. Taylor has rightly said that he did not merely revive Aristotle and follow him blindly. "What he effected for the first time in history since the expiry of Neo-platonic learning in the sixth century was a magnificent and original synthesis of past philosophical thought. He took his materials freely from the whole record of the classic past, so far as it lay open to him, and what he constructed out of them was no chaotic eclecticism, but a coherent system, welded into a unity by the presence throughout its details of a few great ruling principles won by permanent hard thinking and held with the clearest consciousness of their implications" (Art. on "St. Thomas as a Philosopher" in *St. Thomas Aquinas*; Blackwell, 1925).

The main problem which confronted Christian thinkers in the thirteenth century was the attitude which they were to adopt toward the philosophy of Aristotle, the knowledge of which in its entirety was for the first time being disseminated in Western Europe. In the accepted theological textbook of the day, Peter Lombard's *Sentences*, there is but one reference to Aristotle, who is mentioned as having taught that the world is eternal and has a triple origin, not a single one in God. When his physical and metaphysical treatises were translated into Latin, they were regarded by ecclesiastical authorities with grave suspicion, for they were reputed to contain and actually had given rise to many theories incompatible with the

Christian faith. William of Auvergne, who was Bishop of Paris from 1228 to 1249, scoffs at the idea of pure spirits who have to turn the heavens round in order to attain the love of God, and regards the Aristotelian theory of two intelligences, one active and the other passive, as mere fiction. Alexander of Hales and John de la Rochelle, his Franciscan contemporaries, while ascribing to abstraction our knowledge of this world, maintain that the human intellect faces two ways, and that its knowledge of necessary truth is derived by way of illumination from the First Truth, which is God. The Franciscan school at Oxford, though insisting much on the importance of experiment and observation, holds that illumination is essential if we are to know anything beyond this world, and to this source Roger Bacon ascribes the wisdom not only of Christian but also of pagan philosophers.

The most carefully reasoned defence of this, the Augustinian position, comes from the pen of St. Bonaventure, St. Thomas's contemporary and friend. Of this world, which is transient and ever changing, there can be no exact knowledge. Knowledge, if it is to be certain, immutable, and exact, presupposes communion with the eternal realm of truth itself. Knowledge proper is neither *of* this world nor is it derived from this world. Terms, propositions, and inferences alike in the moral, the metaphysical, and the mathematical order, presuppose, not indeed the vision of God nor yet the vision of the eternal nature of things as they are ordered in the divine mind, but at least the operation of these eternal natures on our own minds as regulative and motive principles. Relative to created things it is not merely as exemplars that eternal natures function; they function also as cognitive principles relative to human knowledge. The theory of abstraction will account for the *genera* and *species* under which we classify natural objects, but it will not account for judgments of value or for the formation of ideals, whether they be moral ideals or ideals of beauty or those ideally perfect figures which are the object of mathematics, for such ideals are never realized adequately by any natural object.

Though for Aristotle's natural philosophy Bonaventure has the greatest respect, he is severely critical both of his metaphysic and of his theory of knowledge. He complains that for the Platonic ideas, which are basic alike to the theory of created being and to the theory of human knowing, Aristotle has nought but contempt. From his list of causes he, Aristotle, omits the exemplary cause, which is the Augustinian equivalent of the Platonic idea, and is thence led to deny that God knows anything beyond Himself, and so to repudiate both divine foreknowledge and divine providence, and in its place to substitute either chance or blind necessity, which in turn does away with the possibility of human merit and divine

punishment and reward. His theory of an eternal world conjoined with his theory of intelligence implies either that there are an infinity of souls or that the soul is corruptible or that it migrates from body to body or that there is but one intelligence common to all men. The First Mover, whose existence Aristotle proves, is not that divine Being whom Christians worship, who is the ground of all truth, and is present to every human soul.

Such was the attitude which the majority of Christian professors and theologians, both regular and secular, adopted towards Aristotle at the time when Aquinas began to lecture in Paris in 1251. Aquinas, on the other hand, is already a convinced Aristotelian. Upon the traditional doctrines of the schools, summarized in the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard, he puts an Aristotelian interpretation wherever possible, and in the light of Aristotelian doctrine seeks to determine points in dispute. In his *de Ente et Essentia* he explains in an Aristotelian sense the relation of being and of essence to the *genera* and *species* under which we classify them. In his *de Principiis Naturae* he accounts for the behaviour of natural bodies in terms of Aristotle's four causes—material formal, efficient, and final. In the *de Potentia* he connects up this doctrine with that of divine creation and conservation. In the *de Veritate* he discusses the nature of truth, the extent of God's knowledge, the function of ideas in the divine mind, providence, predestination, the nature of angelic knowledge, of human knowledge, and of prophecy.

An "idea" for Aquinas is the form which, in the intention of a purposive agent, a thing is to reproduce. Since God is the creator of a world, there must be ideas in the divine mind, and since creatures are manifold these ideas must be many, and must comprise not only *genera* and *species* but individuals. Such ideas are "exemplars"; but they are not, properly speaking, causes. They are the finite ways in which God sees that His essence can be copied by creatures; it is not the ideas, but He, who produces creatures. They are *principia generationis* relative to creatures and *principia cognitionis* relative to God, since it is in them that He knows the creatures in which they are reproduced; but they are not "subsistent" ideas, nor substances, nor yet do they constitute a fifth type of cause. As Aristotle said rightly, of causes there are but four.

Thus far St. Thomas keeps closely to the Augustinian tradition, though he interprets it in an Aristotelian sense. It is in his theory of knowledge that he breaks with it, yet with caution, for he still uses Augustinian terminology though to its terms he assigns a new meaning which in some respects is the negation of Augustinian theory. Not only in his earlier works, but in his later works also, he speaks of first principles in the order of knowledge as "innate," of their being "impressed" upon our minds by God, as also is the

natural law, and of our beholding the nature of the soul "in inviolable truth." But, though the words are those of Augustine, the doctrine which underlies them is that of Aristotle. For Augustine all that pertains to the realm of nature is phenomenal and transient; in it there is nothing stable, so that of it we can make no true judgments, but can only apply to it standards and values from which it ever falls short, standards and values of which we have cognizance, not through sense perception, but in so far as we share in eternal laws and ideals ever present to God. This standpoint is that of Plato, as St. Thomas points out; Aristotle's way was different. For him there is something stable in the objects of sense; they are substances of which the essences endure amid phenomenal change: of their proper objects each sense forms true judgments; and, above sense, there is an intellectual power which judges of truth "not by means of intelligibles which exist outside it, but by the light of the active intellect which makes things intelligible" (*de Spiritualibus Creaturis*, a. 10). It is this intellectual power that is impressed on man's mind by God and is innate—nothing else, for at the outset intelligence is a *tabula rasa*. First principles are innate only in the sense that it is by this innate intellectual power that we abstract their constituent terms from the objects of sense-perception, recognize the necessary connections that hold between them, and, having done so, form habits of thought in which they function as axiomatic principles and constitute the basis of all scientific reasoning. When this reasoning obeys the laws which intelligence has thus formulated, we contemplate inviolable truth, but we do not contemplate it in the mind of God, nor yet in a realm apart. Though it may be analogous to what exists before the mind of God, in itself it is but the product of our own thinking, which is primarily of essences that exist in this world and secondarily of the powers involved in the apprehension of them.

The "light" which in Augustinian theory comes from God, in Thomist theory is transferred to man's intelligence, in the activity of which God concurs as he does in all natural activities, but not in a special way as the Augustinians maintained. It is in the light of his own intelligence that man beholds the nature of created things, simple things at first, whence he passes to the recognition of their implications. Nor, in spite of opinions to the contrary, does St. Thomas make any distinction here between moral principles and speculative principles. It is with respect to their objects that they differ. Moral principles are concerned with goodness and speculative principles with being. Both goodness and being, however, are to be found in the created world, so that there is no need to look elsewhere for the source of those primitive notions which lie at the root of either moral or speculative laws. To the contention of

Augustine that, since the wicked recognize a moral law which they fail to obey, they cannot derive such knowledge from their own nature or habits of mind, but must derive it direct from the "book of light" which is eternal truth, St. Thomas answers that "first principles of action are perceived, just as are the first principles of the speculative sciences, by the light of the active intellect" (*De Spiritualibus Creaturis*, a. 10, ad. 9). This light is a "participated light" in that we receive it from God. It is, however, a created light, not a divine light, and exists within and proceeds from our own minds. Hence it is not the moral law itself that is implanted within us, any more than the axioms of geometry are implanted within us. What is implanted within us is the power to formulate such laws and axioms, given the requisite sense-data and the requisite knowledge of human nature and human society.

Successfully to have defended so revolutionary a theory of knowledge, entailing as it does the discarding of the traditional Augustinian position in regard to the source of human certainty and the origin of human science, was in itself no small accomplishment in view of the issues at stake and the authorities that, both in the universities and in episcopal sees, were ranged against it. It is not on this solely, however, or even mainly, that Aquinas's reputation depends. His claim to fame rests not upon his brilliant interpretation and ingenious defence of the Aristotelian position, but upon the fact that he saw its bearing on Christian doctrine, realized that if adopted it would mean the rewriting of the whole of Christian theology, and in his two *Summas* successfully carried out this gigantic task.

The later and larger *Summa* is primarily a theological treatise, written ostensibly for beginners, though in fact it covers the whole theological field. The earlier *Summa contra Gentiles*, on the other hand, is addressed to the whole world, to the infidel, the Moslem, the Christian, the heretic, and the Jew; and contains a defence of Christian doctrine based primarily on the principles of Aristotelian philosophy. The limits which this philosophy imposes upon the scope of human knowledge St. Thomas frankly accepts. If "knowledge begins with sense-perception," it follows that "the human intellect can understand what is not itself an object of sense-perception only in so far as it can acquire such knowledge with the aid of sense-perception" (1, c. 2). The essences of perceptible things, such as stones and triangles, the human intellect is capable of apprehending, but of God, who is imperceptible, it can know only *that* He is, not *what* He is. That intelligible world which Plato affirmed but Aristotle repudiated, still exists for Aquinas in the divine mind, but of it man has no immediate cognizance. Hence for the Christian there are two realms of truth, one accessible to human reason, the other transcending it and knowable only in so

far as it has been divinely revealed. The position of the twelfth century is thus reversed. Philosophy and dogmatic theology are assigned to separate compartments. Faith and reason, though not incompatible, are none the less divorced.

From an Aristotelian standpoint the traditional proofs of God's existence also have to be revised. We can no longer appeal, with Augustine, to the realm of eternal ideas, since to human minds these are inaccessible. Neither can we, with Anselm, argue from the nature of God to His existence, since of His nature we have no immediate knowledge. There is but one legitimate way of proving God's existence—by appeal to the character of the perceptible world, which does exist, with a view to discovering its nature and implications.

To this task St. Thomas devotes the first Book of the *Contra Gentiles*. If it can be shown, as he thinks Aristotle has shown, that (*a*) no motion is purely spontaneous and (*b*) that in the order of movers an infinite regress is impossible, the existence of motion implies ultimately the existence of a first immovable Mover. This Mover Aquinas identifies with God, and then proceeds to the deduction of other attributes. Immovability implies immutability, he argues, and so not only eternal existence, but also that God is such that He can in no wise *undergo* change; and again that He must be simple, not composite, since, if composite, change would be possible. Seeing that changelessness and eternal existence are ascribed by Aristotle to the heavens, and St. Thomas holds that it is impossible to disprove this except by appeal to faith, the proof that God is incorporeal presents some difficulty. St. Thomas argues therefore to incorporeality from simplicity, since this excludes the possibility of there being parts in God which would exist if He were indeed a body. Simplicity also implies, St. Thomas urges, the negation of any real distinction between essence and existence or between God and the attributes we ascribe to Him. Wherefore, since God is identical with being, He must possess being in its plenitude, and so be all-perfect, and, if all-perfect, must be the highest good.

From perfection St. Thomas deduces yet other attributes. Unlike Richard of St. Victor, who from the perfection of God infers a plurality of persons on the ground that if goodness is to be perfect it must be shared, Aquinas holds that perfection implies unity, since, if there be many of whom each is all-perfect, there will be no ground for distinguishing one from the other. From perfection he deduces also infinitude and intelligence, which, if infinite, must embrace the knowledge at once of self and of all possible beings. The eternal ideas of Augustine are thus re-established as the realm in which God contemplates all the ways in which His infinite nature can be finitely reproduced.

It remains only to find a ground for affirming volition of God

and Aristotle's First Mover will have been converted by Aristotelian logic into the Creator in whom Christians believe. This ground St. Thomas finds in intelligence which, recognizing that the object which it contemplates is good, deems it also to be desirable, and so evokes the will for it to be. Nor does will rest there. In willing itself, it wills also all that intelligence embraces, and so wills what is other than itself; but with itself as the end, the highest good that the universe is somehow to attain. Creatures are a means to this end. Wherefore, since there are a variety of ways in which the end can be attained, there is scope for election, and the actual world emerges as the product of free choice.

In the Second Book St. Thomas argues from the position thus established to the nature of the creatures which the universe must contain if the creation of it is to manifest the source whence it proceeds. Since in the order of being God pre-exists all else, it must be out of nothing that creatures are produced, and so to produce things will be the peculiar attribute of God. The creatures of God, therefore, must be other than God; but it does not necessarily follow that they cannot be eternal. The most we can do there is to refute the arguments which purport to prove them to be eternal, which St. Thomas proceeds to do. He then discusses the various grounds that have been alleged for the diversity of creatures; and concludes that diversity is not due to chance, nor to diversity of matter, nor to the intervention of other causes, nor to merit, but to the express intention of God who wills His creatures to be as perfect as it is possible for each of them to be.

The created world, if not a best possible world at the outset, must at least be capable of becoming a best possible world if it is to realize its end. It must contain, therefore, a hierarchy of being, St. Thomas argues, so that it may manifest the perfection of its Creator in all possible ways and degrees. Within it there must be pure intelligences as well as intelligences united to bodies, not indeed in Plato's way but in Aristotle's—as the forms of the bodies which they animate. There must also be in man not only a potential intellect capable of knowing, but also an active intellect which, operating on the data of perception, enables man to acquire knowledge. Though the soul which contains these intellects becomes one substance with the body as soon as the latter has reached an appropriate stage of development, it will not perish with the body, but is immortal. So too *a fortiori* are pure intelligences which, since they are not united to bodies, must each be of a different species ordered in angelic hierarchy.

The Third Book deals with creatures from the standpoint of their end. After discussing the nature of final causes, the position of evil in the scheme of things, the different ways in which things seek and attain their ends, and the relation of the heavens to intellectual

substances, St. Thomas proceeds to establish his main point, which is that for intellectual substances, inclusive of man, their natural end is the understanding of God; whence it follows that man's ultimate happiness will consist in the contemplation of God. He then argues that in this life we cannot understand intellectual substances of a higher order than our own, nor yet our own except by inference from its activities, nor yet *a fortiori* the essence of God. In this life, therefore, man's ultimate happiness can never be attained, nor can it be attained by man's natural powers. In order to see God, there is required an influx of divine light, which will make man a participant of that eternal life from which otherwise he is cut off, and so will satisfy all his desires, which otherwise must remain to some extent without fulfilment. Aquinas has transferred the "illumination" of the Augustian to the supernatural order.

There follows a discussion of providence, of its relation to natural causes, to events that are not necessary but contingent, to free-will and chance; of the way in which providence uses intellectual creatures (angels and men) in the governance of other creatures, and celestial bodies in the governance of all inferior forms of body; of its connection with prayer, with the course of natural events, and with miracles, magicians, and demons. Then the author discusses how law, worship, marriage, the counsels, poverty, sin, punishment, rewards, and finally grace, fit into the general scheme of things as already set forth.

In the erection of this vast superstructure upon the basis of perceptual knowledge it is to reason, and reason alone, that Aquinas appeals. Only in the Fourth Book, where there is question of specifically Christian beliefs, such as belief in the Trinity and Incarnation, the Sacraments, and the Resurrection, does he rely, and that explicitly, on the revelation made by Christ and on the teaching of the Church. That the perceptual origin which he ascribes to all natural human knowledge to a certain extent vitiates the conclusiveness of the arguments adduced the author frankly confesses in the Introduction to his Fourth Book, and both there and elsewhere alleges that it is in order to confirm and supplement natural knowledge that revelation has been vouchsafed. Whether his arguments are valid or whether his superstructure will stand on so feeble a basis it is impossible here to inquire. In the following century a new school of Christian thought denied this, alleging that, though it is under concepts that we think of things, we do not by this means discern the nature of things. Descartes was of the same opinion, but, be that as it may, there is in the whole history of human thought no thinker who surpasses St. Thomas in constructive genius, or whose system, once it has been constructed, hangs so well together.

NATIONALISM AND THE INTERNATIONAL IDEAL

W. D. LAMONT, M.A., D.PHIL.

"NATION" and "nationalism" are not easily defined; mainly, perhaps, because these words, as popularly used, do not have precise meanings. A nation may mean: (1) A people living under a common government,—as when we speak of British or French "nationals"; or (2) A people with a common racial inheritance—the Jews; or (3) A people, inhabiting a certain tract of the earth's surface, with generally common sentiments and habits of thinking, though possibly of mixed race, and part of a wider political society—the English, as distinguished from the Scottish, or Irish, nation.

As clarity of thought requires that we should use our terms with an unambiguous meaning, I may be permitted to confine the use of the term "nation" to this third sense. The main question to be discussed in this paper is whether the nation-state, as we know it to-day, must be accepted as a permanent factor in social organization—whether all political theory and practical politics must simply take for granted the existence of national sovereign states; the theory and the art of politics being confined to questions about the internal organization, and external relations, of these permanent units. To discuss such an issue, and to ask whether it is possible to give nations a place in a political order very different from the present, obviously demands that we use the word "nation" to mean a community which may be, but is not necessarily, a sovereign state. It is hardly necessary to define what I mean by "sovereignty," as that, I trust, will become clear as we proceed.

I have little—if anything—original to say. I wish, simply, to focus attention on certain problems which are agitating many reflective minds at the present day; for the answers we give to these questions are vitally important for the future.

In our day we find two apparently conflicting ideas claiming the allegiance of mankind—the idea of nationalism, and the idea of internationalism. We have, on the one hand, Germany, Italy, Japan, Ireland, and India exhibiting a vigorous national consciousness. We have, on the other hand, the existence of the League of Nations, the recent entry of Russia to the League, and the increasing tendency in the U.S.A. towards abandoning the traditional policy of isolation. We have the tendency to think of the national life as frustrated and incomplete if it lacks the attribute of state sovereignty; and we have

an equally influential body of opinion which regards the nation-state as owing allegiance to a system of law and order above and beyond itself. Is the conflict between these two tendencies merely apparent, or is it real? If one is right, must the other be wrong?

From one point of view there is a fairly simple and straightforward answer to this question. The nationalist and the internationalist sentiments are not opposed. They are, indeed, complementary expressions of the one social ideal—the ideal of an international democracy. Within any particular state, the process by which a democracy displaces an oligarchy or tyranny has, necessarily, two aspects. On the one hand, the claim of each individual to self-determination, as against the arbitrary power of any other individual, is asserted and vindicated. But it can be vindicated only by extensive common control, and by the submission of each and all to rules of law. Similarly—with regard to nations—if the relations of Britain and India are matters on which the British Government claims to speak the final word, then India has not secured that degree of national equality and self-determination which is a fundamental condition of that democracy of nations for which the international ideal stands. To a very real extent every intense nationalist movement at the present day is an assertion, rather than a denial, of those moral principles on which a healthy internationalist sentiment must be founded. Or, if it is too much to say that the outstanding nationalist movements now assert these principles, it is, at least, true that they have begun by expressing them.

But the more we recognize the compatibility of the nationalist and the internationalist sentiments, the more important does it become that we should clearly apprehend the ethical principle of which these two sentiments are, in some respects, complementary aspects. There is grave danger in assuming that everything about the nationalist temper is sound; and there is an equally grave danger in accepting what, at first sight, appears to be a perfectly innocent and legitimate assumption—the assumption that the proper relations between nations can be understood by our regarding them as completely analogous to the moral relations between individuals. We have, ourselves, made use of this analogy, illustrating the two complementary aspects of an "international democracy" by considering the rights and the obligations of the individual in a democratic state. But this analogy must not be pressed too far. The motive power in the development towards democratic institutions is the conception of the individual as the "source of all values," and of his welfare as the end for which all social institutions exist. I shall deal with this subject more fully below. At the moment, I only wish to indicate what will happen if we unduly press the analogy between the individual and the nation or nation-state. Regarding the nation-

state as "the individual writ large," we shall be led to the mistaken view that the nation-state (and not the individual) is the source of all values, attributing to it a kind of personality, and not only measuring all other institutions by their capacity to contribute to its welfare, but also looking on individuals as living only in and for its life, and acquiring their value from what they contribute to its welfare and strength. We shall think of the nation-state as the "permanent unit," as that which is to be taken absolutely for granted in all our political theorizing and practical statesmanship. And such a view of the nation-state, or any other form of state, is contrary, not only to any defensible principle of ethics, but also to the development of any efficient international co-operation for human welfare.

I shall now state, briefly, what is to be the main contention of this paper. I contend that to regard the nation-state as the permanent or ultimate unit of political organization is a false and mischievous view. So far as any form of nationalism maintains, or implies, that the national life lacks an essential attribute if it lacks the powers of a sovereign state, then that form of nationalism, I am prepared to say, exhibits a retrograde mentality.

The rest of this article will be an explanation and elaboration of this view.

As men increase their mastery over the forces of nature, the range of their activities widens; and, as the range of activity widens, there is a natural tendency towards increasing intimacy and co-operation between peoples in different parts of the world. This tendency is cribbed and distorted, though it cannot be entirely frustrated, in a world order where completely independent, or sovereign, authority is claimed and exercised by separate nation-states; and the interference with the tendency to internationalization effectively limits economic and cultural progress.

How this interference occurs will become most clear if we consider the effects exercised on each other by economic and political interests. We are familiar with the old saw that "trade follows the flag." Equally important is the fact that the flag tends to follow trade. To take one example:—owners of capital participate in an Egyptian loan; and, that the interest of the bond-holders may be secured, Egypt ultimately becomes virtually subject to the British Government. In the absence of counteracting influences, economic relations tend to become more and more extensive; and, at the same time, they tend to drag political relations in their train. The counteracting influences are most negligible, and the above noted tendencies are, therefore, most clearly operative, where a commercially enterprising nation-state is dealing with backward or undeveloped countries. For such countries the history of their contact with the

outer civilized world follows a fairly uniform course: discovery, exploration, intensification of commercial relations, and, finally, incorporation as part of an "empire."

This process of political incorporation is effectively checked, however, where the economic relations are between two sovereign states of approximately equal strength and social development. The natural tendency to political unification is, in the nature of the case, prohibited and inhibited; and, inevitably, the development of economic intimacy is also stunted. Each state wishes to preserve its sovereign independence, and to secure itself against external domination. Its independence is always in jeopardy if the state lacks self-sufficiency. It will, therefore, discourage the tendency to international division of labour, if that international specialization would lead to the neglect of industries necessary to its self-sufficiency. And, quite apart from any fear of active aggression on the part of its neighbours, each state has the responsibility for the welfare of its citizens. It must, if possible, prevent the disappearance of home industries on account of successful foreign competition. And, with this end in view, it checks the movements of industry and commerce by the weapons of tariffs, subsidies, etc.

Thus, while the natural tendency in economic relations is towards greater and greater internationalization, yet, where there are firmly established sovereign nation-states, the political tendency is towards self-sufficiency; and because the economic and the political interests are each trying to drag the other into acceptance of its own boundaries, the present political world-order makes for a ceaseless tug-of-war between the economic and the political interests.

Now, the existence of this tension or conflict means that we must make up our minds to a choice between two things: (1) The preservation of national state-sovereignty, or (2) A higher standard of life for all men, including our own countrymen. No doubt many of us would like both of these things. That the second is desirable, no decent person would deny; and the preachers of nationalism and imperialism in Britain are at least interested in the welfare of their own fellow-countrymen. But they dislike the idea of "foreigners having the right to tell us how we ought to behave, and to poke their noses into our affairs." They want, in a word, complete sovereign authority to be vested in the national will, as well as a greatly increased standard of living for our nationals. My contention is that they cannot have both. Of course, I do not mean that *no* advance in the standard of living conditions is possible within the existing political world-order. New discoveries, improved technique in production and distribution, and the use of neglected natural resources may do a great deal. I mean, simply, that, at any given time, the total benefit which it is possible to derive from these things

cannot be appropriated under the conditions which are involved in the existing political world-order.

Why this should be so becomes clear on a little reflection. If we could picture a country cut off from all contact with the rest of the world, and ruled by a central government, there political and economic relations would have the same boundaries. We can see how, in principle, such a country would be able to deal effectively with many of our vexing problems. Extremes of poverty and wealth, the unwholesome conditions under which so many workers are compelled to live, the miseries of unemployment owing to restrictions of trade—for these there is no real necessity or moral justification. We know what immensely beneficial effects were wrought, in the way of overcoming similar evils, when mediaeval restrictions on industry and commerce were first given up, and later replaced by judicious social legislation and the expenditure of public money on education, sanitation, etc. History seems to show that, while there is a wrong way, there is also a right way of controlling the economic life of a community. The point of importance is that this control must be exercised, or must at least be supervised, by a central government. There are immense possibilities in the matter of controlling industry and commerce for the general welfare, once a central political authority extends over the whole range of persons who have economic relations with each other.

But, in the political conditions of the contemporary world, the people of Britain, of France, of Germany, or of Japan have no constitutional method of controlling the conditions under which the others are to produce and distribute their goods; and, consequently, no single people can properly control even its own industry and commerce for the general benefit. It would be very satisfactory if we could shorten working hours, and raise the standard of living, for the workers in certain of our industries. But, as changes in this direction would influence cost of production, any attempt to improve the standard might result in our losing our foreign markets, owing to the competition of cheap goods from other countries; and the last state of affairs would be worse than the first. It is perfectly possible that, from the point of view of world economics, it does not really "pay" for us to produce the goods in question. But what will happen if we cease to compete? If industries move from one area to another *within* the same state, there is a corporate responsibility to ease, and, as far as possible, prevent any hardship to the inhabitants of the district from which the industry has moved. But these obligations do not hold as between the members of different states. The Japanese will not be taxed for the purpose of starting new profitable industries in Switzerland, if Japan captures the market for the watch-making industry.

It is difficult for a layman to discuss economic issues without committing himself to indefensible judgments; but I do not suppose any present-day economist of repute would challenge the general position I have taken up. My view is this: While, under the existing political system, improvements in the standard of living may well continue, the possibilities of improvement can never be given full effect, so long as the free commerce of nations is hampered by considerations of self-sufficiency; and it is obvious that these hampering restrictions are necessarily involved in any world-system which assigns sovereign powers to a number of independent nation-states.

Now, why should we consider it out of the question that the nation-state should disappear in favour of some more inclusive form of political organization? Nation-states are of comparatively recent growth. As increasing intimacy and commerce between communities have demanded, earlier independent political units have gradually become incorporated in larger wholes. Why should this process stop at the point we have now reached? What valid reason can we give for asserting that no further advance is desirable, or even possible? By what standard do we judge the *desirability* of remaining where we are or advancing to some form of international polity, except the standard of expediency? And how do we judge of the *possibility* of such an ultimate goal, except by the attempt to interpret present experience in the light of the past? It is true that "history does not repeat itself"; but it is also true that "like causes produce like effects"; and it is my view that the days of the nation-state are numbered.

No doubt the anticipation of an international polity will be described by some as a Utopian dream; but we can hardly be expected to answer such criticisms, until they descend from the woolly clouds of dogmatism to earth, and formulate specific reasons as to why any such anticipation must be unrealizable. There are, however, some criticisms of a more definite character with which we ought to deal, and I shall now discuss one objection which may present itself to the reflective mind.

The whole of the preceding argument, it may be said, concentrates on economic questions. But, even if the argument for an international polity were, so far, sound, does it not leave out of account interests which are far more important than are the conditions of material welfare? There is no such thing as a merely "economic man," the critic may continue; and, if we attempt to break down all group and national boundaries, and stir universal humanity into one indiscriminate mess, are we not destroying the conditions on which all the richness and loyalties of life are founded? Is it not a valid criticism of Plato's ideal state that, in his attempt to secure loyalty

to the state by abolishing the family, and in his attempt to prevent the misuse of property by abolishing private property, he was blind to the fact that you cannot make men more enthusiastic about a wider community by merely abolishing the narrower, nor can you increase their care of the public interest by denying them the opportunity of having any interests of their own? And is not this criticism even more applicable when we are trying to whip up enthusiasm, not for a small Greek city state, but for a supra-national political world-order?

In answer to all this, I may begin by agreeing that this criticism points to a real danger against which the advocates of internationalism must guard their practical policy. But it should be remembered that much of Plato's unsatisfactoriness is due to his conception of the state as "the individual writ large." There is some truth in the common idea that, for Plato, the state, rather than the individual, is the object of ultimate value. I have held, on the contrary, that the state has no intrinsic value. Its value is instrumental. The same holds good with respect to any international polity. Institutions of all kinds, national or supra-national, are valuable and legitimate seats of authority only so far as they are necessary for conserving and enriching the interests of individuals. I do not suggest that families, local communities, and nations should be dissolved, in favour of some universal human herd containing within itself no diversity of interest or local culture. I am only arguing that, in the interest of national, local, and, ultimately, of individual development, certain powers, now exercised by nation-states in their severality, should be pooled and centralized in a more universal authority, because it is no longer possible for those powers to remain so localized, and efficiently serve the purposes of humanity. The fact that central governments often find that the interests of a people can be more effectively dealt with by the decentralization of certain functions of government, does not in any way detract from the argument that there are certain powers which ought to be centralized.

But the objection may be pressed that, whatever the intention, yet, in actual fact, local diversities, and what we may call local cultures, tend to disappear with the extension of the range of political authority. Government's hatred of diversity is no less intense than nature's abhorrence of a vacuum; and the picturesque and traditional have but a forlorn champion in romance, when pitted against the power of the sword and the lure of gold.

Now, we cannot deny that governments have sometimes, by barbarous methods, succeeded in stamping out the native language, religion, or custom of relatively small communities over which they have extended their rule; but, in relation to this point, two things must be borne in mind. In the first place, not everything in religion

and custom is beneficial to the local community or to humanity at large. Obvious examples are the practice of human sacrifice, or a caste system such as obtains in India. In the second place, there is a difference between the wise and the foolish, the legitimate and the illegitimate use of political authority. The argument for a supra-national authority is founded on the ethical principle that individuals, not institutions, are of primary worth; and there is no reason at all why a wider political authority should be less capable than is a narrower authority of using this ethical principle for measuring the value of different cultures and institutions to different peoples. Indeed, it is arguable that the wider the authority, the more chance legitimate variations have of being safeguarded. With all its faults, the Versailles Treaty has tried to secure the protection of minority rights which national governments are prone to disregard.

Further, it would be ridiculous to suppose that, when local diversities disappear, this always happens against the will of the peoples concerned. It is probably true that the most powerful factor influencing such changes is the belief of the local community itself that its own interest dictates the abandonment of its old traditions and habits. This holds specially, e.g. with regard to language. In his *Memories*, published a few years ago, the Archbishop of Wales relates: "When I was a boy, I heard a Welsh lecture in a Methodist Chapel given to an audience of working people, chiefly farmers and farm servants, by a brilliant lecturer, Dr. Kilsby Jones. He finished his lecture on 'Famous Welshmen' with this sentence, 'Boys, if you want to succeed in the world, learn English. Remember, Welsh is a barley-bread language.' " No doubt the disappearance of local peculiarities involves loss as well as gain. But the losses and gains have to be estimated, not from the point of view of the sentimental nationalist whose bread and butter—with a fair allowance of jam—are secure, nor from the point of view of the tourist who is intrigued by what is "cute," "quaint," or "picturesque," but from the point of view of the toiling population. Certainly uniformity is not an end in itself. But neither is diversity. The test of the value of all local custom and usage is this: Does it, rather than something different, most conduce to the real welfare of the individuals concerned? And, as inertia is a characteristic of men and of societies, any abandonment of traditional usage is a prima facie (though, of course, it cannot be a conclusive) argument against its value.

In any case, it is disastrous to try and keep a culture alive and healthy by isolating the community from external influences. The deadening effects of such a policy are amply revealed in those institutional religions which try to preserve their original modes of thought and practice by insulating them from the outer world of

ideas. Restriction of the free intercourse of ideas is as ruinous to cultural development as tariff walls are to material prosperity. While the seed-bed and the seed of any culture are the land and the people, influences from abroad are as the air and sunlight without which that seed cannot reveal its potentialities. And if the establishment of an international polity tended to promote the free movement of ideas, and the free criticism of tradition, it would be the friend rather than the enemy of a richer national life.

This, it may be objected, is all very plausible—until we cease from abstract argumentation, and turn to face hard realities. Is it not true that there is something about a nation which marks it off from every other form of community? And is there not something unique about the nation-state, giving it a status in the world which we interfere with only at the cost of irreplaceable loss?

I cannot agree that this is so. Indeed, I should say that it is precisely this view, rather than the one I have been pressing, which refuses to face the facts of history and the meaning of the modern situation. Accept clearly and frankly the principle that value resides ultimately in individual persons; then put the question, posed with such salutary effect by the reformers of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, "What is the utility to mankind of this or that particular law or institution?" and we shall be in a fairer way to judge of the merits and defects, the potentialities and the limitations of the nation-state. It is, I think, a fair observation to say that, if not all, at least many of those who insist that the nation-state is "the permanent unit" in the political world-order, have not squarely faced this question of the "utility" of the state, and, consciously or unconsciously, adopt the attitude that to ask such a question amounts to bad form or treason. Such an attitude clearly implies the ascription of intrinsic, and not merely instrumental, value to the nation-state—as though it possessed some kind of "personality" distinct from, or inclusive of, the individual personalities of men and women. Such an idea distorts, not only our conception of the real international possibilities, but also our view of the relation of states to their own "nationals."

According to the main stream of historical ethical thought, personality is to be respected as an "end-in-itself"; for, when we reflect upon the notion of personality, we seem to find several things implied in it. In the first place, an individual or person is "organic" in character. It has an internal unity, the particular organs taking their character and value from the part they are fitted to play in maintaining its life as a whole. Or—when we think in psychological, rather than in physiological, terms—the will of a person is thought of as central and undivided. In the second place, and turning our attention to its external relations, we think of a person as a member

(not as a mere organ or part) of a community. It is only by the most far-fetched metaphors that we can speak of two individual wills as fused or united in a higher or more inclusive will. And to treat any individual as though he did not possess a will of his own, distinct from yours, is to repudiate the whole basis of moral relationships.

Now, suppose we transfer this conception of "personality" to the nation or nation-state. What follows? The conclusion that the nation or nation-state is of intrinsic value; that individual persons are its organs, deriving their value from their contribution to its life and strength; and that its "will" can never rightly be merged in a more inclusive "will." One of the main implications of the "state personality" theory, therefore, is the denial of intrinsic value to individuals. That is to say, we cannot attribute personality—with all that personality implies—to the state, without taking the further step of denying to individuals the value and the rights of persons. It is surely a serious theoretical inconsistency in this conception of the state, that it starts with the assumption of certain attributes as inhering in individual persons; supposes, next, that the state is a more inclusive person; concludes that the state must, therefore, possess the attributes inherent in individual personality; and, in this very conclusion, implies that individuals do not in fact possess those attributes. It may disturb only philosophers if theoretical inconsistency is all that can be urged against the doctrine of state personality. But the practical consequences of such a doctrine touch the life of the plain man, as he may sometimes learn to his cost. Stated simply, the main practical implication is that, if "reasons of state" so demand, the question of justice to individuals is of no importance. It is highly significant that those British philosophers who, in our own day, have most strongly asserted the theory of state-personality, have as stoutly denied intrinsic value (and even individuality) to the "finite individual"; and, in their earlier writings at least,[1] indulged in rather perverse criticisms of the conception of "universal humanity." To F. H. Bradley and B. Bosanquet the "finite individual" is merely a fragment of something greater; and the notion that this "self" is, in any real sense, a centre of value, is due simply to our bad metaphysics and "irreligious moralism." No doubt there were special influences operating in Britain when these two philosophers' characteristic ethical and political ideas were formed—the intense study of Greek philosophy, the domestication of German Idealism, the resurrection of the imperialist mentality —but to explain is not to justify; and probably their chief permanent contribution to ethical and political philosophy is that they show,

[1] See Bradley's *Ethical Studies*, Essays V and VI; and compare the Introduction to the latest edition of Bosanquet's *Philosophical Theory of the State*.

clearly enough, what happens when we take the doctrine of state personality as more than a questionably useful fiction.

Taking our stand on the ethical principle that *value* resides ultimately in the individual, and political *authority* in whatever institution best conserves the interests of all mankind, what place do we assign to the nation? Clearly it is not the natural seat of political authority, except at a certain stage in the course of human history. The appropriate seat of authority naturally expands as non-political relations become more extensive and intimate. It is true that, so long as the nation-state is the most comprehensive governmental organ, it must be accorded a special degree of loyalty. But this is because it is the greatest guarantee of an orderly system of rights which we have, so far, attained. Its claim on our loyalty rests on the contribution it professes to make, and does make, towards human welfare. But this gives no valid reason for attributing to the nation-state a sanctity out of relation to its function and utility. As soon as it claims this sanctity, and obstructs the progress towards any more inclusive organization, to that extent it forfeits the right to our loyalty, for to that extent it is on the side of disorder. The more the enlightened moral consciousness faces up to the real issues of the modern world-situation, the more will it be driven to demand the transference of the final control of legislation, judicial and coercive power, to a supra-national authority. The progress towards this goal will, of necessity, be slow and tortuous; but we are already on the way. While the present constitution of the League of Nations does not fit it for the exercise of sovereign powers, yet the more we are willing to work its existing machinery, the more will it gradually transform its own character, by gathering to itself the power of making enforceable decisions.

CAN PRESENT HUMAN MOTIVES WORK A PLANNED SOCIETY?[1]

Sir JOSIAH STAMP, G.C.B., G.B.E., D.Sc., LL.D., F.B.A.

The title I first chose for my remarks was "The Socialization of the Hedonic Impulse," but I concluded that I had better indicate my real objective rather than the process of getting to it.

The social organism may be conveniently viewed as consisting of two parts on different planes, one the contractual, legal, and habitual relations between human beings and their work, akin to the parts of a machine, and the other the force that makes the machine work, the motives, physical and mental limitations and reactions, akin to the motive power. If the design of a machine is radically altered it does not follow that the old fuel and transmission of power will be either adequate or appropriate. We are to examine human behaviour in the economic field as it actually is, or has been in our experience, and to conjecture how far it will be the same or modifiable in a social organization different from past models, and how far the new models may create new aptitudes and reactions not now necessary or developed. To put it more bluntly, whether a planned society can be worked by the existing bundle of elements in human behaviour, or whether it will demand other, and, if so, really possible, elements.

Nassau Senior gave as the first of four general propositions on which Political Economy rests "that every man desires to obtain additional wealth with as little sacrifice as possible." It took an intelligible form in the schoolboy's definition, "Political economy teaches you how to get the most you can with the minimum honest effort." It accounts for the mental confusion of the small daughter of the Professor who lectured on *Economic* History: "Does that mean that you teach as little history as possible for as much money as possible?" We can all think of particular exceptions to the general principle, of course, but the question is whether any exception is a sufficiently high common factor of human motive in the mass to lend itself to generalization. The much abused "economic man" is obviously an abstraction, for few men act on economic motives only, or even on rational motives only, but it is a useful abstraction in the economic field which possesses greater value or truth in that field than any alternatives that may be assumed. The student is always

[1] An address to the British Institute of Philosophy given at University College on March 19, 1935, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede in the Chair.

warned that before he reintroduces the derivatives of the abstraction back into complex reality, and makes any statement of general force, he must reclothe the abstraction with the discarded elements of behaviour and qualify his dicta. That is one reason why no *simple* statement in economics is ever precisely true. It is also a reason why Ruskinian diatribe about "life being wealth" and so on, is rather irrelevant *in the economic study itself*. The introduction of moral and ethical implication at some stages in the argument is inappropriate and confusing; at others necessary and completing. Catch-phrases such as "Production for use and not for profit," however comprehensible from an ethical point of view, conceal, not very effectively, much confusion of economic thought, which only disappears on a careful analysis or definition of the words "use" and "profit." Similar cloudy implications rest in such words as "service" and "needs."

A first essential is to decide whether we shall use "profit" in its economic sense, as a differential surplus, which must really exist all the time whatever the form of economic society, so long as the factors of production are unequal in their productivity, and whatever name we may give to it. There is a common price of all supply—even in a communism that has no open price its place is taken by a marginal cost—which yields that part of the supply having any advantages over the other parts, a surplus. The advantages may be in location of raw materials relative to manufacture, or of both to the point of convenient use; in efficiency of labour management or machinery; in some elements of luck. The determining limit is at a margin where wages of capital and management and interest just meet and just evoke that supply in continuity. The superior advantage of a unit gives it a profit. A continual struggle is going on not so much between the different factors as between competing units in the same factor, to search out positions of this advantage and secure this surplus. Human behaviour in reaction to the search for this particular "profit" is a different study from that which follows a normal reward or profit necessary to evoke and maintain normal effort, which is found at the margin where the other profit is non-existent.

There is very little permanence about this economic profit unless there is a monopoly or franchise. In a competitive régime profits shift from one unit to another in a surprising way. The time curve of high and low profits in the aggregate may be of a certain type and be stable, but the position of individual businesses on that curve is continually changing. This has received important statistical verification in the researches of Professor Secrist.

We are familiar with the conditions under which a greater reward, i.e. a higher price, stimulates a greater supply, and a less reward brings about a smaller supply, inasmuch as in the short period,

at any rate, owing to the principle of diminishing utility in the satisfaction of people's wants, the greater supply cannot command a continually higher price. There is a balancing mechanism brought about through price which is at the very foundation of economic life, and is the final deciding factor of the way in which men's efforts are distributed between alternative walks of life. There are sometimes exceptions to this general rule of a temporary or particular character, e.g. a very large output may be deliberately marketed, not in response to a higher price, but with a specifically lower price—foreseeing that the increase in supply itself would enable a lower unit cost to be secured, the producer is exploring the *social demand curve* to find the new position of equilibrium for a large quantity at a lower price. Again, whereas a falling price ordinarily checks supply, in such a case as American farm produce it had the reverse effect. If the farm were heavily mortgaged its charges had to be met and the owner argued that, at the low price, he must sell substantially more in order to make up the fixed charge upon him, so that low prices positively brought about even larger increases of supply than high prices would have done. But these are merely backwashes of the very general principle of the regulation by price.

First of all, we have to consider the motives and reactions to stimuli as they at present exist—to analyse them in order that we can pick out which of them could be translated unchanged into some new sphere, which of them would have to be completely altered, and which would have to be developed to a degree that would make them almost different in kind.

Dealing first with the fund of capital that is required in any form of society which is to have a good standard of life and to take advantage of new scientific inventions, we find that, in general, the satisfaction of future wants at any moment is less valuable than the satisfaction of the same wants to-day. The discounting process of time represents an abstinence which requires an economic price to secure. The payment of interest in some sense is a reward of abstinence, at any rate, in the case of moderate incomes, and in any world in which there is a measure of equalization of resources, the principle is of far greater importance than in the nineteenth century, where we were able to rely upon the massing of capital funds out of wealthy resources—where the word "abstinence" had much less meaning. In so far as future enjoyment is discounted against the present, "waiting," requires a reward. The price of waiting is interest and the quantity of waiting may generally be increased in the same way as a supply of any other economic product if that price rises. Interest is also necessary in addition to the pure interest of waiting, in respect of the risk of waiting and the possibility of never enjoying at all. The motives for saving are not quite the same over the whole

field. Riskless waiting, which is what we generally mean by thrift, may be first of all undertaken against being *worse off* in future, in which case, by insurance, a *low rate* of interest on the principle of accumulation demands more saving and not less. Or the saving may be undertaken in order to be *better off*. If this is for a specific purpose, to a specific sum, then the lower the interest the more the saving. But if saving is a merely general desire, then the high rate of interest as its price may increase saving. A high rate of interest certainly is important for directing saving into highly profitable but rather risky ventures.

A further motive is that of moral thrift—in an ordered life the feeling that it is wrong to spend up to the hilt; and, again, saving may be like a dividend reserve, equalizing good and bad times.

There are certain conditions under which saved money may be very plentiful, and so much more than the suitable openings for it that the price is inoperative as a control. The automatic savings coming up now through the various agencies for thrift may very easily represent a surplus during the period when business confidence is not great. The element of risk will always require a loading from the individual saver and the price element is a controlling factor. Socially, there may be much collective individual loss, but much pioneer gain. Industrially it is no good money being cheap unless it is also cheap *in the field of risks*. We will defer for the moment our examination of how much of this will survive in a different society.

Passing to the motives affecting the wage-earner; apart from the differential higher return that is normally expected for greater skill and responsibility, it is generally suggested that an increase in earnings will also increase effort and willingness to produce, i.e. the higher price creates a larger supply. Conversely, that a lower return reduces the amount of effort forthcoming, but, on the other hand, that more people can be employed at the lower wages. To these generalizations there are numerous exceptions; in so far as they are true, they are true only for movements at a particular time and not for changes which are absolute over long periods. It would be ridiculous to say that because men are now paid four times as much as they were a hundred years ago, they are willing to work four times as hard. Generalization also ignores the fact that the higher and lower returns, respectively, may have physical consequences as distinct from psychological, and that the higher yield from a higher return may come from better health and physical capacity rather than from psychological willingness to do more. From a broad point of view, the best test is perhaps that of a relation between wage and effort as found in piece rates, but the quantitative connection between the two is never exact. If wages are well above subsistence level, a fixed addition is certainly not correlated to an increase of effort.

Often a standard amount per week is looked for, and if, by a change of rates, it can be got with fewer hours, then leisure is preferred, or slackness may set in and Monday is a bad day. This has been verified again and again. In the present state of average psychology, a rise in *real* wages is of less importance than money wages, and a rise in real wage may be quite inoperative in securing increased production. A *fall* in money wage is quicker to work than a fall in real wage and also may lead to disputes and stoppages. As I have said, the absolute rate of real wage is not very material, whether we judge it by comparisons over periods of time, or country by country. It is the comparative rate in a man's own trade over short periods or compared with the adjoining trades that has psychological value in effort. Perhaps quite as important is the appearance of a disparity in large payments going to the other factors of production, and a wage that may be consistent with contentment and maximum effort at one period, may mean merely discontent and slacking if there is the appearance of large profit going in other directions. Economic psychology is by no means uniform throughout the world. I remember being told when we were discussing in 1924 in the Dawes Commission whether the German Railways should be a Government concern or under private management, that the uniform denoting Government service was worth a definite differential in money. There are, no doubt, in all ranks, elements of prestige which may in themselves act in the same way as an increment or decrement of money. There is a marked increase in the extent to which pride of success and of craftsmanship are operative beyond the monetary incentive to produce good and plentiful work. There is, too, the pride of institution, particularly if it can be put competitively, and, just as the members of a family may quarrel amongst themselves, but will stand together like a rock if it is a question of contest with another family, so the different factors in a single business may pull away from each other if the issue is a domestic one. They can be made to play up for the honour of the company or the concern if there is a rival institution. My own Commercial Department have done their best to bring into operation this factor of friendly rivalry within their own vast area, by giving quotas to separate districts and setting the districts against each other like football teams in a League Table. Over a certain area of the wage-earning class there is an element of ambition which leads to a desire to excel and rise out of the ranks, but this is not assisted in the main by Trade Union ideas; nor is it very operative after a few years. My own observation leads me to the view that there is enough of it to bring out a number of leaders, but not enough to increase the mass output on a large scale, of all workers taken together.

When we come to the salaried class, the larger salaries are desired

not always so much to secure a larger output, or even a higher quality within the same range of work, but to satisfy a natural desire for emulation; secondly, as a mark of success in life; and third, to institute some reasonable comparison with private business. We may compare the security and the dignity of Civil Service, thus reconciling the holders to salaries considerably below what might be necessary in ordinary business life. The officials are, in fact, rarely required to produce a profit result. Those important classes in an ordinary capitalist régime, who are risking their own capital with their own management, produce many trials, a large number of failures, and a few successes. If one reviews the early commercial history of artificial silk, or of flying, or of the zip-fastener, and sees the extent to which risks were taken and capital invested on evidence and calculations which would not satisfy any rigid tests, one is driven to ask whether any Committee would be willing to risk public money for which it would be answerable on a similar basis. Committees are always ready to decide, when conditions are proved and when comparisons can be made to indicate the possibility of success, but they must inevitably play for safety, particularly as, by the nature of the case, the successes will tend to be far fewer than the failures. The one who plays for safety can get a reputation for wisdom because his successes exceed his failures, but even so, his absolute number of successes may be fewer than that of another person who, while having a majority of failures, attempts more. A committee responsible for public money might, perhaps, be prepared to do the same if they were given a fund specifically for trying out inventions and new ideas, but without any questions being asked and only subject to an audited probity. The truth is that in the field of invention and innovation the motives are mainly non-commercial—the joy of the game, the lottery of success throw up amid countless casualties those intrinsic successes which are invaluable to the next rank of less enterprising entrepreneurs. When the risks are proved and output is steady it becomes the subject of successful communal exploitation.

How much of social progress is due to these various elements is not strictly determinable. We need to have knowledge on a more definite and scientific basis about the strength of desire and the extent to which it prevails, to do a workmanlike and efficient piece of work; of man's ability to sacrifice for a principle, for an institution or for a person, and of his craving for recognition by others. It has often been held that the classical school of economists minimized these factors. Exactly how powerful are they at the present time? or to what extent can they be cultivated and made the mainsprings of action? We want an examination of the actual cases similar to that which William James carried through in his *Varieties of Religious*

Experience. It is true that most of his examples were rather of the abnormal type, and that while they may prove inductively beyond all scientific dispute that the factor of religious experience is a reality and a great power where it occurs in the right type of individual, they do not tell a great deal about the strength of this force in the average man or mass of men taken together. In the same way, the examination of particular instances of altruistic economic life might be deceptive if we took it as representing what the man in the street was prepared to do.

Says one writer, "the trend of society is to emphasize the acquisitive qualities. Money is necessary not only for survival, but for power and, in a large part, for public respect as well. The motives of working for the sake of the work, for altruism and for non-financial recognition find themselves swimming against the swift-flowing stream of financial pressure." Certainly the incentives of captains of industry—the men whose minds and powers we should rely upon for progress in a new state of affairs—can be reduced to economic terms in the majority of cases. We are bound to say that any evidence of non-economic incentive that is obvious in business to-day cannot be taken as final, if we try to estimate the possible strength of a non-economic motive in a different environment.

It was said of Ford: "He is an instrument of society and he can serve society only as he manages his enterprise so as to turn over to the public an increasingly better product and an ever-decreasing price and, at the same time, to pay all those who have a hand an ever-increasing wage based upon the work they do." In this way and in this way alone can a manufacturer justify his existence.

Harriman said: "I never cared for money except as power for work. What I most enjoy is the power of creation." It may thus very well be said that power and not profit is the primary fascination.

If a similar place can be found for this incentive in a new state of affairs, there may be no great change in their output. The leader of a wholesale Co-operative Society, getting only £400 a year, remarked: "I enjoy the respect of my colleagues, and I possess great power. These things satisfy me." The question has been put: "Do not able men demand such high salaries and monetary rewards under capitalism in large part because they feel the chief rewards under capitalism are but money? In this country we have a much greater spirit of public service than in many countries abroad. If you were to tell an American that a man is prepared to spend much time and effort in certain activities *for its own sake*, you would simply not be believed. Here we find that to do a thing for a small sum or for nothing may, in itself, be a distinction and a subject of pride. Service on committees, on the judicial bench, service by ministers, by missionaries, by scientists, all who have a sense of "calling" may

be far more on the non-economic plane than general economic activity. It is interesting to look at the motives of great scientists: Faraday, although connected for some time with commerce, and getting an increasing income, came to the conclusion that he had to make a choice and he put it deliberately aside. But then he was very exceptional. Even the honourable non-economic rewards given by his peers did not influence him. When he was offered the Presidency of the Royal Society, he said: "If I accepted I would not answer for the integrity of my intellect for a single year." We should not have many Faradays, even in a translated sphere.

The work of Clerk Maxwell and Darwin and Wallace of an altruistic kind cannot be divorced from the fact that they enjoyed private incomes. The simplicity of Pasteur and perhaps of Metchnikoff, and Huxley's long fight to work along scientific lines without reference to monetary rewards, are important cases for study. On the other hand, Agassiz was not really swayed by any desire to benefit mankind or posterity. Vanity, even to the point of lack of scruple, was his clearly marked motive, and Sir Humphry Davy's life does not show him as actuated by motives of the most excellent order. There were those like Kelvin, Edison, Perkins, Parsons, and Van Siemens who made money freely with their scientific discoveries, and cannot really be invoked to prove the point we have at issue. More interesting, perhaps, is the case of Newton, who ceased to be really creative and productive after he secured safety and salary in his office at the Mint.

Professor Paul Douglas, after examining the biographical material, gave an analysis of the non-economic incentives as follows: (1) A desire to benefit humanity; (2) Fascination or joy of the work itself; (3) Desire to project one's own personality into the work; (4) Desire to be esteemed by one's fellows in the same field; (5) A desire for the esteem and approval of the general public; (6) A craving for notoriety; (7) A desire for power over man and over things.

Before assuming that there can be a considerable transfer of the important work that is done gratuitously to-day into a different sphere, one must remember that much of it may be done by those who have a sufficient competence in other ways. They might not be so willing to work for non-economic rewards if they had not this background. Moreover, where the large percentage of all service is given for a cash reward, there is a distinction in giving public service for no reward at all. It cannot be said that in a field in which there is *no* specific monetary reward at all this same distinction would remain, and where everyone is actually or compulsorily altruistic the general level of work so performed may be far lower than where altruism derives its hedonic satisfactions from its comparative rarity.

McCurdy says that the phrase "every man has his price" is intended to be cynical. Yet it is a proof of existing altruism. It shows that some considerable margin of compulsion or attraction is necessary before a man will sacrifice either loyalty or conscience. Much depends on how greatly the group action can seize the imagination, for a group formation can certainly increase loyalties, as we can see in every society or association to which we belong. In a large number of cases they exact a higher standard of conduct than the individual life alone would render. McCurdy says "the group that cannot exact sacrifices from its members is moribund if not already disintegrated." Not every group is of this order. "The best example of a selfishly motivated group is that of the shareholders in a large company who retain their shares so long as dividends are forthcoming. But among even these are apt to be directors who develop pride in the business as such and complicate their operations with loyalties."

The principles that are at work dominating economic society and inherent in men's physical and psychological make-up, include that of diminishing utility, in which case an increasing supply can only be taken off at a less price, or additional increments are worth less to the user than the preceding ones. It is inherent that we should seek the highest marginal satisfaction and that for this purpose the principle of substitution is constantly at work. I do not see how we can expect to override this in any society, but I do see that it makes planning *outside the area of the stability of large numbers extremely precarious.* Wages may not be wholly determined by marginal productivity, but it is so commanding an element in their true level that this also is a factor to be reckoned with, and I have not yet seen any scheme for a planned society which gives the technique for working it out. The individual to-day, in the present economic society outside Russia, has two great choices: first, whether he shall spend or save; and when he spends whether he shall buy home or foreign goods; and, when he saves, whether he shall invest or take risks. His second great choice is in the occupation to be followed; the training for it, where he shall reside, and the changes that he may care to make. Now in so far as these individual choices work themselves out into a massive stable result in the aggregate, the planner can take the results for granted and project them into the future, so that the individuals within the aggregate will still retain freedom, but unless there is the compelling element of a change of price, i.e. of interest, of wage, of rent, and transport, etc., to check changes in a mass movement, I do not see how these chief items of individual liberty can possibly be retained intact in a planned society. A denial of liberty in these respects must have some influence upon human motive—exactly how much we cannot say. Just as it used to be said, with Ireland in mind, that some

people would rather be badly governed by themselves than well governed by others, so even where one can postulate a higher individual reward through planning, it might very well so react upon the individual that he would not give the service necessary to create the higher reward.

The first requirement of a planned society is to compute the probable demands in each direction, but unless this is computed on some price either actual or notional, the term "probable demand" is meaningless, and it would be best to speak, perhaps, of a computation of a demand schedule at different prices. The planner must then also construct a supply curve showing the quantities that will be forthcoming at a given level of costs. Once again, a monetary economy seems necessary with all that this connotes. On the whole, planning may be said to eliminate private capital, though it has not universally done so in set terms. But the elimination of private capital and the substitution therefor of planned capital, which is to be a deduction from total production, does not absolve the planners from the necessity for a notional rate of interest, and for some quantitative test as to the *optimum* points of production to which to apply their capital.

I have not so far seen any successful attempts to avoid the usual market price test. Let us suppose that the consumer is prepared to give up the equivalent of x hours of his labour to procure the product x hours of somebody else's. If there is a change in his tastes and he will only give x hours minus 1 for one hour's labour, then there is over-supply and price must come down. But if the consumers are keen and will give x plus 1 hours, then the price ought to go up and, in consequence, supply should increase. But a plan states how much capital is going into the production and also how much labour and, therefore, the entry of labour into the industry is controlled, and I imagine that wages must also be controlled if they are not to be so sensitive as to keep the numbers down. So long, therefore, as people can give effect to a slackened or increased desire for any product, or so long indeed as nature itself varies the supply, and it can only be accommodated by changes in demand, I find it very difficult to secure a satisfactory plan. In the second place, the consumers' choice may be affected in the endeavour to make rational the necessary international trade and thus not to upset the plan. Supposing that hats are to come from Paris which are preferable to the British. They must either be kept out and the consumers' choice affected, or if they come in the plan is upset. Fashion and obsolescence are put into strait-jackets. I understand that the crocodile leather and snakeskin shoes of the lady visitors in Moscow have caused more flutters in the breasts of the Russian girls than that distinction would in our minds actually deserve.

In the third place, as I have already said, invention and risk under a planned scheme have to be dealt with by committees subject to political attack. They must be judged by results. The question is how soon? and are these results to be collective or individual? Will one good success be a complete answer to three failures? Modern competitive enterprise, with all its disadvantages, constantly seeking novelty, does get us forward in one way or another. It is a question whether, in the long run, the attitude of mind which is more bent upon establishing stability and standardization will not keep back economic development. Certainly all human motives of management, as we know them now, will want to justify the plan, and this may tend to mean more to them than would breaking the plan and so giving the greater ultimate advantage. On the assumption that the consumers maintain a good freedom of directing their purchasing power, can the managers compete by advertisements and other blandishments? The increasing real wage of the average wage-earner is at the present moment enlarging the scope for expenditure upon travel by bus or train. This is greatly sought and competed for, not merely amongst the different agencies for travel, but as against other ways of spending the money, and probably as severe a competitor for money spent in evening excursions as any other, would be the campaign for spreading the habit of beer drinking. How, under a planned society, will these rival attractions for increasing purchasing power be resolved?

There is not much actual experience of motive and reaction in a fully planned society to which we can turn, but Professor Brutzkus has quite recently made some considered declarations for Russia. He notes there has been a great decline in *quality* to keep up statistics of production.

"The system has a most unfavourable effect on the intensity of the work. The Soviet Government seeks to base the division upon the hours worked, and the efficiency and the quality of the work done, hoping in this way to increase the intensity and quality of labour. . . . The confusion existing in the organization of labour naturally has a very unfavourable effect upon the intensity of the labour. . . ."

"It proved much more difficult to transfer the methods of mechanized agriculture to Russian soil than the Soviet Government had imagined. The tractors did not work so efficiently. . . ."

"Specific achievement of the planned economy was the fact that it compelled a poor nation to make great savings. Anything of the sort would have been impossible in a market economy. Also that the savings were directed into production goods. . . ."

"At the heart of every enterprise, however modest, there must stand a *politically* trustworthy man—a Communist. Under the

Communist planned economy, the economic system is managed, not by experts but by laymen, and that is one important reason for the failure of the system."

Professor Halm claims that the Socialist economy foregoes the stimulus to good service which lies in the capitalistic connection between economic calculation and income.

"Those who advocate economic planning are at this point in the position of having to count upon a change of the general attitude towards economic life, without being able to evince any presumption of its reliability or any reason why it should come about at all."

A decline in individual responsibility means an inevitable expansion of the central auditing apparatus.

Finally, I do not think the answer to the question put depends to a major extent upon moral values or ethical betterments.

(1) Man is so constituted that he cannot help the diminishing sense of satisfaction received from successive increments of enjoyment. This will stand in any environment, and it leads to the ceaseless, silent principle of substitution. This leads to the phenomena of price tests as correctives of over- and under-supply. How price and interest are to be measured in a planned society is still unsolved from an economic point of view.

(2) I do not think it can be said positively that output *cannot* be secured in the mass without the forces of fear, self-interest, and self-preservation, or without being responsive to degrees of reward. But the probabilities of other incentives working as well, with less than the educative environment of some generations, is pretty small. The physical laws of fatigue and human interest are *prima facie* against the idea that an extra hour's work can be dissociated from a differential stimulus. This leads, with the physical facts about capital goods, to a supply curve of costs, also inescapable. This again means that the planner has a double task on both sides rather against human nature.

(3) I do not despair of the spearhead of progress and invention being thrust, in a planned society, into unconquered knowledge. But the communal control of it in capital application will be less wasteful of capital. It will also be less advantageous in the net balance of gain in a given space of time.

(4) I think a community isolated from world economy must be lower in its economic standard. How to relate the planned community to an unplanned world, without introducing such elements into the plan as to rob it of its planned character, has never yet been worked out. How to plan a world economy without destroying nationalism, is beyond examination.

(5) From (2) must follow the existence of differential surpluses or units, in either state of society. The economic aim of the planner

should be to reduce these; the political temptation will be to maintain and appropriate them for other ends.

My provisional answer is, therefore, over a major part of the field, "No"; over a certain smaller but important part, possibly "Yes," and over yet a balance of the area probably "Yes." But I have only exposed a part of the mechanism to view, and more attention ought to be devoted to the psychology of the plannees alongside of elaborate study of plans and planners.

LOGICAL POSITIVISM AND THEOLOGY[1]

H. H. PRICE, M.A.

THE subject of this paper is the relation of Logical Positivism to Theology. By "Logical Positivism" I mean the doctrine originated by Dr. Wittgenstein and expounded more at length by Professors Carnap, Schlick, and other members of the Viennese Circle (Wiener Kreis) in the periodical called *Erkenntnis*. The clearest account of it in English is that given by Mr. R. B. Braithwaite in the volume called *Cambridge University Studies*.

Logical Positivism is what would commonly be described as a theory of knowledge, though I do not suppose its originators would like that description. But it differs from all other theories of knowledge in its starting-point. It starts not from a consideration of our cognitive acts, nor of their immediate objects, but from a consideration of *language*, and primarily from an examination of sentences. Its primary question is, under what conditions is a sentence used significantly; or, under what conditions can one be said to know the meaning of a sentence? The central tenet of Logical Positivism is its answer to this question. The answer is: *One knows the meaning of a sentence when one knows the method of its verification*: that is, when one knows what kind of experiences, whether perceptual or introspective, would render it true or false. When I am puzzled as to the meaning of a sentence, I am to ask myself: "What sort of sense data or introspective data should I have to be acquainted with, in order to decide whether that sentence is true or false?"

Let me give some examples. First I will take the sentence "There is a penny stamp on the mantelpiece." I know what this means (though I don't know whether it is true) because I know how I should have to set about verifying it if I wanted to. I should have to sense such and such a series of kinaesthetic and visual sensa, and then I should have to sense a number of members of a family of sensa whose standard figure is rectangular in shape and whose standard colour is red. So, too, if I say "There is a church with two spires in Oxford." I know what this means (though I believe it to be false), since I know that the method of verifying or refuting it is to walk round all the churches in Oxford and notice whether any of them has two spires: which again reduces to sensing such and such a series of sensa. Likewise I know what is

[1] A paper read at University College, Aberystwyth, and at Exeter College, Oxford, in May 1934.

meant by the sentence "I want my tea." I have only to introspect in order to discover whether it is true or false. It is, of course, not necessary that one should actually be able to carry out the verification; it is enough if one can see how it would be possible. Thus the sentence "there are mountains on the other side of the moon" is a significant sentence, because we do know what kind of experiences we should have to have in order to verify it or refute it, namely those of moving towards the moon and then going round to the other side. It does not matter that owing to the imperfection of our scientific technique we cannot at present obtain those experiences.

Now let us consider, by way of contrast, such sentences as the following: "There is a lion outside the door which ceases to exist as soon as one looks for it"; "the planets are moved round in their courses by invisible spirits"; "Smith knows German very well, although he never either speaks it or reads it or writes it, or answers appropriately when Germans speak to him." These sentences are unverifiable. There is no method of either verifying or refuting them whether by sense or by introspection. Therefore, say the Logical Positivists, those sentences are meaningless. Of course, grammatically they resemble sentences which do have meanings. Moreover, the several words of which each is made up do mean something (in that sense of "mean" which is appropriate to single words); but the sentence as a whole has no meaning. Such sentences are technically called *nonsense* by the Logical Positivists. I want to make it quite clear that this *is* a technical usage. In ordinary speech we often (though not always) use the word "nonsense" in a much wider sense. We often say that Mr. A. is talking nonsense when we only mean that what he says is obviously false; sometimes again we mean that he has made two statements which contradict each other. But I want to insist that what Logical Positivism calls nonsense is *not even false*. (Since Logical Positivism came in, it has become rather a compliment to say of someone that his remarks are false.) Nor is the nonsensical, in this usage, to be identified with the contradictory. Contradiction is a relation which exists between two statements, such that if one is true the other must be false (for instance, between "this is a circle," and "this is square"). It follows of course that each of the two statements must mean something. And a sentence which involves a contradiction such as "this circle is square" should be called absurd rather than nonsensical.

Thus statements which can be verified or refuted in experience make sense, and those which cannot be make nonsense. But what of the statements of Logic and Mathematics? Surely they neither need empirical verification nor can they receive it? To this the Logical Positivists answer that they are *tautologies*, which I think is equivalent to calling them *analytic*. Thus they are not statements in the

ordinary sense of the word "statement," and so they form no exception to the "Principle of Verifiability." And if any other statements are produced, outside of Logic and Mathematics, which claim to be self-evident, we shall be told that either they are tautologies or they are empirical generalisations.

From this fundamental principle as to the meaningfulness of statements, some very queer conclusions have been drawn. I shall briefly mention three of them:

1. It is deduced that statements about *the material world* are entirely reducible to statements about sensa actual and possible; in other words, that the view called Phenomenalism is true. For if anyone says that material objects are something other than groups of sensa actual and possible, we cannot conceivably verify or refute his statements, and they must therefore be nonsense.

2. But further, and much more paradoxically, the Logical Positivists hold that statements about *other human minds* are reducible to statements about the behaviour of certain human bodies (and especially about the sort of behaviour which we call speech): it follows that they, too, are eventually reducible to statements about sensa. This does not, of course, apply to my statements about myself. When I say, for instance that *I* am angry, I mean that I am in a certain psychical state, with which I am directly acquainted in introspection. But when I say that Smith is angry, I cannot mean that *he* is in a similar psychical state, or in any psychical state at all. For I cannot be acquainted with any psychical state except my own: I cannot sense them, I cannot introspect them, and sensing and introspecting are the only forms of acquaintance. To talk about psychical states other than my own is therefore to talk nonsense. But obviously I do mean *something* when I say that Smith is angry. What, then, can I mean except that his body is uttering noises, his fists are clenched, his brows frown, and further perhaps that his limbs will probably soon be in a state of violent movement? Similarly when I refer to Smith's cognitive acts. If I say that he sees the motor-car, I don't mean that he senses a visual sensum and believes that it belongs to such and such a *group* of sensa collectively constituting a motor-car. I mean only that his retina is being stimulated by such and such light-rays, and that his body is responding to those stimuli, say, by jumping on to the pavement. And if I say he is *thinking* so and so, I mean that either his body is uttering certain noises which are to me significant, e.g. the noises "the rain has stopped"; or else that his speech-organs are moving in such a way that these noises *would* be produced if the movements were larger. This, of course, is the celebrated, or notorious, combination of Solipsism and Behaviourism which is, perhaps, the best-known tenet of the Logical Positivists.

3. It is further held that *statements about the past* are really reducible to statements about present images and the like (if it is a case of memory), or else to statements about records and documents (if it is a case of history.) For it is maintained that nothing can be experienced except the present. Thus, unless I am really talking about present images or present records, my sentences about the past will be nonsense.

These consequences, especially the second and third, are so queer that they seem to cast grave doubt upon the original doctrine, I mean upon the Principle of Verifiability, plausible as that appeared at first sight. With regard to the third (that concerned with statements about the past), I think that Logical Positivism has entangled itself in unnecessary difficulties by unduly restricting the sphere of experience or acquaintance. It does seem to me that I am *acquainted* with some past events, though not with very many. If so, some of my statements about the past could be verified by actually inspecting the past events to which they refer. I cannot think why it should be supposed that the only entities with which we are acquainted are those which exist simultaneously with the act of acquaintance. Such a supposition, I believe, only seems plausible because of a confusion between the two senses of the term "present." What I am acquainted with must be *present to* my consciousness. This indeed is a tautology. But it does not follow that it need also be present in the sense of *existing at the present moment.* What is *present to* a certain act of consciousness need not be *contemporary with* it.

With regard to other human minds, the Logical Positivist doctrine of Solipsism plus Behaviourism seems to me extremely difficult to believe. Indeed, it seems to me quite clear that I do *not* mean by "another human mind" an organism which behaves in certain ways. But still, I do not think the doctrine is entirely mistaken. On the contrary, it contains a very important point which some other theories leave out; its error is, that it contains nothing else. That point is simply this, that we can only conceive of other human minds *by description* (to use Mr. Russell's phrase), and the description by means of which we conceive of them always has reference to some thing or some event *in the material world*: whereas when we conceive of our own mind this is not so. By "I" I mean a certain mind or self with which, or with the states of which, I am directly acquainted in introspection or in self-consciousness. But by "you" I do *not* mean a mind with which, or with some states of which, I am directly acquainted. When I address another man as "you," what I mean is "the mind which animates this body that I am looking at, and which expresses itself by means of these significant noises which I hear." And unless I think of this body or those noises, I do not know what I mean by "you," and am relapsing into nonsense. But of course

this situation, which we might call the *vocative situation*, is not the only one in which we make statements about other minds, though I think it is the primary one. We can also conceive of another mind by means of other descriptions: for instance, we can conceive of it as the mind which wrote such and such significant marks on paper, or which caused such and such a building to come into existence, or painted such and such a picture, or, in general, performed such and such an action. Such minds, we think, do or did animate bodies, though we have not actually perceived those bodies. But so far as I can see, we could even conceive of a mind which did not have a body at all. For instance, we could still conceive of it as the mind which caused me to hear such and such significant noises, or caused such and such perceptible rearrangement of matter; we could even conceive of it as the mind which telepathically caused me to entertain such and such thoughts (say, which gave me premonitions of future events, or gave me the solution of a problem which I could not solve for myself).

None the less, the reference to experience still remains, even in these last cases. The phrase "another mind" does always mean "the mind which stands in such and such a relation to A," where A is something which we are acquainted with, or which we experience; whether it be a visual or tactual sensum manifesting a certain organism, or a visual or tactual appearance of some other piece of matter like a house or picture: or a set of audible and significant sounds, or a set of visible marks: or, lastly, some introspectible event in myself, as in the case of the premonition. Unless there is *some* such reference to the experienceable when I talk about another mind, I do not know what I am talking about, and am talking nonsense. This will indeed be seen at once when somebody asks me "*Which* mind do you mean?" For that question can only be answered by mentioning some *experienceable* entity, and almost always it has to be answered by mentioning some entity in the material world, some perceptible organism, some perceptible words written or spoken, or some perceptible product of constructive or destructive activity; and, unless we can give some answer of this sort, we are convicted of not knowing what we mean.

If what I have said is correct—and I have only been stating the merest commonplaces—the Logical Positivists are by no means completely mistaken in the account they give of statements about other human minds. Statements about other human minds, if they are to be sense, will always contain a reference to something which is experienceable, and nearly always to something experienceable by sensation. And this is not an accidental feature of such statements: it is essential to them. If we remove from them this reference to the experienceable, this element of experiential verifiability or refut-

ability, they lose all definiteness, and can no longer even be called false. But it does not follow, nor (I think) is it true, that the *whole* of what we mean in such statements is experientially verifiable, even though part of what we mean, and an essential part, is thus verifiable. When I talk about another mind, I am not merely asserting that such and such a body could be seen, or such and such words could be heard; I am also asserting that there is an entity standing in such and such relations (usually causal) to this body or these words or whatever they are, and that this entity has psychical characteristics in the literal, not the Behaviouristic sense—for instance, that it is aware of things as I am, that it has feelings and desires the same in kind as those which I am aware of by introspection in myself. And *this* part of what I mean is not verifiable or refutable by experience, at least not if we understand by "verifiable" what the Logical Positivists understand by it. For this part of my statement does not assert, as the other part does, that there exists something which I do or could know by direct acquaintance.

Yet in a looser and more popular sense of the word "verify" even this part of my statement does assert something verifiable. For in ordinary life we often say that we have verified something when we have discovered *evidence* sufficient to make it probable. For instance, we say that we have verified Jones's statement that he was in college before midnight by taking the testimony of the college porter, who says he saw him come in: but of course the porter may have had a hallucination, or he may have mistaken someone else for Jones, or he may even be lying, so that all we have got is *evidence* for Jones's assertion. Now in the looser sense of "verify," we do have to know how to verify our statement about another mind. I do have to know what sort of experienceable events would be *evidence for* that other mind's existence, and what others would be evidence against it. Roughly speaking, what is required is that these experienceable events should be of a purposive or teleological kind, i.e. should be the sort of events which I should bring about myself in the course of fulfilling some purpose of my own. (That another organism should have the same sort of shape and size as my own is a point of very minor importance; hence the ineffectiveness of the old analogical argument for the existence of other minds —an argument which the Logical Positivists quite rightly reject.)

A further point in favour of the Logical Positivists is this. Not only do I have to conceive of another mind as *related to* certain events experienced or experienceable by me: the *intrinsic qualities* which I conceive it to have must also be qualities which I have myself experienced in my own introspection. If I profess to attribute to it other qualities than these, I do not know what I am talking about, and my statements are so far nonsensical. This, then, is a very good

sense in which my statements about other minds "cannot transcend experience." Not only does the evidence for them have to be experiential evidence: that which the evidence is evidence for has itself to be something the same in kind as things which I have experienced in introspection.

To sum up this discussion as to statements about other minds: the principle that knowing the meaning of a statement is knowing the method of its experiential verification seems to break down when applied to statements about other minds; or rather, it gives an incomplete analysis of what we mean, if to verify (or refute) a statement means to experience something which makes it *certain* that the statement is true (or false). If "verify" be understood thus, it is only a part of what we mean by such statements which can be verified, though an essential part, which some other theories overlook. But if "verify" be taken in a wider sense, if verifying a statement means experiencing something which makes it *certain or probable* that the statement is true, then the Principle of Verifiability is both true and important, and applies perfectly to statements about other minds. For such statements, I have argued, are always complex. Part of what I am stating is something such that assignable experiences could make its truth or falsity *certain*; the other part is something such that these same experiences could make its truth or falsity *probable* though not certain. And the Logical Positivists are right in maintaining that if I am talking sense when I make my statement, I must know what sort of experiences they would be.

I will deal more briefly with statements about the past and about material objects. It seems to me that we can approach the Logical Positivist doctrine about them in just the same sort of way. *Part* of what I mean when I make a statement about the past is, that I can now experience, that is be acquainted with, a small number of events in my own past history. But again this is not the whole of what I mean. For I am also asserting that there are such and such past states of affairs which these now-experienceable data would be evidence for. Here, too, if "verifying" a statement means being acquainted with something which makes it *certain or probable* that the statement is true, we can say that knowing the meaning of a statement about the past is knowing what experiences would verify it. But if "verifying" has the narrower sense of having experiences which make the statement *certain*, then the Principle of Verifiability is false: for then it will apply to only a part of what we mean in statements about the past, not to the whole.

Much the same can be said as to statements about material objects. Even if we accept the Phenomenalist view that a material object is a family of sensa actual and obtainable (and I am not sure that we should, for I suspect that though the family of sensa is part,

and an essential part, of the material object, it is not the whole), even so no statement about a material object could ever be verified if the word "verify" be taken in the narrower sense. For we cannot say that a family of sensa contains any finite number of members, even at one single moment: to take only the visual members, there is no finite number of directions nor of distances from which they could exist. But a family of sensa, at least the sort of family which could plausibly be identified with a material object, contains other sorts of members besides visual ones, and moreover it endures through a long period of time. Thus no conceivable experience nor series of experiences could verify the existence of a family of sensa, if verifying means making it *certain* that the family exists. We can conceive of a series of experiences which would make it *probable*, e.g. walking nearer to the thing, walking round to the back of it, touching it, and so on: and we can conceive of a series of experiences which would increase that probability without limit. But we cannot do more. Thus here again, if "verify" be taken in the narrow sense, the Principle of Verifiability only tells us *part* of what we mean by our statements about material objects (though here again an essential part, and a part which some theories overlook). Here again, then, "verify" must have its wider sense of making *certain or probable*, if the Principle is to hold good.

What are we to conclude from this discussion of Logical Positivism? Let us ignore, as irrelevant for our purpose, the curious doctrine that self-evident propositions, including those of Logic and Mathematics, are tautologies. Let us likewise ignore those universal propositions which are established by induction; for as to the right analysis of these the Logical Positivists themselves are not (I think) agreed. Let us confine ourselves to those statements which profess to state[1] *particular matters of fact*, that is, singular propositions, including existential ones. I wish to suggest that, provided the word "verify" be taken in its wider sense, the Logical Positivists have given, if not an absolutely complete account of statements of this sort, at least an account which is correct as far as it goes. To know the meaning of such a statement must certainly *include* knowing what sort of entities we must be acquainted with in order to verify it: and it is not clear that it must include anything more. I will go further. It seems to me that their view, if put negatively, is perfectly correct, and even obvious. If we do *not* know what sort of entities we must be acquainted with in order to verify a given statement, then it seems to me obvious that we are *not* talking sense when we utter the statement. And even if the word "verify" be taken in the narrower sense (of knowing what experiences would make the truth of our statement certain), *part* of what we are stating

[1] "S professes to state F" = S is true if F is the case.

must still be called verifiable: for part of what we are stating is that we are or could be acquainted with such or such introspectible or sensible data, and unless we know what sort of data they would have to be, and how to set about getting them, we are talking nonsense.

If this be granted, I think it follows that many statements which various people have thought very important, and which have made a great noise in the world, are really nonsensical—that is, are not really statements at all, and are not even false. In the rest of this paper I wish to consider how far this consequence touches *theological* statements, by which I mean all statements made by religious persons in their religious capacity, not just statements made by professional theologians.

Now it is certainly natural to assume that theological statements are *not* verifiable, nor of course refutable, by experience. It is true that a certain number of religious persons would dispute this assumption, and perhaps we may reconsider it later. But it is a very plausible assumption to make, and I think it is one which is very widely accepted at the present time. In any case, it is instructive to consider what follows if we do make it. The first thing that follows is, of course, that *all theological statements are nonsense*; for instance, that it is neither true nor false to say that there is a God, or that He orders the course of events for our benefit, or for the benefit of persons who are morally good, or whatever the religious man would say. I stress the fact that it is not even false to say such things. The denials of the Atheist are just as nonsensical as the affirmations of the Theists. Not only so: the Agnostic's assertion of ignorance is nonsensical too. To say that we do not know, or have not sufficient evidence to be sure, whether God exists or not, implies that the *question* about which we are concerned is itself sense. But this it cannot be, if both the affirmative and the negative answers to it would be nonsensical. It is as if one said "I am not sure whether blue is more identical than music or not" (to take an example from a Logical Positivist writer). You cannot be uncertain whether God exists or not, if there is no such question.

But if theological statements are not sense, if they are not statements except in their grammatical form, can we say what they are? The obvious answer, and the one actually given (I think) by the Logical Positivists, is that they are just *expressions of emotion.* It is not meant, of course, that they *state* the emotional attitude of the speaker (in the way that "I am angry" states my emotional attitude): they merely *express* it in the way that an ejaculation or exclamation would. What exactly is meant by "expressing" when it is thus distinguished from stating, is not easy to say. On the one hand, an utterance which expresses an emotion provides, as it were,

an *outlet* or relief or safety-valve for the emotion. We express our anger by a swear-word, and then we feel better. On the other hand, the hearer or reader can *infer* from our utterance what sort of emotional state we are in, although we have not stated what it is. I do not think that this is a complete account of what "expressing" is, but I cannot at the moment see what exactly would be added to make it so, and perhaps it will suffice for our purpose. The main thing is to make quite clear the distinction between expressing and stating.

Let us consider this suggestion that theological statements are merely expressions of emotion and see how far it will take us. First we may note that it is not nearly so shocking to the religious man as it sounds at first. He may indeed object when he is told that his favourite utterances are nonsense, but that (it may be suggested) is mostly prejudice, and he will soon get over it. At the price of that small concession he gains in return this enormous advantage, that those utterances cannot possibly be refuted by anyone, and that he on his side can cease from the laborious and disappointing task of trying to prove them. No conceivable historical or scientific or philosophical discovery can disprove them, nor even cast doubt upon them; for they are not the sort of things to which the notions of proof or disproof, of favourable or unfavourable evidence, have any application. There can be no dispute between Religion and Science, for there is nothing to dispute about. Moreover (though perhaps this conclusion will be less welcome to some), there can be no dispute between one religion and another, for instance between Christianity and Mohammedanism, or between two varieties of Christianity. One party has one sort of emotional attitude, another has a slightly different one; or possibly the emotional attitude is the same, though the words which give expression to it are different, just as one man expresses his joy by dancing, another by merely smiling. In any case, there is nothing to dispute about.

We may add that this view of Religion is sometimes held by religious people themselves. There is, for instance, the saying *pectus facit theologum*. And we often hear that Religion *transcends the intellect*, which, perhaps, is only a rhetorical way of saying what the Logical Positivists say: rhetorical; because the word "transcend" is just an emotive word designed to secure the hearers' approval, the meaning being simply that Religion is *non-intellectual*. One might also mention the doctrine of Retschl (with which, however, I must confess myself ill acquainted). When he maintained that the judgments of the religious consciousness are not judgments of fact, but value-judgments, was he not approaching very close to the view that they are not judgments at all, but expressions of an emotional attitude? I do not know whether Otto's theology of the Numinous points in

the same direction: but I think that some theologians have interpreted it as if it did. Others again have suggested that Religion resembles Art more than it resembles either Science or Philosophy: and I think that those who say this would also say that Art is concerned with the expression of emotion—whether rightly or wrongly we need not at the moment inquire.

However, we have not yet fully worked out this view that theological statements are expressive of emotional attitudes. For first we must observe that an emotional attitude is always *directed upon* something, or (in Brentano's language) has an *intentional* character. For instance, we cannot be afraid without being afraid of something, nor angry without being angry with someone, and when we are surprised we must have something to be surprised at. The something or someone towards which our emotion is directed is usually called the *object* of it. But if we speak so, we must remember that the object of an emotion can be something fictitious or imaginary. It is the *object of* our emotion, but it is not necessarily *an object* in that non-relative sense of the word in which "object" means a real entity. Thus a child can be afraid of the Bogy Man, and one might feel distressed at an event which never happened; for instance, at some fictitious misfortune of a mendacious beggar. Another way of putting the point is to say that any emotion has as a constituent—not as a mere accompaniment—a cognitive act of some sort, whether it be an act of knowing, or believing, or taking for granted, or questioning (as in anxiety) or barely of entertaining the thought that so and so is the case, and whether the *cognitum* is true or false.

What, then, is the object of the religious man's emotion, the emotion expressed in such statements as "God is good," or the like? It cannot be that God is the object, though that is what both Theistic and Atheistic thinkers would say. The Atheists would say, of course, that He is a fictitious object, like the Bogy Man (in other words, that the statement "God exists" is false) but they would agree with the Theists that the religious emotion is directed upon this object, as the child's fear is directed upon the Bogy Man. But this cannot be right, according to the view that we are working out. Statements about fictitious characters, such as Mr. Pickwick or the Bogy Man, are presumably false;[1] but they are not nonsensical, otherwise they could not be false. But statements about God *are* nonsensical. God is not even a fictitious character, and as we have seen, the Atheist's position is just as nonsensical as the Theist's.

But if God is not the object upon which the religious man's emotion is directed, what can that object be? The obvious answer

[1] I take it that such statements are always complex, as Mr. Russell holds. "The Bogy Man is black" = "there is a being of such and such a description; there is only one such being; and he is black."

is that they are directed upon "the World" or upon "Life as a whole." "Religion is not a system of doctrines but an attitude towards Life" is a very familiar statement. But this must be made clearer. What is meant by the phrase "an attitude towards Life"? Obviously "Life" here is not the name of a substance, like "Socrates"; nor yet is it a description like "the tallest man in this room." And there is the same difficulty about "the World" and "the Universe." Strictly speaking, there is no such entity as Life, or the World, or the Universe: though statements into which these terms enter often make sense, and some of them are true. When we speak of an attitude towards Life, I think we just mean an attitude towards *any experienceable entity, no matter what, which is of interest to any human being.* When we speak of "the Universe," we mean something still wider. We are really talking (if we are talking sense) about *any entity no matter which.* But I suspect that many statements about the Universe are nonsensical, and don't mean anything.

Now it seems to me that there is much truth in this suggestion as to the object of religious emotion. An emotion which is not directed upon some one specific experienceable entity or class of entities, but upon *any* entity you please, no matter what—a *cosmic* or *completely generalised* emotion, as we might call it—does seem to be *ipso facto* religious. For instance, optimism and pessimism, which are respectively attitudes of hopefulness and despairfulness towards any experienceable entity no matter what, can fairly be called religious attitudes. And again, the attitude of aesthetic joy and admiration which some enviable people have towards no matter what experienceable entity is naturally called religious: likewise that attitude of ἀταραξία or indifference towards no matter what experience which some have preached and a few have practised.

I have spoken all along of emotional attitudes. But this may suggest something narrower than I really mean. Perhaps it would be better to say just "attitudes." For that condition of mind which I am describing manifests itself not only in emotions, but also in other ways. Obviously it manifests itself in *speech,* for one thing; these manifestations of it are indeed the main topic of our discussion. But also in other forms of behaviour: for instance, in *ceremonies* and *rituals,* from the simplest to the most complicated. This manifestation of the religious attitude is indeed very closely akin to its manifestation in speech, I mean in those "nonsensical" statements which we are discussing (and of course most ritual includes a certain amount of speech or equivalent dumb-show). For ritual behaviour is mainly or primarily *expressive.* The main point of it is to give utterance or outlet, to provide a safety-valve, for an inward state of tension, which would otherwise, as it were, choke us (I am sorry to speak so vaguely, but I hope you may see the kind of

thing that is meant). Of course, ritual may also have what we may call an economic purpose—to make the crops grow, or to ensure our safety in the next world, or to remove uncomfortable feelings of guilt; and this is the feature which anthropologists chiefly lay stress on. But I incline to think that it is very often secondary; and that a good deal of ritual behaviour, for instance most Christian ritual, has no economic element in it at all, but is purely expressive. We may further note that at any rate one type of religious person would say that ceremonies and rituals express his religious attitude better than words can do: which seems to be an admission that when he *does* use words he is not using them in the ordinary way. So far as it goes, this admission supports the Logical Positivist view that his statements, when he does make statements, are nonsensical. For who would imagine that an ordinary statement—a perceptual or scientific or historical statement—could be "better" expressed by ritual than by words?

But further, our religious attitude may, of course, manifest itself by still other types of behaviour: for instance, by doing a charitable act, or burning a heretic (that is one whose linguistic or ceremonial expressions differ from our own), or voting against Disestablishment, or going to Africa as a missionary.

Nor is this all. The religious attitude is also manifested in what we may call an *intellectual* way, in the formation of beliefs and disbeliefs. I do not, of course, mean beliefs or disbeliefs about God or the gods or about other unverifiable entities. For on the view which we are discussing there cannot be such beliefs or disbeliefs: just as I cannot believe, to take a previous example, that "blue is more identical than music," nor disbelieve it: for I cannot even entertain the thought of its being so. The sort of beliefs and disbeliefs that I am referring to are certain ones about *ordinary* objects and events, experienceable objects and events whose existence is verifiable. It is characteristic of the religious man to have what the Logical Positivists call in their technical language *rules*, that is rules for forming beliefs, and particularly for forming expectations about the future. (So far as I know, they do not themselves use their doctrine of rules for the analysis of religion, but rather for the analysis of scientific generalizations. But I think it does apply to Religion, more plausibly perhaps than to Science.)

Thus one of the Christian's characteristic "rules" is to believe that any event which happens to him is ultimately for his benefit, though on the face of it it may appear indifferent or even harmful. When a man says that he believes in Providence, it is precisely this rule that he is expressing. "I believe in Providence" will mean "It is my rule to expect with regard to every event which happens to me that it will be for my ultimate benefit, whether there is empirical evidence

for this expectation or not, and even if there is empirical evidence against it." There are various ways in which such a rule might work itself out. For instance, if the pious man suffers some great misfortune, he regards it as a lesson. If something which he prays for actually happens, it is an encouragement, perhaps a reward for past merit. If it does not, it is a trial, and so will work out for his good. I think that a great part of what is called *faith* consists in the having such rules, and particularly in the sticking to them when experience inclines us to abandon them.

It is, however, very important to note that a rule cannot be *disproved*, nor yet verified. The statement that *I have got* such and such a rule, say that I am a believer in Providence, can, of course, be verified or refuted, by introspection or by observing my actions. But the form of words which expresses the *content of the rule* is not a statement at all. It is just the expression of an intention or policy as to the forming of expectations. And a policy is not the sort of thing which can be called true or false. It cannot be disproved; it can only be abandoned. This is not perhaps obvious, because the policy here under discussion is not a policy of behaviour, but a policy of forming a certain kind of expectations. And this or that particular expectation *can* be disproved or verified; for instance the expectation that the rain which we prayed for will actually fall to-morrow. None the less, the rule itself cannot be disproved, but only the particular expectations to which it gives rise. If I have a long run of falsified expectations, it may be as silly as you please for me to stick to that particular rule, and I might be very much wiser if I adopted another quite different one in future. But my rule is not disproved, because it is not the sort of thing which can be either true or false.

Thus the "attitude towards life" which theological statements are held on this view to express is something much more complex than it seemed at first sight. It is something which manifests itself (*a*) in emotions, (*b*) in ritual, (*c*) in ordinary practical behaviour, and (*d*) in the rules according to which one forms one's expectations. However, all these manifestations of it are of course concerned with ordinary experienceable things and events. It is to them exclusively that the emotions are directed, it is with them that the behaviour and the rules for forming expectations are concerned; in short, they form the *object* of the religious attitude. What is queer about it is not its object (as most people would suppose) but its nature.

Let us now consider whether this account of theological statements is adequate. As I have said, some types of religious person will be well satisfied with it, since it puts them beyond the reach of refutation and absolves them from the labour of defending their

position by argument. And it does, I think, give a fairly adequate account of such non-theistic religions as Hinayana Buddhism and Confucianism, and of at least some forms of Pantheism. (It is well to remind ourselves that there *are* non-theistic religions.) But is it adequate to Theism of any kind? A Theist would surely tell us that the attitude expressed in *his* theological statements is not solely an attitude towards "Life," that is towards any experienceable event you please, though it does include this; it is also, he would say, an attitude towards God. He would say, indeed, that the attitude towards God was primary, and the attitude towards Life derivative: he would say, for instance, that he feels towards God the emotions of reverence and trust. And this, of course, involves that he *believes* various propositions about God. For those particular emotions only occur when their object is believed to exist. Indeed, a Theist who did not believe that God existed would be a very curious phenomenon.

Yet on the philosophical view which we are discussing it is, of course, impossible to *believe* that God exists. The statement that God exists is nonsensical, and whatever it may express, it cannot possibly express belief in the existence of its grammatical subject: no more than "virtue is blue" can express a belief about virtue. That which is nonsensical cannot possibly be believed. (We are, of course, still assuming that no statement about God can be experientially verified or refuted.) Thus when a man says he believes that God exists, he cannot possibly mean what he says. Yet it is a curious circumstance that people do insist on saying such things. And it is not only the naïve religious man who says them. Learned and self-conscious theologians, well accustomed to reflect on the meaning of what they say, and even eminent philosophers, have written many thousands of pages assigning or refusing to assign predicates to God, exactly as if He were an ordinary object of belief (like the planet Neptune or the Emperor Diocletian) or even an object of knowledge. It is difficult to think that they did not in the least know what they were talking about and that none of the things they said were even false. Theology may not really be a science, but how can it even pretend to be one if the view which we are discussing is correct? Would anyone even pretend to set up a science whose chief object was to prove that blue is more identical than music, or that in some other universe than this there is an imperceptible chimera? It is possible, but it does not seem very likely. And it is well to remember that these considerations apply not to Theism only but to any sort of *metaphysics* in that sense of the word in which metaphysics is distinguished from Logic and Theory of Knowledge: that is to Metaphysics defined as *the attempt to prove or disprove existential propositions which can neither be verified nor refuted*

by perceptual or introspective experience.[1] Can we hold that no metaphysician has ever even known what he was talking about? If we did, we might appeal to the authority of Kant, whose theory of knowledge in this respect as in others is strikingly similar to the one which we are discussing. But even so, the suggestion is a surprising one.

However, we must not suppose that the resources of Logical Positivism are yet exhausted. Let us consider the statement that God exists a little more closely. I am going to assume that existence is not an attribute or characteristic (though grammatically it appears to be) and that "A exists" means "A-ness has an instance, or something is A-ish." So "God exists" means "God-ness or Divinity has an instance, or something is divine" (a Monotheist will add, only one thing). But *divine* is a complex predicate. Let us assume that it is equivalent to "omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect." We may now consider these predicates in order and see what a Logical Positivist would say about them.

Now would it be sense to say that X is omniscient? Could such a statement be experientially verified? Clearly it could not. For however much X turned out to know, we could not be certain that he knew everything. It might, however, be sense to say that there was no discoverable limit to his knowledge—discoverable, that is, by human beings. And very likely this is what people mean by "omniscience." So, too, with omnipotence and moral perfection. Though these as they stand will be nonsense predicates, yet it might still be sense to say that there is no discoverable limit to X's power (i.e. to the number and variety of the changes which he can bring about in entities accessible to human perception or introspection): and likewise that there was no discoverable limit to his moral excellence. I have said that these statements about X might make sense. But they will not really make sense as they stand. For though the predicates are now genuine predicates, X is not a genuine subject. It is, as it were, a blank (a "variable") which needs to be filled in by some proper name or descriptive phrase, if our statements are to make sense. For instance, it is sense to say that there is no discoverable limit to the power of the head-porter of Exeter College, or to the moral excellence of Mr. Ramsay MacDonald. These statements make sense because we can discover by experience whether they are true or false. But what happens when we use these phrases in an *existential* statement—when we say "powerfulness with no discoverable limit has an instance," or "something (add if you like 'only one thing') possesses power with no discoverable limit"? The answer is, our statement can still make sense, but only on one condition: namely that the instance or the something is capable of being

[1] This definition was suggested to me by Mr. Gilbert Ryle.

discovered by perception or introspection; in short, by experience. But if it is insisted that that which possesses these "divine" predicates is not experientially discoverable, then the statement that there is something which possesses them must be nonsensical, according to Logical Positivism. Thus we return to our original position that the statement "God exists" is nonsensical, and cannot therefore state anything which could be either believed or disbelieved.

But though we return to it, we can now qualify it in an important way. Our analysis of the statement has shown that its component statements, "something has knowledge without discoverable limits," etc., although they are nonsensical, are yet each of them *closely analogous to statements which do make sense.* Now this does enable us to give at least a partial solution of our problem (which was, how can people obstinately insist that they believe that God exists, if that statement is nonsensical?). A man could believe that some human being or animal now alive, or some historical character, possessed power, knowledge, and moral excellence without discoverable limit; such statements could at least be false. And he might write many volumes attempting to prove them, and drawing numerous conclusions from them. Thus he *could* believe a statement which is in part, and in its most interesting part, exactly like the statement that God exists. In other words, the predicate "Divine" is not a nonsense predicate.[1] like "more identical than music": it is a predicate which *can* occur in propositions which make sense, though doubtless they are false.

To complete the solution, we have merely to add that there can be not only beliefs about things statable, but also beliefs about statements themselves. It is possible to believe *that a statement makes sense,* though one cannot *see* for oneself that it does: and of course this belief, like any other, might be false. This is my own position with regard to most statements in mathematics and many statements in the empirical sciences. Consider, for instance, the statement that π *is a transcendental number.* I cannot myself believe nor disbelieve this: for I do not know what the statement means, having no idea what a transcendental number is. But I can and do believe that the statement does mean something, that mathematicians know what it means, and even that they can prove it. And I have good though not conclusive evidence for my belief: for I *can* understand some mathematical statements, and I can verify for myself that many mathematicians are intelligent and careful men. We may add that a more unreflective attitude than this is possible and indeed frequent, where we do not even believe something upon evidence, but just assume it without question, without asking whether there is evidence

[1] By a "nonsense predicate" I mean a predicate such that any statement in which it occurs must be nonsensical.

for it or not. And we can be in this attitude in regard to statements, as in regard to other things. Thus I might just assume without question that the statement *π is a transcendental number* makes sense.

Now it is obvious at once that both these attitudes towards statements, and especially the second, are common among religious persons: and they are particularly common where the statements are themselves theological. Thus a pious but uneducated Christian would assume without question that the statement "God is both transcendent and immanent" makes sense, and that theologians can understand it; though he would not himself profess to know what it means, and therefore, in strictness of language, cannot be said to believe that which the statement states. Now might not this be true of all Theists, and not merely of naïve and unsophisticated ones? If so, when they say they believe propositions about God, they really are believing something. But their belief, it may be suggested, is not really about God at all; it is about certain statements or sentences. And what they believe about them is that they make sense. Now this *is* something which can be believed: it is something which can at least be false. For the existence of these sentences or statements, these collocations of noises or black marks, is, of course, experientially verifiable. And to say of them that they make sense is not nonsensical, though it may be false. Moreover, there would be some *prima facie* evidence for the belief that they make sense, even though the belief be false; and it would therefore be natural to hold it. For as we have seen, the component statements into which the statement "God exists" may be analysed, though they do not themselves make sense, nevertheless do closely resemble statements which do. To say that X has power, knowledge, and goodness without discoverable limit does make sense, provided that X is some entity whose existence can be verified in experience. And it is therefore natural to suppose that it still makes sense when X is some other entity whose existence is not thus verifiable: natural, but mistaken, for really the removal of the reference to experience makes the whole statement nonsensical.

To conclude: if the doctrine of Logical Positivism with regard to the pre-conditions of meaningfulness be accepted, there is no escaping the consequence that theological statements are nonsensical; that is that they are not even false, but are merely expressive of an attitude in the way we have described—provided that we assume, as we have been doing throughout the discussion, that they are *not* capable of being verified or refuted in experience. But what if we abandoned this assumption? If we did abandon it, then theological statements would not be nonsensical after all, though, of course, they would now run the risk of being false. And certainly many religious people would say that the Logical Positivists, like many other philosophers (Hume and Kant for instance) have fallen into error by taking too

narrow a view of experience, confining it as they do to ordinary perceptual and introspective experiences, and to the scientific and historical judgments based upon these. It will be said that there is also such a thing as religious experience, and that by this, though by this alone, theological statements *can* be verified or refuted.

This is a suggestion which, for my own part, I am prepared to treat with great respect. And it seems to me that if we hold any sort of empiricist theory of knowledge (of which Logical Positivism is one variety) we have to choose between this suggestion and the purely "attitudinarian" theory of religion which I have sketched above. But what exactly is meant by the phrase "religious experience"? An adequate discussion of this question would require another paper as long as this one. Here I will only say that the phrase seems to me to be radically ambiguous. On the one hand, it may stand for an experience wholly different from ordinary sensing and introspecting, an experience in which one is acquainted with an entity (or entities) different in kind from anything sensible or introspectible. This I think is better called *mystical* experience. On the other hand, it stands quite as frequently for an experience of such things as miracles, providential intervention, "guidances," answers to prayer and the like. (When apologists appeal to "the evidence of Christian experience through the ages" it is experience of *this* sort that they usually mean.) Now the occurrence of the events thus described is established, if at all, by ordinary perceptual or introspective evidence. And *in themselves* they are events of the ordinary kind, such as a recovery from a disease, or the occurring of a thought to someone's mind. What is not ordinary about them, it is supposed, is their *causation*, their manner of origination.

I wish to suggest that mystical experience, though it may be used to support religion in general, cannot be used to support any particular form of religion, as against any other. It is just as frequently met with in the non-theistic religions of the East as in the theistic religions of the West. And it is just as easily interpreted in non-theistic terms as in theistic—perhaps, indeed, *more* easily. If we wish to defend Theism in particular, we must appeal to religious experience in the second sense of the word. That is to say, we must try to show that in ordinary perception and introspection we meet with events which give evidence of the existence and activities of a non-human intelligence: evidence similar in kind to that which each of us uses to justify his belief in the existence and activities of other human intelligences like himself.[1] But whether there really are such events, and whether (if there are) the intelligence whose existence they give evidence of has the characteristics which Theists would wish to attribute to God, I do not know.

[1] This is the line of argument followed by Mr. Malcolm Grant in his ingenious and stimulating book *A New Theory of God and Survival.*

PLEASURE AND CONATION

ARTHUR T. SHILLINGLAW

THERE is no subject to which the writers of ethical textbooks have devoted more attention than that of the relations between pleasure and desire, and yet it is surprising how little agreement their efforts have produced in philosophical circles. This failure seems to me to be chiefly due to the fact that the question is only one among the many problems of conation, and can only be discussed in that context. In consequence, there remains a very wide gap between what psychologists have to say about the analysis of conation and what ethical writers have to say about the problems of moral psychology.[1] My object in writing this article is to help to bring this deplorable state of affairs to an end by expounding a theory of the relations between pleasure and desire, which is based upon a careful analysis of the facts of conation.

Pleasure and desire are only two among the many factors which enter into conative situations. Until some agreement has been reached as to what these other factors are and as to how they are, or are not, commonly related to each other in conative processes, theories about pleasure and desire must necessarily be abstract and provisional. For example, it is by no means impossible *a priori* that they should never be directly related to each other, but only mediately through such terms as instructive wants or propensities. Again, it is a mere assumption that there must be any one relation which invariably holds between them. At the root of all these false simplifications, there seems to lie an unwillingness to keep before one the obvious fact that conation is a process, not a state, and that its factors and their relations may undergo considerable modifications from moment to moment.

A process may be described as a series of temporally adjoined terms, standing in direct causal relations to each other. Now the nature of a process can best be seen by analysing the various phases through which it passes, and I see no reason to believe that conations are an exception to this rule. I shall therefore begin by taking a typical (and perhaps trivial) example of a well-developed conative process, and examining the various phases through which it passes.

Five minutes ago, while I was sitting writing at this desk, I

[1] How wide this gap is, and how deplorable its consequences are, can be seen from a careful reading of the first two chapters of Mr. Joseph's *Some Problems in Ethics*.

began quite suddenly to feel thirsty, and knowing that there was a glass of water on the table opposite, it naturally occurred to me that I might stop writing and relieve my thirst. After a few moments' hesitation I decided to do so, despite the fact that this entailed an interruption of my work. I then crossed over to the table and drank the water. When my thirst had been relieved, I went back to my desk and resumed working.

I think that, without distortion of the facts, we can distinguish four phases in this process.

(1) *Appetitive Phase.*—It is obvious that in this case at least desire did not form the starting-point of the conation; the explicit desire to drink the glass of water must rather be regarded as the culmination of the preliminary phase through which the process passed. A careful analysis of this phase will disclose at least three distinct factors. (*a*) In the first place, there is the fact which I might have described at the time by the words "I am thirsty now." This is neither a perception nor a desire, though it is more akin to the latter than to the former. Such experiences can best be described as *Wants,* and in what follows I shall employ the word in this rather special sense. (*b*) Secondly, there is my awareness of the fact that I was sitting at this desk and that there was a glass of water on the table opposite. This factor is common not only to all conative processes, but to every conative situation however short. I shall call it the *Awareness of the Present Situation.* (*c*) Finally, there is the actual desire or impulse to drink water, which was in this case an outcome of the other two experiences. Desires, unlike *wants,* do admit of analysis, since they contain both a subjective and an objective factor. On the subjective side, there was my aversion from the present state of affairs and my appetition towards another one. But appetition and aversion cannot in fact exist in isolation from their objects. The word "object" is misleading, for as Dr. Broad has pointed out (*Five Types of Ethical Theory,* p. 67), appetitions and aversions are directed not at things, but at changing or preserving of the states of things. Strictly speaking, I did not desire the glass of water; I desired *that I should drink the water in the glass.* To avoid confusion, I think it is best to call what is expressed by this last clause the *Objective* of the Desire or Impulse.

As regards the relations between appetitions, wants, and our awarenesses, I think we can lay it down that the occurrence of the first is in most cases jointly determined by the other two. It is in virtue of this principle that we are able to predict other people's behaviour. The relations between the other two are not so simple; sometimes a want is aroused by a perception, sometimes *vice versa.*

(2) *Deliberative Phase.*—In the case I have been considering, appetition or aversion did not immediately give rise to action.

There was an intermediate phase, during which I considered such questions as how I could gratify my desire to drink the water, and whether it would seriously inconvenience me to do so. So far as I can see, the word *deliberation* is generally used to indicate these two rather different processes, i.e., consideration of the means whereby a desire can be fulfilled and reflection as to which among a class of alternative desires is to be realized.

The distinction which is commonly made between desires and impulses seems to me to turn wholly on the fact that in impulsive conative processes the deliberative phase is completely absent, since appetition passes over into action without any thought being given to alternatives or to the question of means. Similarly, the distinction between desires and intentions turns upon the fact that after the deliberative phase is over, the desire has become a cause of action, not merely a possible ground. If a desire persists throughout the deliberative phase, it *ipso facto* becomes an intention.

(3) *Active Phase.*—After I had decided to fulfil my desire and had called to mind the appropriate means, the conative process entered upon a new phase, viz., that of action. Psychologically, the chief peculiarity of this stage is that from now onwards the alternatives, even though they may persist in consciousness, are no longer entertained as grounds for immediate action. From now onwards we are committed.

(4) *Passive Phase.*—Once action had taken place, my desire to drink the water was realized, and therefore came to an end. This is what I shall call the *Fulfilment of Desire*. We must, however, note that desires may be terminated not only by their fulfilment, but by the realization that fulfilment is either impossible or inexpedient. Closely connected with this fact, there is another experience, which many philosophers have failed to distinguish from fulfilment. Not only did I fulfil my desire when I drank the water, but by doing so I removed the want which originally gave rise to my desire. This experience is what Stout calls *Satisfaction*, but for various reasons I think it would be more suitable to give it the name *Satiation*.

Very often the fulfilment of a desire does not bring Satiation, and when this is the case, the conation generally persists, the original desire being replaced by another. E.g., had my thirst not been satisfied by drinking the glass of water I might very well have gone to the trouble of finding some more exciting beverage. Strictly speaking, Satiation never occurs except as the last event in a conative process; though there are many conative processes which do not terminate in this way, since its conditions are not always realizable at the moment.

There are three points which I wish to stress in this connection. (*a*) Firstly, the fact that the fulfilment of a desire does not always

lead to the removal of a particular want proves conclusively that wanting and desiring are two quite different things. So far as I can see, our wants are pure experiences and not directed at *Objectives*, though each may be dispositionally connected with courses of action which lead to the realization of objectives of some general kind. (*b*) Secondly, we must be careful to avoid confusing the satiation of a want with the pleasure which invariably accompanies such an experience. If they were really identical, the intensity of the want relieved would be exactly equal to the pleasure experienced. This is not, however, the case—*e.g.*, a diabetic gets little pleasure from drinking, though his want is presumably very intense. (*c*) Thirdly, from what I have said, it does appear that wants play the part of predisposing conditions in regard to our conative processes. Now, recent psychologists profess to have shown that the ultimate wants or predispositions present in human beings are relatively few and simple. They have also pointed out that such tendencies are generally associated with structural and functional peculiarities, in virtue of which certain acts specially adapted to satisfying them are performed from their first appearance with marked facility. To such a combination of tendencies and capacities they have given the name *Instinct*. Now that the dust of controversy has settled, I think we can see quite plainly that there is no necessary principle in virtue of which each ultimate want should be associated with some such mechanism; so that the importance of recent investigations is due rather to the discovery of the former than to the analysis of the latter. If MacDougall is right in maintaining that there is an innate tendency to submissiveness, he is surely wrong in calling it an instinct, for there is no special capacity with which it is associated.

Before passing on to consider the chief point at issue, there is one further aspect of conative processes with which I must deal, viz., hedonic tone. As regards the first phase, I think we can say that it is only in rare cases that it is pleasant. It is, of course, a truism that desire is not always painful, but in my case at least pleasure never arises until I begin to think about such things as the certainty with which my desire can be fulfilled, or the pleasantness of the activity involved in doing so. And, as I have pointed out, such considerations belong to the second, and not to the first phase. Deliberation itself may be either pleasant or painful, though in most cases it is more nearly neutral than is commonly supposed. One of its most peculiar characteristics is that its hedonic tone is largely determined by the anticipated pleasantness or painfulness which will follow upon the fulfilment of a desire. It was this fact which made it possible for the Hedonists to confuse the pleasantness of X with the pleasantness of the thought of X.

In the final phase of conation, the variations in hedonic tone are

more marked. The fulfilment of a desire is no doubt accompanied by pleasure in most cases, but I am inclined to think that this pleasure is a self-conscious one, due to the knowledge that we have achieved what we set out to do. Satiation, on the other hand, is in itself a pleasant experience, even where it is not accompanied by fulfilment; and the painfulness of its opposite ("dissatiation") seems only to be intensified by our success in achieving the immediate aim.

I have now completed my preliminary analysis of conative processes. What I have said must necessarily appear unduly simplified, for it is only in very exceptional cases that an act is motivated by only one instinctive want, and in every developed human being satiation is dependent upon conditions much more complex than those I have described. Nevertheless, I think that the schematic analysis I have given is a good deal more complete than those which are to be found in the writings of psychologists, and can readily be applied to more complicated cases than the one I have dealt with. It only remains for me to apply it to the solution of a familiar, but none the less difficult, problem of psychology.

The two questions which I wish to discuss are these:—

(1) Is it possible to desire pleasure alone?

(2) If so, can we ever desire anything other than pleasure?

Neither of these questions is wholly free from ambiguity, and, in particular, there are two sources of confusion which must be cleared up at the very outset. The word *pleasure*, like *colour*, may be used either as a general name, denoting one of a class of particulars, or it may be used as an abstract name, denoting a quality or characteristic. Neither of these usages would exactly express what is meant here. I shall interpret the proposition, "Smith is desiring pleasure" to mean "Smith is desiring a certain experience X, which he believes would have the characteristic of pleasantness, and if Smith did not believe this, his desire for X would be less strong than it in fact is." With this definition, it is not difficult to explain what is meant by the desire for pleasure alone. If Smith desires X for its pleasantness alone, his desire for X will not, and cannot, survive his belief that X would be pleasant.

There is another ambiguity which must be dealt with here. There are two different ways in which we may be said to desire things, i.e., as means and as ends. Unless we restrict the question to the second of these senses, there will really be no question to discuss: for pleasantness is a resultant characteristic which cannot be directly produced, so that unless we desire the means it is logically impossible that we should fulfil a desire for pleasure In that sense, therefore, it would be impossible that we should desire pleasure alone. But in the present inquiry I intend to confine myself to the question whether it is possible to desire pleasure alone as an end.

(1) Many of the refutations of Hedonism, Ethical as well as Psychological, rest upon giving a negative answer to the question we have formulated above. The arguments upon which this denial have been based may be divided into two classes. To the first class belong those which maintain quite simply that since there is no ultimate or instructive want whose object is pleasure, there can be no desire which is directed to this end. The premise is in this case true; for, as Butler said, the particular propensities have for their object their own satisfaction, not the pleasure of their possessors.[1] But this premise will not in itself prove that there can be no desire for pleasure, since wanting and desiring are, on any careful analysis, two quite different states, whose ends may be as distinct as night from day. I do not therefore feel inclined to attach much importance to this objection.

The second class of argument adds another premise to the above one. It is asserted that while wanting and desiring are quite distinct, they are so connected that the object of desire must stand in some special logical relationship to the object of the want which occasions it. So far as I can see, this special logical relation is commonly thought to be either that of determinate to determinable or of means to end. On the former view, a want is to be regarded as a vague longing for an indeterminate object which becomes or gives rise to a definite and explicit desire for a particular object, in accordance with the ordinary processes of psychical causation. It is therefore argued that, since there is no want whose satiation consists in pleasurable experience, there can be no desire directed to the having of a particular pleasurable experience. But we have already seen that desires are directed to their own fulfilment, just as wants tend towards their own satiation, and these two things are logically quite distinct. Whereas, if this theory were right, fulfilment would curtail satiation, in the same way as the fact that this has the determinate quality of scarlet entails that it has the determinable quality of redness. For this reason I think we may reject the first alternative.

The other form of the argument is as follows. Every desire is directed to the means of "satiating" the want which occasioned it. There is no instinctive want whose satiation is a causal consequence of pleasurable feeling. Therefore there can be no desire whose objective is the production of pleasurable feeling.

This argument is much more plausible than the former one, since it seems generally to be true that our desires are directed at bringing about states of affairs which do in fact lead to satiation. This is particularly true in the case of high-developed instincts, where the

[1] It should of course be noted that on my view the connection between a want and its "object" is not a strictly logical one, since wants are immediate experiences.

determinateness of the end to which desire is directed is only equalled by its peculiar fittingness to produce a state of affairs which will "satiate" the want. Let us therefore admit that originally this relation does hold between a want and a desire on their first appearance. Is there any good reason to suppose that it will continue to hold after the process of conditioning has started?

The most important law which governs the relations between mental wants is that of Association or the Revival of Contexts. This law applies to desires as well as to purely cognitive states. The chicken that first experienced an appetition to eat any red object on the ground soon comes to feel aversion towards such objects if it finds one of them very unpalatable. This is due to the fact that the "dissatiation" attending the fulfilment of appetition brings about an aversion from the object. When a similar object appears later, the revival of the context of the previous experience brings back the aversion. This instance is not incompatible with the theory we are examining, but it points to others which are. The history of most fetishes would provide suitable examples. In such cases the fulfilment of a desire has at some early stage been accompanied by intense satiation. The experience has in all, or most, cases been accompanied by the presence of some accidental and irrelevant feature, e.g., the chiming of a grandfather clock. Now in the course of time the subject may transfer his desire from the real cause of his satiation to the clock itself, and may experience an acute desire to possess a similar one when the original want is revived. It is idle to pretend that the possession of the clock will fully satisfy his instinctive want; he has become the victim of a misplaced or dislocated conative impulse. In this case, therefore, the desire has ceased to have as its objective an appropriate means of satiating a want, so that even when the desire is fulfilled the want will not be satiated.

On these grounds I think we may safely reject the arguments which have been put forward to prove that we cannot desire pleasure. There is another ingenious theory, however, which admits that we can desire pleasure, but denies that we can ever desire it alone. It may be summarized in the following two propositions:—

(*a*) There is no primary desire whose objective is the attainment of pleasurable feeling, but there are secondary desires which are directed to the fulfilment of their associated primary desires.

(*b*) Pleasure *is* the fulfilment of a secondary desire of this nature.

The advocates of this theory point out that very often my desire to produce a certain state of affairs is accompanied by the desire that my desire for that state of affairs should be fulfilled. However paradoxical this may sound, I have no doubt that their contention is so far right. Part at least of what is commonly called the desire

for success is simply the desire that one should succeed in fulfilling one's desires. The existence of secondary desires of this sort may easily be verified by taking an example where the primary desire is weak and the secondary desire very strong. My desire to play push-pin could under no circumstances be very strong, but if I were to find that it was very difficult to play that curious game, I think that I would probably devote a great deal of energy to acquiring the art. Now, the most plausible explanation of this fact is surely that though my desire to play push-pin is slight, my desire not to be frustrated when I tried to do so is really quite strong. So I think that we are forced to admit that secondary desires are by no means uncommon or unimportant.

The second proposition is hardly so well established. There is little doubt that the fulfilment of a secondary desire is usually accompanied by pleasure, or its non-fulfilment by displeasure; but such facts fail to prove that pleasure and the fulfilment of a secondary desire are one and the same thing.

(1) In the first place, the characteristic of pleasantness does not seem to me to be analysable; it is to all appearances as unanalysable as redness or any other such quality. Yet if this theory were correct, pleasantness would be a very complex thing indeed, containing both a secondary desire and its realized objective. Of course it is strictly impossible to prove that anything is unanalysable, but I think it must be admitted that in this case the evidence is distinctly unfavourable.

(2) The above difficulty might, of course, be met by conceding that "pleasant" does not literally mean "being the fulfilment of a secondary desire," but that the first characteristic is nothing more than a necessary consequent of the second. But here again there are serious difficulties. What is there common to secondary and not to primary desires, in virtue of which the fulfilment of the former is invariably pleasant while the fulfilment of the latter is not? The only answer that I can think of with the slightest pretence to plausibility is that secondary desires are self-conscious and that pleasure is from its very nature an experience of which only a self-conscious being is capable. Is such a view defensible?

(3) This brings me to a third and, to my mind, insuperable difficulty. The desire to fulfil a desire is what we might call a self-conscious experience, i.e., it is impossible to entertain the secondary desire without being introspectively aware of the primary one. If that is so, I cannot experience pleasure unless I am at the same time introspecting. Hence on this theory it would appear that almost all the judgments we make concerning our past hedonic experiences are false. When Jones declares in the club-house that he did definitely enjoy his last round of golf, his statement cannot literally be true

unless he divided his attention on the links between the playing of his shots and the introspecting of his mental states. Of course, such judgments might really be conditional, i.e., if Jones had introspected at the time he would have had pleasant experiences. But I think it is clear that Jones at any rate did not attach this meaning to his assertion.

(4) Finally, there is the difficulty of dealing with what are called the sensory pleasures. To account for them, the advocates of this theory must either postulate an indefinite number of unconscious desires directed to the having of certain types of sensation, or they must maintain that the pleasantness of sensations is utterly different from the pleasantness of conative experiences; and both these hypotheses are, to say the least, improbable.

Hence I have no hesitation in pronouncing this ingenious theory to be almost certainly false.

It still remains for me to show how it is possible for us to desire pleasure, for in the absence of any sound theoretical objection the evidence of introspection would then be far too strong to be disregarded. To do so I shall once again fall back upon the Laws of Association.

In the first place, I would submit that pleasure and the satiation of want are more frequently associated than pleasure and any particular desire, on account of the fact that the fulfilment of desire does not always bring pleasure, while satiation does. Now, where the means of satiation are varied, it is obvious that pleasure will be *much* more commonly associated with satiation than with the fulfilment of any particular desire. Thus, if there are ten different ways in which I can satiate my thirst, the want will become more strongly associated with the thought of the pleasure consequent upon quenching it than with the thought of drinking a glass of water. To suppose otherwise would be to complicate the laws of mental process in a way quite unjustified by the facts. As a corollary, we should expect that where the means of satiation chosen are unvarying, the original association between means and end would be left unimpaired. This is exactly what we find when we examine the facts. A miser invariably gratifies his instinct of acquisitiveness in one way, and it is notorious that he does not desire pleasure but money. On the other hand, in those classes of society where the means of gratification are widely varied, the percentage of hedonists is very high. This is only what we should have expected, since in their case pleasure is more frequently associated with satiation than any other circumstance.

My theory is therefore amply verified by the facts, but it still remains for me to consider a very important objection. If it is true, it might be urged, that desire and the means of satisfying the fundamental wants of human nature are liable to become so patently

dissociated, will it not follow that cases will arise in which these wants will cease to be satiated, so that life will become intolerable? This objection does have some force, but it ignores one important fact. If the object of desire and the satiation of its want are not related as means to end, but as effect to cause, the hedonist must be as careful to bring about the means of satisfaction as anyone else; otherwise, he will be deprived of the pleasure he is seeking. Desire is always accompanied by the thought of the means whereby it can be fulfilled. In his case, one of the means is the bringing about of those situations, which would have fulfilled his desire, had it still been directed at the means of satisfaction. On the other hand, I think we must admit that the means will tend not to be so adequately realized, when they are desired only in this secondary and indirect manner. It is for this reason that many cases do arise in which instructive wants are left in a state of chronic dissatisfaction—a condition to which I think the name "neurasthenia" is given.

My conclusion is therefore that, while there may be no instinctive want whose proper object is pleasurable feeling and no original desires which are hedonistic, the laws of psychology both permit and explain the development of the desire for pleasure.

(2) I am now in a position to deal very briefly with the popular error that it is impossible to desire anything but pleasure. If my previous remarks have been to the point, there should be no difficulty in exposing the erroneous character of this conception. For, in the first place, we found on direct analysis that in one particular case the objection of a desire was not the pleasantness of an experience, but the bringing about of a certain psycho-physical situation, viz., the drinking of a glass of water. Such pleasure as was experienced was no more than an indirect result of this state of affairs. So far as I can see, the doctrine of psychological hedonists could never have been made to appear even plausible, unless they had failed to distinguish fulfilment from satiation and satiation from the pleasure consequent upon it.[1] In the second place, we also found reason to suppose that there is no instructive want whose end is pleasure. If there had been, we might have expected this want to be associated with a mechanism for the discharge of certain secretions into the blood-stream, which would produce an intoxication of delirium; whereas the instinctive mechanisms we know of exist solely for the performance of acts, whose ends are both contingent and external. Finally, we may press the biological objection further

[1] Psychological Egoism—the doctrine that we only ultimately desire future states of our own minds—clearly rests on a confusion of satiation with the objective of desire. The former is always purely mental; the latter almost invariably a psycho-physical state of affairs.

and maintain that, the constitution of human nature being what it is, the successful functioning of any such desire would have intensified such a tendency, and that the greater the intensity it acquired, the less efficient would its possessors become. It is therefore questionable whether such a race could ever have been evolved, and if it had been it would certainly not have survived. For these reasons I think the doctrine that every desire is a desire for pleasure of some sort cannot be regarded as a serious contribution either to psychology or ethics.

DISCUSSION

PROFESSOR BROAD'S *EXAMINATION OF McTAGGART'S PHILOSOPHY* [1]

S. V. KEELING, D.-ès-L.

In his Preface Dr. Broad anticipates that two sorts of censure might be passed on his subjection of McTaggart to criticism. Some may say: "You know perfectly well" (*sic*) that any system of constructive metaphysics by deduction from self-evident truths "*must* be moonshine", so why waste your time? Others may think it "barely decent" for "the executor of the man to become the executioner of the system". Dr. Broad is rightly unperturbed by either kind of objector. To the former he is "certainly not prepared to make such great concessions". "Absolutism is the philosophical expression of an aspect of reality which has profoundly impressed some of the greatest thinkers in all parts of the world and at all periods of human history. If (they) all talked what appears, when literally interpreted, to be nonsense, it is surely a most significant fact that men of such high intelligence and of such different races and traditions should independently have talked such very similar nonsense. To me, for one, this fact strongly suggests that there is a genuine and important aspect of reality, which is either ineffable, or, if not, is extremely hard to express coherently in language which was, no doubt, constructed to deal with other aspects of the universe." To objectors of the latter kind he answers that were McTaggart now living he would prefer to have his philosophy criticized by "at least one reasonably competent professional colleague" rather than see the product of all his efforts go by default—though we may think this an over-gloomy and perhaps over-hasty view of the alternative. Dr. Broad had reviewed Vol. I of the *Nature of Existence* for *Mind*; he had read and prepared for publication with extreme care the MS. of Vol. II after McTaggart's death, and on these and other grounds was obviously intimate with his subject's mind and work. So that Dr. Broad, in his turn, should not wish *his* special knowledge, the product of much labour too, "to go by default", but should have chosen to utilize it in composing a course of lectures on McTaggart's philosophy at Cambridge and then place that material before the unprivileged outer world in the form of the present book, is surely to be accounted pure gain.

Of the examiner's intended fairness there can be no question, but the few readers who are "at home" in McTaggart's volumes may vary in opinion about Dr. Broad's sympathy with his subject. For my own part, I confess to some amusement at seeing how swiftly and low the mighty may fall at Cambridge, especially when no longer physically Fellows. And even were one to suppose the fall occurred only in Dr. Broad's imagination, one would still be curious to know the cause of that imagination. For barely six years ago he declared McTaggart "a thinker of the very first rank" comparable with Spinoza, Hegel and the greatest. His *Nature of Existence* was "a work of genius", placing its author "in the front rank of the great historical

[1] *Examination of McTaggart's Philosophy, Vol. I.* By C. D. Broad, Litt.D., F.B.A. (Cambridge University Press. 1933. Pp. lv + 460. 21s. net.).

philosophers". His writing was "pellucidly clear", ranking him "with the masters of English philosophical prose"—no meagre meed of praise! Now the scene is one of dust and ashes. To notice only those of Dr. Broad's discussions which relate to the more important of McTaggart's principles and arguments, I find some twenty instances in which the refutations close with such rhetorical full-stops as "a mass of verbal inconsistencies", "verbal moonshine", "extremely obscure", "particularly silly confusion", "all this apparent nonsense", "verbal tangles", "very confused and confusing", "completely trivial and much ado about nothing". Is this all by way of emphasizing McTaggart's "crystalline clearness" and his "lawyer-like determination to make every clause completely watertight"?

We should keep it steadily before our minds throughout that this examination takes place in a strangely constituted court. Only the prosecuting counsel is present, the defendant is not represented. True, Dr. Broad is a generous as well as an able counsel for the prosecution. He will state a case on behalf of the defence in the way he thinks the defence would have put it, and he scorns to profit from a slip. But it is hardly to be expected that he would see the defendant's case with the same force as he sees his own.

There are three things ostensibly being tried in this examination—McTaggart's conclusions, his supporting arguments and the applicability of his method; perhaps, though not declaredly, also the very possibility of philosophy in the sense in which the greatest thinkers have understood it. In these circumstances, we shall not be surprised if the defendant's fortunes seem to stagger on somewhat haltingly at times, and where there is no one to rule whether or how questions should be put, I, as a mere eavesdropper, decide that at the least a very large allowance must be made when returning the verdict. With this in mind, I shall give a brief account of Dr. Broad's principal contentions, with occasional comments on them, and mention in conclusion some of the reflections my readings of this work have prompted. The contents, which are conveniently arranged into five "books", consist of (i) "restatements", sometimes very lengthy ones, of what McTaggart maintained, (ii) critical discussion of his conclusions and of his arguments for them, (iii) a number of "independent discussions" of topics treated under (i) or (ii) or topics connected with them. My space here is too limited to be able to refer to the last, or to relate except in truncated form what I take to be the main points of (i) and (ii).

(1) *Preliminary Considerations.*—Bk. I opens with an exposition of the most general character of McTaggart's method, and of its more obvious differences from the methods adopted by Kant and Hegel. The remaining four chapters expound and criticize McTaggart's views on existence and reality, and on the question whether there is anything both real and non-existent. He regards (*a*) 'real' and 'existent' to be names of indefinable qualities, and (*b*) qualities to be, some real and non-existent, others both real and existent (e.g. Wisdom is a real quality, Socrates's wisdom an existent one).—Broad considers the view that reality is a generic quality to be "quite certainly false", but in lieu of alleging a reason for the certainty, he substitutes for McTaggart's quality of being real a certain "property" found convenient in modern formal logic, so allowing "there is the characteristic of having instances". In what sense there "is" this characteristic we are not told, but presumably *it* will be other than that of "having instances". I suspect there is more to the question of the connexion between reality and existence than Broad's discussion takes into account: I do not know how that "more" should be expressed, if McTaggart's expression of it is unclear and objectionable.

Broad also finds "quite untenable" McTaggart's distinction between

'the wisdom of Socrates' and 'wisdom', on the ground that the wisdom of Socrates might have characterized innumerable other men, and so differs from wisdom only as wisdom differs from any determinate degree of wisdom. He therefore decides that McTaggart's distinction is an epistemological, and not an ontological one. (*Is* there nothing but a certain determinate *degree* of the characteristic in reference? I cannot believe it.)

In order to prove there are no non-existent characteristics, McTaggart introduced the principle that the parts of whatever is existent are themselves existent, hence, e.g. the characteristic 'non-phoenixhood' exists, though there are no phoenixes.—If, Broad argues plausibly, 'non-P' names a complex attribute of which P is a part, then presumably there is another part of which 'non' is the name.—This is certainly unplausible. But if we suppose with Broad that 'X is not a phoenix' expresses "a negative fact",will there not still have to be some entity which 'non' expresses, and so the difficulty remain?

Other entities which have also been held real but not existent are possibilities and propositions. Broad finds McTaggart's treatment of the former "unduly negative", and this seems to me true. McTaggart does, however, assert their existence, though he denies it to propositions. With these conclusions Broad agrees "in the main", but thinks that McTaggart misunderstood what was meant by those who held propositions to exist. Here too Broad seems right: propositions were not held to be required for judgments to *correspond* with. But I fail to see why (in discussing McTaggart's answer to supporters of the proposition) Broad should 'boggle' at McTaggart's distinction between what a belief *professes* to correspond with, and what it *really* corresponds with. Surely there is a plain sense in which every belief "professes" or purports to be about something or some things, whether or not it is also really about them? It seems unnecessarily contentious to object that "beliefs do not literally profess to *do* anything"—nobody supposes that beliefs profess to *'do'*, but that they profess to *'be-about'*. Broad has no objection to writing that "an argument *professes* to be about" (p. 367) and that "a phrase *claims* by its linguistic form to be an exclusive description" (p. 289), why then does he demur at "propositions" professing to be about something?—So, though McTaggart probably misunderstood the grounds on which those who believed in propositions did so, his main point is undisturbed, viz.—there is no reason to believe there are such entities.

(2) *Characteristics and Particulars.*—In Bk. II, Broad brings together McTaggart's conclusions about characteristics and substances. Division of the former into qualities and relations, and into simple, compound and complex is discussed fully in ch. vii, and in ch. viii the notions of substance and of the plurality of substances are considered. A searching examination of two principles, the "Dissimilarity of the Diverse" and that of "Sufficient Descriptions", which depend on certain views about characteristics and substances, brings the Book to a close. Broad's criticisms here relate to matters so vital to McTaggart's system, that the utmost care must be exercised in reaching a decision about the soundness of these criticisms. I mention here only four of the points Broad examines in ch. v, viz. (i) whether qualities can be replaced by relations, (ii) whether a term can be related to itself, (iii) the generation of qualities by relationships, (iv) McTaggart's use of the phrase 'the nature of' a term.

(i) Complaining that McTaggart dismisses this possibility "almost without discussion", Broad denies that it is either self-evident or demonstrable that exact likeness consists in, or depends on, the possession of a common quality. He offers the irrelevant suggestion that "it is certain" that *recognition* of

likenesses and unlikenesses precedes *recognition* of common qualities, but does not discuss whether recognition of likenesses and unlikenesses does not presuppose prior *cognition* of common qualities. He decides that it is not "an altogether unreasonable view" that common qualities are "convenient fictions" resorted to for economy of expression.—I find the whole discussion on pp. 88–9 unconvincing and strained. Even had there been an echo of doubt in my mind, I still should be surer that what are commonly supposed qualities are not relations than I should be sure of the argument Broad gives in this place. There seems as good, and the same kind of, evidence for the existence of qualities as for relations, and Broad's argument against qualities seems to me just as dubious as Bradley's argument against relations which, according to Broad, "would disgrace a child or a savage" (p. 85).

(ii) Broad points out that there are two types of relation that McTaggart held to relate certain terms to themselves, e.g. certain symmetrical relations, as identity, and certain non-symmetrical ones, e.g. contempt, respect. Each case is considered separately. McTaggart had pointed out that when a term stands in a relation to itself, that term "has a certain aspect of duality", which shows up in language, one name or descriptive phrase occurring twice in the sentence. This "aspect of duality" seems unobjectionable to Broad when the relation in question is non-symmetrical (for 'to be respecter of A' is other than 'to be respected by A'), but most objectionable when the relation is symmetrical. Why it should be so I cannot fathom. If it were replied that the "aspect of duality" is due to the same linguistic fact in *both* cases, viz. that the same noun or a descriptive equivalent must occur twice because the sentence expresses a relationship, Broad would doubtless reply that the answer is circular. If it be asked but why *should* the same name occur twice in the sentence, presumably McTaggart would reply because the sentence expresses a *relation* in which that named by the name stands, and not a quality possessed by it. This point does not seem to be one that could be proved or disproved by analysis of the *language* used to express the situation. McTaggart's position is that 'identity' is the name of a relation not of a quality; 'being identical with B' would be the form of a description describing the generated quality. Broad will have none of this, however, but takes as an example the convenient case "Tully is the same as Cicero", which he analyses into: there exists something having a certain pair of properties ('being called Tully', 'being called Cicero') and such that neither property belongs to more than one thing. Thus, in avoiding recourse to the *words* "same", "identical", he supposes he has shown the non-existence of identity. At least he says, "if this analysis be right" there is no relation of which 'identity' is the name.—The force of this criticism will naturally depend on whether the reader is satisfied that "this analysis is right", and on his views about the ontological claims made by logical analysts. Is it not conceivable that an alternative analysis of the same situation should be worked out, which seems as plausible and in which reference to 'same' *is* made, and if so, what then would our analyses of the use of language here prove? Further, I am wondering how Broad would choose to analyse that statement which he alone can truly assert, viz. "I am Broad". I imagine its analysis would not be formally analogous, and even if it dispensed with all use of the word 'same', would it thereby be shown to dispense with identity?

Where the relation is non-symmetrical (e.g. in self-contempt, self-respect, etc.) Broad says it is "indirect" (a "relational product"). But indirect though it be, is it not a relation in which a term stands to itself? I cannot see how the indirectness as explained in pp. 91–2 can take away the sting attaching to direct relations. And if a term can stand in an indirect relation to itself,

why can it not stand in a direct relation to itself? Broad admits that a term *can* stand in an indirect relation to itself ("Here the relation of x to itself is indirect" p. 91). The matter is important for McTaggart. That there should be *some* relation (e.g. identity) which every particular must have to itself is indispensable for the principle of the Dissimilarity of the Diverse, which, we shall see, Broad denies.

(iii) Broad's attitude to McTaggart's view that relationships generate qualities in the related terms seems extraordinary; the asserted distinction between a person being in love, and two persons being related by the relation of love is dismissed as "mere verbal moonshine", though dismissed, be it noted, in favour of the *relation*, not in favour of the quality, which is said to be "a figment". McTaggart at least gives a reason for distinguishing, Broad gives none for his denial. Now it would normally be allowed that when A falls in love with B, his being in love contributes importantly to making A the sort of person he then is, and sometimes even to making him the sort of person he will be. If it be argued that this can quite well be expressed by saying A's formerly standing in the relation of love to B is the reason of his later, changed characteristics, are we not admitting that the former relationship has *affected* the term A, made it qualitatively different, or of a different nature, from what it would have been, had A not stood formerly in that relation? Is this not to assign a relationship as a ground of a certain qualitative difference in a term? And if it were argued that these later characteristics (A's changed nature) could be expressed in terms of further *relations* in which A stands to various people, so that none but relational facts are required, shall we not then be maintaining that *facts* (and not, as I understand Broad to require, *events*) are terms in causal relation? I am perplexed how there should be any doubt in this matter. If either entity, quality or relation, were suspect here, my own suspicion would fall rather on the *relation* of love than on the *state or "quality"* of love.

That qualities generate relationships Broad agrees with McTaggart. "A is qualified by redness", he admits, expresses a different fact from that expressed by "A is red", since the former is about (*inter alia*) a certain sort of relation, and the latter is not *about* that relation. Broad also agrees that "an original fact" (qualitative or relational) generates an endless series of relationships, and that this series is not vicious.

(iv) McTaggart defines "the nature" of a term as the compound quality composed of all the qualities of the term. And since relations generate qualities in the related terms, a thing's nature changes if any of its relationships change, and all things' natures will change (importantly or unimportantly) if any one thing changes.—Broad objects that (*a*) compound characters are "probably a figment", and (*b*) even if not, at least a compound quality consisting of *all* a term's qualities is an illegitimate totality, since it would have to include itself as a component. Therefore Broad can accept only a very modified account of what is "the nature" of a thing.—McTaggart's own statement (*N. of E.*, p. 65) is certainly too wide and does expose him to the objection (*b*). But if his statement: "all the qualities possessed by any particular thing form a compound quality" be amended to "all the *non-compound* qualities", etc., Broad's objection would seem to be met, and all McTaggart requires allowed. And this amendment, unlike the one Broad proposes, would still allow for a change in the nature of one term entailing a change in the nature of others. This seems to be a consequence Broad seeks to avoid, but I see no good reason for doing so. Nor can I see that those who object to McTaggart's wide sense of "the nature of" a thing do so for any reason except that in common life a thing's "nature" is often

used in a narrower sense. This only shows that narrow senses are often more convenient for the business of common life. The 'wide sense' remains, and requires a name by which we can refer to it; the restricted sense, though convenient, may none the less be arbitrarily imposed. In common life we have rarely if ever an occasion to refer to *all* that is 'true of' a thing, as a rule only a few characteristics of an object are important for our purposes, so it is very natural that a narrow sense should be the usual one in common life. But in metaphysics it is necessary to make statements about *all* the characters that a thing has, even though some of them are trivial or unimportant in practical contexts. Hence some word to denote this complete sense is required and unobjectionable. If any short of all of a thing's characteristics are to be called its nature, where should the line be drawn, and why should it be drawn in accordance with practical convenience? And what should the remaining characters be called, for they too contribute in measure to making the thing the sort of thing it is?

In ch. vii, Broad turns to McTaggart's notion of substance. Of the many points raised I select two for notice, viz. that McTaggart's definition allows facts to be substances, and that he tacitly assumes there is no "fundamental difference" between occurrents and continuants, since his sense of "substance" applies indifferently to both.

(i) As Broad says, McTaggart does not intend to include facts among substances. This, indeed, McTaggart confirmed in his later summary, 'An Ontological Idealism', where he redefined substance to exclude facts, after Prof. Moore had pointed out that his book definition was applicable to them. McTaggart added to the definition of substance in Vol. I the clause, "or having qualities or relations among its parts . . . the last part is added to exclude facts" (*Contemporary British Philosophy*, I, p. 253).

(ii) Broad regards the distinction between occurrents and continuants as "fundamental", and appends a long "independent discussion" under the title "Processes and Things".—Their distinction is not in doubt, but I do not understand the force of the epithet "fundamental", unless he means that they are ultimately distinct (cp. qualities and relations) and not merely apparently so. The only relevant question I see apropos of McTaggart is, Are both occurrents and continuants kinds of substance, as McTaggart defines "substance"? Both plainly are, for both have qualities and stand in relations, neither is a quality or a relation and neither has qualities or relations among its parts. I do not therefore understand why Broad should several times repeat his objection, and think it a "most extraordinary fact" that McTaggart does not directly discuss occurrents and continuants, for what relevance would this have to McTaggart's purpose in Vol. I?

On p. 142 Broad is of the opinion that "the notion of Facts was an afterthought in McTaggart's mind", and finds it a defect that their status is left uncertain. This seems too strong, for McTaggart has a good deal to say in Vol. I about relationships, and these (and what in one or two places he misnames relations) are facts. Are there any facts which are *not* relationships? It is only that McTaggart often prefers the word "relationship" to "fact", and this presumably because it connects facts with his doctrine of relations. He pretty plainly regarded facts as derivative entities, and not, with the logical analysts, as primitive ones, and he would presumably argue that in studying existence (particulars, qualities and relations) we should thereby be studying relationships, i.e. facts.

In ch. ix Broad criticises McTaggart's principle that there cannot be two particulars which are exactly similar to each other, i.e. such that every quality

of one is a quality of both. He points out that if there is a relation of identity in which every term stands to itself, the Dissimilarity of the Diverse follows at once, but that McTaggart did not rest his case on this, but required the dissimilarity to be other than an analytic consequence of plurality. McTaggart claims that his principle is a necessary one, Broad thinks inspection of it shows exceptions to it are conceivable. It is, he points out, sufficient to show that exceptions are logically possible, and unnecessary to establish *de facto* existence of exceptions, in order to refute McTaggart. Broad's argument is too long to reproduce here. Its first part concludes that two sensibilia sensed by the same mind must be non-analytically dissimilar, and thus he agrees, so far, with McTaggart. (I do not know, however, what McTaggart would think about sensibilia which are "processes" having sensible qualities—I cannot find such entities "on inspection", and suspect they may be our old friends, sensa, in which the 'patch' has become "process.") It is the second part of the argument in which Broad considers he has refuted McTaggart, but I find the discussion here very wire-drawn and quite unsatisfying. In particular, the use made of the notions of "logically possible" and "logically impossible" strikes me as most suspect. Conceivability proves Dr. Broad's very willing handmaid in chaps. ix and x, and some characteristically Cambridge arguments in which it is claimed to show that certain sorts of 'object' are "logically possible" of existence convince me that whether or not speculative philosophy is sufficiently critical, critical philosophy can be speculative enough when it chooses. That there is a permissible use of "conceivability" is not doubtful. But neither need it be doubted, surely, that it is impermissible to exclude certain characters which the name of your object connotes, show that the remainder are not inconsistent with what you want to assert about your object, and then tacitly suppose the object does not in fact possess the characteristics you have excluded, though still naming the object by a name which includes those excluded characters as part of its connotation! Yet it seems to me certain that this is how Dr. Broad "refutes" two of McTaggart's principles in chaps. ix and x. For he asserts it is "logically possible" for there to exist two unsensed sensibilia having only analytical dissimilarity. Such sensibilia "might be unheard noises". The "refutation" then consists in this proposal: It is logically possible that nothing should exist, in the past, present or future except "two unheard squeaky noises" simultaneously occurrent and of equal duration, and *literally nothing else*,—nobody to hear them, nothing to cause them, no even apparent moment of time, past, present or future at which they "occur", no region of space from which they issue, no physical occurrence *of* which they are manifestations. We are to accept that it is "logically possible" that there should exist two such uncaused, unheard squeaky noises, and that they are the universe, then McTaggart's Dissimilarity of the Diverse will have been shown false. Thus the recipe for manufacturing "refutations" seems to be that we set aside those elements in the meaning of a term (e.g. a noise) which, in presupposing the existence of other terms of a certain character, promise dissimilarity and diversity in the world, and that we attend only to those characteristics of the term which could be qualitatively similar, and then argue that it is "logically possible" that these latter alone should characterize that term without it being in different character from that which the connotation of its name denotes. Plainly something is wrong with "conceivability" of this kind. I should reply, then, that to speak of *a noise* (as distinct from an x with arbitrarily assigned properties) and at the same time deny any cause whatever to it, any region of space or direction from which it issues, is to give a description which *could not* ade-

quately describe a noise, even if there were unheard noises. Otherwise put: if such an adequate description could apply to anything, that existent would not be a noise.

Similar remarks apply to Broad's refutation of the principle of Sufficient Description. Broad invites us to "imagine a universe consisting of just three minds, A, B, C", in which A is jealous of B on account of C, B of C on account of A, and C of A on account of B. "Imagine" such a universe perhaps we may, conceive it *possible* for this to be the whole character of an actual universe, I at least cannot. Broad is easily able to show that there would be an exclusive description of each, A, B, C, but a sufficient description of none of them. The argument is supposed to be about possible persons and their jealousy, it is, however, *really* about symbols that symbolize nothing in particular, bare *X*, *Y*, *Z* given as being related each in turn by a triadic relation R which is such that *any terms it relates* (*X*, *Y*, *Z*) *would not therefore have to be related by any other relation whatever*.—Why jealousy should be thought to be a relation satisfying this requirement (R) I do not see. I suggest that what Broad has really proved is something different from what he supposed himself to prove. He has not proved the logical possibility of an actual world in which three people and jealousy exist, and in which nothing else whatever exists. For to have proved this it would have to be true that 'being a person' and 'being jealous' were non-complex properties whose applicability does not entail the possession of any other property. But these are plainly properties that presuppose the applicability of other properties to whatever they apply to, and Broad has not considered whether those other properties would not be such that one at least did not apply to all three existents, and thus serve to distinguish one from the others, and so render possible a sufficient description of the one.—I think there has been a deal of loose thinking about "logical possibility" and that some usages of it have been illegitimate. We may remember that Leibniz was careful to distinguish between possibility and *com*possibility, and I could wish that Broad had discussed the whole matter on its own account in an "independent discussion".

So, to sum up, I cannot agree that Broad has established his contentions (i) that McTaggart has not shown reason for his principle of the dissimilarity of the diverse, (ii) and therefore shown no reason for believing that every particular must have an exclusive description, and (iii) that the principle of Sufficient Description is "nothing but a fallacious inference from a doubtful premise".

(3) *Determination*.—In Bk. III, Broad restates and examines McTaggart's statements about the determination of one quality by another, then considers Intrinsic Determination and the two connected relations, Presupposition and Requirement, next examines McTaggart's views on Causation as a special case of Intrinsic Determination, and passes in conclusion to Extrinsic Determination. He finds McTaggart's views about Instrinsic Determination "highly confused" and believes he failed to distinguish it from another relation which Broad calls Conveyance. McTaggart's position may be summarized thus: Not every quality of a particular intrinsically determines every other (there are non-reciprocating causes), yet none of its qualities are completely contingent to any of its others, so it follows that none of the qualities could be different from what they are and the rest remain unchanged. Extrinsic determination is both universal and reciprocal; all the qualities of a particular extrinsically determine one another.—When Broad reviewed Vol. I in 1921 (*Mind*, xxx, p. 324) he thought "this must be admitted", but he has since changed his mind. He now substitutes for McTaggart's statement an

"accurate account" of what McTaggart meant, decides that extrinsic determination is not, as McTaggart said and he thought, a relation between characteristics, but one between facts, and now objects that in the argument on p. 113 of *N. of E.* McTaggart "probably failed to distinguish" two verbally similar though really different propositions, to wit: (1) one and the same particular cannot have each of two different natures, (2) one and the same particular could not have had one or other of two different natures. Broad then deals in his own way with the question whether it is ever consistent to suppose that a particular which in fact did exist might not have existed. The discussion seems very involved and after three careful readings I have failed to make sure that I grasp the meaning clearly.

(4) *The Composition and Division of Particulars, and Determining Correspondence.*—Broad first examines the views about groups and classes from which McTaggart led up to the conclusion that all substances are endlessly divisible. Though "quite certain" that there are "collective facts", Broad is uncertain whether there are particulars which are groups. He then turns to the notion of the content of a group, modifies McTaggart's definition of this, shows that every group *has* content, and that content in Broad's sense has the characteristics that McTaggart assigned to content in his own sense. McTaggart found no difficulty in one substance being several groups, as many as it has sets of parts. To Dr. Broad this is "sheer nonsense", and sense only if "is" be held to mean "is adequately divisible into". But *this* interpretation involves that the particulars so divisible will be *diverse* from all the groups, therefore not identical with them. What McTaggart asserts in defence of his view (*N. of E.*, p. 139) requires, in order to be true, that a group should be a quality, according to Broad, but for McTaggart a group is a particular. He therefore suggests that McTaggart should have said that one particular may be adequately divisible into each of several different groups. This "has the merit of not being nonsensical", but even so, Broad finds no reason to believe that there is an additional particular diverse from the particulars which are groups, hence no reason to believe there is anything to be called 'the universe' (i.e. one particular which contains all other particulars as parts). Broad, however, offers an alternative definition of the property of 'being a universe', and claims to show there is a particular answering to it.

He now passes to what he aptly calls "the watershed of the system" (i.e. the materials of chaps. xxi–xxiii *N. of E.*). There McTaggart holds that after due explanation it can be seen to be a self-evident and necessary truth that every particular is composed of other particulars; none is simple. We are thus "debarred from finding any natural units". Yet this endless divisibility of particulars, McTaggart admits, leads to almost insuperable difficulties, and he holds that there is only one supposition about the structure of the universe upon which the difficulties can be resolved. If the universe is a determining correspondence system, then there must be "an intrinsic natural system of classification in which all the content of the universe finds its place". It is enough that the divisibility of each particular be in one dimension. Broad discusses this point at length, decides that there is only one dimension in which the endless divisibility appears at all plausible, viz. duration, or what appears as such. Yet this is the very dimension in which McTaggart holds particulars to be *in*divisble, so Broad is led to deny the asserted self-evidence of the principle, and to doubt its truth.—I am uncertain whether McTaggart meant by "dimension" a Johnsonian "determinable"; also whether failure to find an *empirical* instance of a suitable dimension is a sufficient ground for rejecting the principle, though it is sufficient to cast doubt on it.

Broad next restates what he thinks McTaggart claimed to prove in ch. xxiii of *N. of E.*, viz. that each set of parts of any particular must contain a term whose members have sufficient descriptions such that from them further sufficient descriptions are derivable of all members of all subsequent terms in the series. Broad concludes (*a*) that McTaggart's argument to prove this contains two fallacies ("gross" and "grosser"), and (*b*) that either the principle of Minimum Adequate Description is not self-evident or else it applies to no character. He adds that the latter alternative "would have served McTaggart's purpose as well as the conclusion he actually draws."

In Bk. V, Broad explores the difficult conception of determining correspondence. The whole analysis is long and the points involved complicated. It is not possible to abridge Broad's restatement, therefore impossible to reproduce it here. McTaggart maintains that the condition specified in the last paragraph can be satisfied only by showing that what exists has a certain form of structure (i.e. that the universe must either itself be a Determining Correspondence Hierarchy, or have sets of parts each of which is such an Hierarchy). Broad then gives a geometrical example. This, he claims, accomplishes three things: it illustrates what McTaggart means, provides an alternative solution to McTaggart's problem (without introducing determining correspondence), and applies to a spatially extended particular. The corollary from all this is, that if Broad's solution stands, McTaggart's conclusion in Vol. II that no particular can be extended, as distinct from being perceived as extended, is disproved. The complicated conception of determining correspondence is analysed into an array of conditions, and these happily illustrated in Dr. Broad's best manner by a hypothetical "mutual admiration society" (I fail to see where the "admiration" comes in), viz. a society of minds which perceive themselves and each other, their own and each other's perceptions, and nothing else; where "perception" throughout is allowed to be of the kind that McTaggart describes in Vol. II. "If we are allowed to play such tricks with the properties of Matter and Space", says Broad, "as McTaggart has played" with those of Mind and Perception in order to represent 'being a perception of' as a determining correspondence relation, then non-mental examples of determining correspondence could be provided. Several consequences of the determining correspondence principle are examined, and it is shown that if the only relation of determining correspondence is that of 'being a perception of', then Primary Wholes in the universe will be societies, Primary Parts the selves which are their members, and Secondary Parts those selves' perceptions of various kinds. And since it is more appropriate to regard those parts as being "differentiated into parts" than as "built out of parts", it follows that a pluralistic view of the structure of the universe will be more appropriate than a monistic view.

Lastly Broad gives his own explanation, with diagrams, of the six suppositions McTaggart proposed as being alternatively possible specifications of the structure of the universe, the degree of its internal unity depending on which of these suppositions is true, this being a matter which McTaggart recognized could not be settled on *a priori* grounds.

What is the proper verdict to return on this examination I do not pretend to know, but I think there are several comments that may be fairly made.

Firstly, I think there is little doubt, as Broad says, that "had McTaggart lived to read the present work, he would certainly have refuted some of the criticisms, have produced amazingly ingenious and unexpected answer

to others, and have started to rebuild those parts of the system which really had suffered in the bombardment" (p. li). Broad also admits "it is also very likely that *some* of the many criticisms I have made on the various links in the chain of argument by which McTaggart professes to prove the Principle of Determining Correspondence are positively fallacious. . . . Again, it may well be that some of the criticisms which are valid could be obviated by a slight modification of the argument" (p. 452). Yet, he thinks, "enough thrusts must have got home to riddle so long and so sinuous an argument."—It is certainly the argument by which McTaggart thought to establish determining correspondence which, far more than any of his others, left me in a state of disturbing uncertainty, and this has only deepened since I have read Broad's discussion. If there are some "thrusts which must have got home", I think it vastly more probable that they will be found in his criticism concerned with the implications of endless divisibility of particulars and with the Determining Correspondence principle, than in his criticisms falling in the first three books of his work. It is extremely improbable, of course, that McTaggart produced a wholly impeccable system, and I should have thought as improbable that he produced one so extremely erroneous as Broad would have his reader suppose. For in my extensive list of references I find only four places recorded where Broad admits himself in agreement with McTaggart, and one of these views (concerning Causation) though compatible with his system is not implied in it or in any way special to it, but held by many who would not accept McTaggart's method, arguments or conclusions.

Secondly, I doubt whether some of Broad's numerous restatements *do* put what McTaggart "really means" more clearly and better than McTaggart's own statements. That the restatements are "exact", and in accordance with the preferred forms of expression at Cambridge since Russellian logic took root there, is not in question. But if exact statement of meaning is a logical matter, clear and sure apprehension of it is a psychological one. Though I am not a stranger to the forms of expression preferred at Cambridge, I had not infrequently to hunt up McTaggart's own words to make sure I had grasped the meaning of a restatement. It seems to be tacitly supposed that an exact statement must be clear. But an exact statement is often a long one, and for a clear and sure apprehension of meaning, a briefer, more natural, and perhaps even less exact statement may be more effective.

It was a matter of suprise and admiration for Dr. Broad that McTaggart managed to keep his head through his long and complicated trains of formal argument without recourse to the aid of a symbolism. I think this was a double advantage. For had he paid more attention than he did he might have become beset with problems concerned with the refinements of that symbolism, and never reached any philosophical conclusions worth noticing. Further, since the value of a symbolic notation in philosophy is extremely limited—for one can have no confidence in what is served up in symbolic dress until it has been re-translated into good, clear English—he avoided the risk of the 'slips' that attends such re-translation, and was able to use a more attractive and less tedious medium of expression. Some too may feel, like Descartes, that while our thinking proceeds as 'concretely' as possible, with the least dependence on notational devices, the risk of error, or of becoming lost in ungrounded abstractions, is minimized.

Thirdly, among errors of omission, there is one, I think, which is serious in a system which claims to demonstrate all its conclusions from self-evident premises and require only two empirical premises to be granted. Dr. Broad notices it, but does not harp on it. McTaggart claims to have proved that there is more than one particular existent. From this, it seems, he passes

silently to assuming an unlimited number of particulars existent. That there are two existents at least may be certified experientially; that there is an indefinite number is presupposed up and down the system, but so far as I can see it is nowhere proved.

Fourthly, Broad relates (pp. 13, 14) that McTaggart's earliest drafts of Vol. I were entitled *Dialectic of Existence*, but that he dropped his original plan of using a dialectical method similar to Hegel's, because (*a*) it "would be questioned *in limine* by many philosophers" (though McTaggart continued to hold that his own interpretation of the method could be defended against their preliminary objections), therefore (*b*) "he wisely decided in the end to use straightforward deduction" rather than "the compromising help" of the dialectical method; (*c*) though he affirmed the possibility of the chief characteristics of reality being connected in the way required by the dialectical method, he admitted that "they did not seem, as a matter of fact," to be so connected, and that "this was conclusive for him."—On this I would suggest (i) that McTaggart may have been "wise" for the reason (*c*) but certainly not for reason (*a*). No matter what method he had used, some philosophers, and probably quite competent ones, would have objected. For there is no separate, "antecedent" and extra-philosophical question of what is the proper method in philosophy. Not only is this question itself a philosophical one, but it is one that cannot be solved "antecedently" and, if soluble at all, probably only after that "proper method" has actually been employed and found successful. And (ii) even though McTaggart were wise in using "straightforward deduction", it does not follow that he need also have taken over from his Cambridge colleagues their atomistic conceptions. Here he may have been unwise. I have long surmised that the forms of statement which the use of those conceptions involves may have led him to compromise unnecessarily the presentation of his philosophy, and that he might have reached its conclusions by straightforward deduction but without the particular logical armature we find introduced in the *Nature of Existence*. Broad's *Examination* tends to confirm me in this surmise.

Lastly, although the temper of Dr. Broad's conclusions must be understood as extremely unfavourable to all that is most important in Vol. I of the *Nature of Existence*, it is a very desirable thing that his *Examination* should be available for admirers of McTaggart's masterpiece. I should like to say I have benefited immensely from it, though by way of reaction; and as a result of seeing McTaggart's positions from an unaccustomed angle, I have been able to appreciate more fully than before the excellence and profundity of his work.

PHILOSOPHICAL SURVEY

PHILOSOPHY IN FRANCE.

SOME AFTER-THOUGHS OF M. BERGSON.

It is precision, M. Bergson suggests in his last book,[1] that has most been lacking in philosophy. Imprecision declares itself in two respects: philosophical systems of the past apply indifferently to many imaginary worlds, and so allows this actual world to slip through their meshes; and they ignore the sense or direction evinced in the order and process of this actual world. Such systems "do not fit the reality in which we live, but are too large for it. Any of them would apply equally well to a world in which plants, animals, and men did not exist, or one in which men went without food and drink and did not sleep or dream or rave, to a world in which men were born decrepit and suckled in old age. . . . Such systems of conceptions are so abstract, consequently so vast, that they can be made to hold everything possible alongside the real". That we should interpret them always with an eye on this actual world and so regard them as being literal transcriptions of the actual is a witness to the practical bias of our thinking and a quite arbitrary reading of them. Contrasted with these highly abstract systems, M. Bergson claims that his own explanation "adheres to its object" and leaves no gap in which an alternative one could find foothold.

It was Spencer's *First Principles* that early stirred M. Bergson's dogmatic slumber. Spencer had not sufficiently examined the ultimate concepts of mechanics, and Bergson, in attempting to make good this defect, realized the necessity of taking time seriously. Spencer's whole enterprise remained to be begun again. Time escapes the mathematicians: its essence being to *pass*, no one of its parts remains when another presents itself, therefore superposition of part upon part for the purpose of measurement is impossible. "For a duration to be superposable, hence measurable, it would have to be non-enduring, hence not be a duration. To postulate an occurrence at the end of time t is simply to express the fact that we have counted, from now to then, a number t of simultaneities of a certain kind. Between them may intervene what we choose; time may accelerate enormously, even infinitely, nothing would be changed for the mathematician, physicist or astronomer." Time in process science uniformly treats as time elapsed, and when plain people speak of time, what they are commonly thinking of is not duration itself but its measure. Reflection requires us to abandon this practice. A direct vision of duration into which common prejudices have not entered shows us "continuity which is neither unity nor multiplicity," and this character is destroyed when translated into the spatial form of our normal concept of time. Throughout the history of philosophy and science we find space and time represented as co-ordinates of the same genus; to pass from one to the other it suffices to replace "juxtaposition" by "succession". Science had its own reasons for thus turning its back on real duration, but meta-

[1] Henri Bergson, *La Pensée et le Mouvant: Essais et Conférences*. Pp. 323, 1934. Paris: Alcan, 25 francs.

physics, without having those reasons, none the less copied it. Language too aided and abetted the conspiracy, for the words which designate time-distinctions are borrowed from the vocabulary of space. The conception of moments juxtaposed in linear file prove a convenient substitute for real duration for social purposes,—action, conversation and calculation—but such moments cannot be so recomposed as to give real duration.

M. Bergson believes that the "eternal" problems of metaphysics are not eternal, i.e., insoluble. He believes that these *problems* really relate not to what such words as time, change and motion denote, but only to "their conceptual envelopes" which we falsely take for the realities or their equivalents. So the reform he sought to introduce into philosophy does not assume the form of elaborating a conceptual explanation which should win acceptance over others already conceptually elaborated. It consists in showing for each of the traditional problems of which his several works treat that what in each case constitutes the problem *a problem* is precisely the character of the *conceptions* in which it is stated, so that once the misleading representation is eliminated the problem is seen no longer to exist, and what exists is directly intuited in its real character, "duration is seen as continual creation"—and metaphysics issues in self-revealing experience. So, since philosophy is the study of philosophical *problems*, and since these originate in, and are constituted by, conceptions incarnate in our language and our customary habits and categories of thought, it follows that whatever be the problem in hand, the effort to solve it will always be an attempt to undo the work of intellectual transposition. What intellect can make it also can unmake. So for M. Bergson discovery in philosophy does not consist in forming a conception which has not been formed before, it consists in uncovering what has been concealed under a variety of conceptual accretions, and in experiencing the existence thus revealed. It will also follow that philosophical knowledge is not a theoretically obtainable system of propositions, nor a body of results conceptually and linguistically communicable, but an experience of that whose positive character cannot be transmitted through spatializing concepts, except when the existent is itself spatial.

That conception and language are the philosopher's *faux amis* Bergson finds aptly illustrated in a prevalent view of possibility and its relation to the actual. Direct experience of duration discloses "perpetual creation of possibility and not only of reality". Now many hold that any event which occurs would not occur had it not been possible of occurrence; in order to be actual it must have been possible. But this is to pun on two senses of "possible". From the negative sense, 'there exists no insurmountable obstacle to that thing's occurrence', we pass unwittingly to the positive one, conceiving that whatever is actual could have been foreseen or foreknown to be about to become actual by a mind sufficiently informed in advance. Thus in this second sense, we commonly suppose that the possibility of a thing's existence itself pre-existed, and there arises "the mirage of the present in the past". The former sense is of course a truism, the latter Bergson thinks plainly false. "So soon as the musician has a precise and complete idea of the symphony he will compose, his symphony is composed". And *a fortiori* of any state of the universe—"whose novelty is far more rich and unanticipated than that of the greatest symphony"—the pre-existence of its possibility is absurd. To Bradley's "once true, always true", Bergson would deny the "retroactive effect"—"as if a judgment could exist before the terms which compose it", "as if the terms do not date from the apparition of the objects they represent". The consequences of this illusion are numerous; one is an error which vitiates our conception of the past, another is our pretension to anticipate

the future. In all these cases possibility is confused with knowledge 'after the event'. Since, Bergson maintains, we have sensed red and yellow, we can know orange to be composed of them, but if orange alone had been sensed and red and yellow not appeared in the world, then orange would not be composed of red and yellow.

The conclusions which issued from this earlier work of Bergson, and appeared at that time somewhat daring, required psychology to break with associationism, and philosophy to reject the positivism of Comte, the agnosticism of Spencer and the Kantian relativity of knowledge. Reassured about duration and its knowability through acquaintance alone, Bergson then examined the claim of intuition to become the method of his whole philosophy. Many thinkers before had employed this supra-intellectual faculty, but believing intelligence to operate in time, they falsely inferred that an intuition which transcended intelligence would therefore operate out of time. This step Bergson did not take. He conceived that the object of an intuitive philosophy should be, not to encircle synoptically the totality of existences, but to secure for each "an explanation which would adapt to it exactly and exclusively". Whether the universe is a unity experience alone can decide, and decide only at the end of its search. Each new problem requires its own and a new effort, the solution of one problem would not be deducible from that of another, and the expectation of a universal science has to be renounced. Once more M. Bergson seeks to correct certain misunderstandings about intuition into which he believes his critics have fallen. Intuition is said to "seize a succession which is not juxtaposition", "the uninterrupted prolongation of the past into the present which is encroaching on the future". Intuition is "the direct vision of mind by mind", "a seeing which is hardly to be distinguished from the object seen", a knowing "which is contact and even coincidence." Our own consciousness is divided from that of others less sharply than is our own body from other bodies, and "irreflective sympathy and antipathy testify to a possible interpenetration of minds." Intuition is laborious and can be practised only intermittently, and, like intellect, it makes use of language and so finishes by lodging itself in concepts (e.g. duration, qualitative multiplicity, unconscious, etc.). The concepts of intelligence are immediately clear, but the idea which issues from an intuition usually begins in obscurity. Yet there are two sorts of clarity to distinguish. An idea may be clear because it presents us with a new arrangement of component ideas with all of which we are already familiar, or it may be clear because it is "radically new and absolutely simple", and therefore impossible of being reconstituted with pre-existent elements. Since this latter kind of idea cannot be easily and readily related with conceptions already systematized, we are tempted to declare it incomprehensible. But if we accept it provisionally, carrying it with us into the several departments of our knowledge, that which at first seemed obscure will now be seen to dissipate obscurities. It will resolve or dissolve problems we thought insoluble, they will be seen either to disappear or to require different statement.

In assigning to metaphysics a limited field (mind) and a special method (intuition), Bergson distinguishes metaphysics from science. But to each he attributes an equal value, and uses the opportunity to correct further misunderstandings of his views on intellect and on the 'knowledge-value' of science. Science as well as philosophy can attain to the ultimate character of reality, and "every natural belief should be taken as true, every appearance for a reality, until its illusory character has been established." The burden of proof falls to those who allege science to be relative or assert knowing to deform or to construct its objects.—"We ask only that science remains

scientific and does not unwittingly dress itself out in metaphysics, and offer itself thus to the ignorant and semi-scientific as being science." In this way science fulfils half the programme of ancient metaphysics, the other half falling to intuitive metaphysics. So metaphysics does not study the same objects as science with the hope of attaining to a more ultimate knowledge about them, each has a different object and the knowledge each yields is equally ultimate. Both may become equally exact and certain, so it is a verbal matter and solely one of convenience whether we regard them as being two departments of science or of metaphysics. Inner experience finds no language strictly appropriate to its needs, and is compelled to resort to concepts and eke them out with suitable images. But M. Bergson thinks when metaphysics has "enlarged" these concepts and "rendered them more supple", it will have accomplished a reform comparable with that which modern physics has effected. Yet this does not mean that we are to expect definite conclusions and radical solutions from metaphysics, for this would exact from it a manipulation of concepts, and so leave it in the region of pure possibilities. The incomplete solutions and provisional conclusions it does reach will, however, acquire an increasing probability. From the moment philosophy sets its problem in terms of mind and not of matter, when it renounces the use of concepts in an enterprise for which they were not made, we are straightway released from the servitude speculation imposes. The real problem here as elsewhere is really *to find* the problem, thence to *state* it, rather than to solve it, for a speculative problem is solved directly it is properly stated. From the moment of correct statement the solution exists; though it remains covered, it has but to be *un*covered. To state the problem, however, is not merely to discover but to invent—discovery relates to what already exists and is sure to reveal itself soon or late; invention gives existence to that which does not exist, and so could never become revealed.

Every philosophical problem implicitly raises the question of the origin and value of general ideas and the question demands a separate solution for each special problem. Diversification of mental functions must be explained by the fundamental exigencies of life. Applying this principle to the origin of general ideas, we see that every living being, perhaps every organ and tissue of it, generalizes and classifies in virtue of its capacity to select from the most diverse objects and substances of its environment those which best can satisfy this or that want, and to neglect the rest. Such generalization is usually of course lived, and not thought. And the general idea, reflectively and consciously created, originates similarly in an "automatic extraction of resemblances". The resemblance of objects and states we perceive is that property they all possess of eliciting from our bodies the same reaction, inducing the same attitude and inciting the same movement. Some few resemblances are objective—"inherent in reality itself"—others again are partly relative to the convenience of individual and society. We may discern three groups of resemblances which are translated into general ideas. The first, essentially biological, represents vital activity as itself exhibiting certain resemblances, e.g. genus and species, as if it followed a limited number of plans of structure, as if it had, by hereditary transmission and by transformation, ordered organisms in hierarchical series. Again, there are those resemblances in inorganic matter which we translate into the general ideas of sensible qualities of determinate kinds, of chemical elements and compounds, and of physical properties. The principle of comparison connecting those of the former group is resemblance in a strict sense, that connecting those of the second set is that of identity, where the identical appertains to the geometrical and static, and resemblance to the vital. The third group of resemblances which find

expression in general ideas is created wholly by human action and speculation—an instance of human fabrication not exercised on matter. Once possessed of these three categories of general ideas, intelligence is able to perceive yet a further resemblance, viz. that which it translates into the general idea of a general idea, thence to proceed to construct others at will, so facilitating social life and pure speculation.

M. Bergson lastly employs these findings to illustrate in what respects, and how far, there is need to reform, modify or even eliminate conceptual thought in order to open the way for the free play of intuition and enable us to exorcise such "false problems" as those of Greek sceptics and of Kant and the Neo-Kantians.—"The merit of Kant was to have developed a natural illusion in all its consequences and have presented it in the most systematic form. But he preserved the illusion and indeed based his philosophy upon it. Let us dissipate that illusion, and thereby restore to mind, through science and metaphysics, knowledge of absolute reality." There will then be but one philosophy as there is but one science, and a progressive and co-operative effort of both.

S. V. KEELING.

NEW BOOKS

Die Philosophischen Strömungen der Gegenwart in Grossbritannien. By Rudolf Metz. 2 Bände. (Leipzig, Felix Meiner, 1935. Bd. i, pp. xv + 442; Bd. ii, pp. vi + 359. Price for the two Bände Geh. 40 R.M., Geb. 44 R.M.)

Dr. Rudolf Metz has been known long to students as a German Gelehrter possessed of a very thorough and competent knowledge of English philosophy. He is the author of two valuable monographs in Fromman's series, entitled *Klassiker der Philosophie*. One on *Berkeley*, which appeared in 1925, is a careful and reliable exposition of Berkeley's idealism in its various phases; the other on *Hume* appeared in 1929, and in it the writer not only provides a trustworthy account of Hume's analysis of experience but endeavours to indicate the influence of Hume's thought on subsequent speculation. In the two volumes now before us, Dr. Metz has set before himself a far larger and more ambitious task. His aim here is no less than to trace the development and progress of British philosophical inquiry from about the middle of the nineteenth century to the present day. He is mindful of the fact that until the end of the last century the relation between German and English speculative thinking was a close and fruitful one, and that this relation has been sadly impeded through the War and the political conditions since the War. He is hopeful that his work may do something towards restoring the kind of relationship that once subsisted between Leibniz and Locke, between Hume and Kant, between Hegel and his English followers. He ventured, so he tells us, upon his undertaking with the express purpose of trying to do what he could towards bringing the philosophical reflexion in the two lands closer together and awakening mutual understanding between the thinkers of both countries.

Let it be said at once that the work has been accomplished with admirable skill and genuine scholarship. The author's acquaintance with recent English speculation is amazingly wide, circumspect, and accurate. He appears to have read wellnigh everything, not only the books of outstanding importance, but those also of more modest pretensions; and not only books but contributions to the Aristotelian Society and other learned bodies, articles in *Mind* and various philosophical journals, let alone periodicals of a more popular sort. Hardly anything, indeed, seems to have escaped his ken. And he has been remarkably successful in stationing himself at the standpoint of the particular thinker whose thought he is engaged in expounding, and in viewing such reflexion from within its own position, rather than from without as an external spectator. Moreover, he brings to bear upon his material a perfectly impartial and unprejudiced judgment; one may read through the whole of these eight hundred pages without discovering where the author's own sympathies lie.

I write as one who is not unfamiliar with the immense labour involved in an enterprise of this description. Nearly forty years ago I was induced, as a young student, by Professor Heinze, of Leipzig, to furnish a survey of English philosophy in the nineteenth century for Ueberweg's *Geschichte der Philosophie*, which Professor Heinze was at that time editing. Several editions of this work have been issued later; and in the last edition, published in 1928, I have covered—on a much smaller scale, of course—the ground which Dr. Metz

traverses. One of the difficulties in the way of writing such a survey is alluded to by Dr. Metz in his Preface. It is almost impossible, namely, to deal with the various philosophical movements which call for consideration without arranging them under certain headings or labels, such as "empirical," "idealistic," "realistic," and so on, labels which in numerous instances, are positively misleading, and which are becoming more and more so. Dr. Metz takes me to task (ii, p. 283), for instance, for grouping Stout under the head of critical idealists, and maintains that his position would be more appropriately designated neo-realistic. I imagine Stout himself would exclaim: "A plague on both your houses!" Yet it is, perhaps, worth while pointing out that in the Abstract of the second course of Gifford Lectures, delivered in 1921, but not yet published in book-form, Stout observes that "if we drop the untenable view of knowledge as an external relation, the points urged by the neo-realists confirm instead of upset the idealist position." But I agree entirely with Dr. Metz when he insists that these short labels should be taken for no more than mere guide-posts, and in no way be introduced as substitutes for a critical treatment of the material itself.

The work as a whole is divided into two chief Parts. The first Part, occupying about half of the first volume, is devoted to a description of the philosophical movements dominant in England and Scotland during most of the nineteenth century; in the second Part, which occupies three-fourths of the entire work, the more recent movements from the end of the last century to the present day are handled in much greater detail.

Four sections subdivide the first Part. These deal respectively with the Scotch school of Reid, Hamilton, and Mansel, the empirical and utilitarian school, the evolutionist school, and the religious philosophical writers from Newman onwards. Naturally, in the second section the lion's share of space is accorded to John Stuart Mill, of whose logical doctrines and theory of knowledge a fairly adequate account is given. I suppose it must be admitted that German philosophy was to Mill "a book with seven seals, to lift the secrets of which he felt not the slightest inclination" (i, p. 40); but it is rightly noted that Croom Robertson clearly saw that English empiricism needed to be supplemented by the profounder insight of the Kantian Critique (*Ibid.*, p. 52). There follows a careful summary of the ethical teaching of Henry Sidgwick, and then a shorter notice of Carveth Read's metaphysic of nature and of his treatise on moral science. In the third section, as was inevitable in a German book on the subject, Herbert Spencer is treated as the central figure, "one of the greatest master-builders and systematizers, which the history of philosophy has ever seen" (i, p. 81), although the writings of Edith Simcox, Leslie Stephen, and Samuel Butler are by no means neglected. The section concludes with a full and well-informed account of the metaphysical, ethical, and sociological work of Leonard Hobhouse. There is, further, a short Appendix on English positivism. I am particularly glad to find that in the fourth section, Dr. Metz does justice to the predominant position of James Martineau, and the strikingly original character of his philosophy of religion, which unfortunately is scarcely known at all in Germany. Emphasis is rightly laid upon Martineau's theory of the Will as the true causal activity in the universe, and a full treatment is accorded to his attempt to elaborate a theistic philosophy on purely rational lines. My only regret is that Dr. Metz has passed over Martineau's analysis of perception and his theory of knowledge, which have always seemed to me most valuable portions of his philosophizing, and, in fact, to anticipate not a few of the theories current at the present time.

To pass now to the second Part, the first section of which, taking up the last two hundred pages of vol. i, is concerned with the new Idealistic Movement.

An opening sketch is given of its initiation and early history in the hands of such men as Coleridge, Carlyle, John Grote, and, above all, J. F. Ferrier. Here the author is manifestly largely indebted to Professor Muirhead's recent volume, *The Platonic Tradition in Anglo-Saxon Philosophy*. Then follows a description of the work of "the pioneers" (*die Bahnbrecher*), as the author calls them—Hutchison Stirling, T. H. Green, and Lewis Nettleship. Hutchison Stirling's *Secret of Hegel* almost, it is true, defies any attempt to outline its contents, yet it abounds in ideas of a suggestive and thought-provoking kind. Has, I wonder, any German, with the exception of Dr. Metz, ever read it? Dr. Metz is, however, of opinion that Hutchison Stirling did penetrate to the essence of the Hegelian system. "Over and over again Stirling lays stress upon the concrete character of Kant's and Hegel's thinking and upon the difficulty of advancing from the abstractions of the understanding to the concrete thought of reason, in which the truth of a notion comes first of all to light, through means of a comprehensive grasp of its opposing factors" (i, p. 245). An exposition of T. H. Green's position is comparatively easy; and Dr. Metz brings out, I think, its main features with praiseworthy lucidity. Green's ultimate "spiritual principle" exhibits itself, he argues, in several different aspects—now as Kantian *Vernunft*, now as Hegelian *Geist*, and now as Berkeleian God (i, p. 256). Probably, the British philosopher who stood nearest to Hegel was Edward Caird, and our author's account of Caird's method of advancing from Kant to Hegel is especially noteworthy. Caird's religion is, he insists, in a certain sense, pantheism, far as he himself would have been from acknowledging the fact (i, p. 273). As other English Hegelians, William Wallace, D. G. Ritchie, Henry Jones, J. H. Muirhead, J. S. Mackenzie, Lord Haldane, Sir James Baillie, and J. A. Smith, each receive a share of recognition. Under the head of "Absolute Idealism," a very full and exhaustive exposition is given of Bradley's system, whose *Appearance and Reality* was translated into German in 1928. Bradley, it is held, was led to an independent handling of philosophical problems by a study of Hegel, and his philosophical work as a whole and in special directions was deeply indebted to Hegelian influence, yet in all that he wrote the impress of his own original reflexion is apparent, and he was in no sense a strict Hegelian (i, p. 303). In particular, it is rightly urged that his thinking owed not a little to Herbart and Lotze. From Bradley, the author passes to Bosanquet and Joachim, and then proceeds to unfold in greater detail the pluralism of McTaggart. McTaggart stands, he thinks, at the extreme wing of the Hegelian Left (i, p. 349). The main difference between Hegel's thought and McTaggart's is to be discerned in the concrete and experiential character of the one and the abstract and non-experiential character of the other (i, p. 357). Then follows a treatment of the "personal idealists"—Pringle-Pattison, James Seth, Sorley and Rashdall. James Ward is rather awkwardly dealt with under the head of "Theists and Religious Philosophers," seeing that the thinkers just named have an equal claim to be so designated. But the main principles of Ward's philosophy are faithfully delineated. And, alongside of Ward's writings, those of Professor A. E. Taylor are handled, although I imagine Professor Taylor would now hesitate in calling his philosophy idealistic, at all events in a metaphysical sense.

The second volume of Dr. Metz's work opens with a description of pragmatism, mainly as portrayed in the writings of Dr. F. C. S. Schiller, although the contributions of Alfred Sidgwick, Howard V. Knox, and Henry Sturt likewise receive due recognition. But the major part of the volume is devoted to a treatment of recent realism, under what I cannot but regard as the misleading headings, the older and the new realism.

As initiating the former, a sketch is given of Shadworth Hodgson's meta-

physic, whose system is, however, more accurately described as s system of critical empiricism (ii, p. 33). It is gratifying to find that Dr. Metz is fully alive to the great worth and value of Robert Adamson's contribution to English philosophical thought, a contribution which has rarely had assigned to it the importance it unquestionably possesses. Adamson himself was doubtful whether the change of view which he desiderated ought to be described as that from idealism to realism, or as that from rationalism to naturalism. But there can, I think, be little doubt that in his later priod he was tending towards a distinctively realistic position. Mind, he held, only knows itself in knowing a nature which is distinct from itself. Mind knows nature only in so far as it is a part of nature, and its knowledge of nature, its apprehension of fact other than itself, is the living tie that binds it to nature and to the sum-total of reality. Dr. Metz links me with Adamson, and I am proud enough to rank as a disciple of my distinguished teacher. I have no fault to find with the account which is given of my work, save that I could have wished that the import of the distinction I have drawn between the content of an act of apprehension and the content apprehended had been pointed out. There is, I have urged, a fundamental difference between the awareness (say) of a blue colour and the blue colour itself. Dr. Metz concludes this section with accounts of Case's "physical realism," of Cook Wilson's logical and epistemological theories, and of the work of Professor Prichard, Mr. Joseph, Dr. Ross, and Professor Aaron.

The next section on the "New Realism" opens with a long and appreciative account of the writings of Professor G. E. Moore, starting with the celebrated essay on "The Refutation of Idealism," published in 1903, and proceeding to the essay entitled "A Defence of Common Sense," published in 1925. A concise summary is also given of Moore's ethical theories. Then follows a still more detailed treatment of the philosophies of Bertrand Russell and of Professor Whitehead, which seem to be handled in a careful and discerning way. Finally, of course, the systems of Alexander and of Lloyd Morgan are expounded at considerable length; and the contributions of Professor Broad, Professor Laird, and Professor Kemp Smith receive proper attention. Strangely enough, Mr. W. E. Johnson is also included under the label "new realists."

The last sections are devoted to cursory accounts of modern mathematical logic, the scientific theories of Eddington, Jeans, and J. S. Haldane, the recent developments in psychology, and the religious philosophy of Lord Balfour, Dean Inge, and Baron von Hügel.

The printers are to be congratulated on the way in which they have produced the two volumes. These are remarkably free from misprints (although a curious liberty is taken with Professor Broad's christian name), and the titles of English books are almost invariably correctly given.

G. Dawes Hicks.

Bernard Bosanquet and his Friends. Edited by J. H. Muirhead, LL.D., F.B.A. (London: Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1935. Pp. 326. Price 12s. 6d.)

Bosanquet was on terms of friendship with the leading philosophers of his own generation, and with several of his juniors. He was not disinclined to amicable discussions on paper, and his correspondents naturally treasured the more important of his letters. These, collected by Professor Muirhead, reveal him as a man of charming character, gentle and courteous and always eager to find points of agreement rather than of difference. This courtesy must be allowed for by those who (like myself) were disposed to be elated by kindly appreciation from him.

I do not think that Bosanquet's philosophical opinions altered much between his earlier and his latest books. He wished to be ranked as an idealist, but not as a mentalist. In an interesting letter to Hoernlé (p. 152) he says: "I want to give up the term Idealism and say Speculative philosophy or something of that kind. The muddle with mentalism is so recurrent." I have long thought—ever since I read Sorley's brilliant article in the *Hibbert Journal* on the two meanings of idealism—that this confusion is inevitable as long as post-Kantian "idealism" is allowed to bear the same name as the Platonic tradition. Bosanquet defines realism as "the conviction that certain objects are independent of mind." This position is defended by some realists, but it is not the doctrine of Platonism, which, nevertheless, is realistic in its strong opposition to mentalism.

Bosanquet also wished to be regarded as a disciple as well as a friend of Bradley, and I do not think he ever willingly opposed Bradley's views. But in temperament they were unlike. Bradley has been called a mystic; and though some may think this absurd, I do not agree with them. Bosanquet, though a Platonist, distrusted, I think, the poetical, imaginative, myth-making method which Plato employed when he tried to give vividness to his deepest intuitions. In his letter to me he says: "We are not to look, in principle, for another world consisting of pure values and nothing else." "A true dialectical advance is necessarily from abstract to concrete. I shrink from the dialectical pyramid." To which I think I should answer that though we must accept the hard saying of Plotinus that "there is nothing yonder that is not also here," and though we must try not to picture heaven as a second physical world in which the evils of earth are redressed, the ideal which floats before us can only be made real to us by poetry, imagination, and symbolism, which are the natural language of religion. Bosanquet's stern intellectual integrity checked him when he approached this region.

He belonged to his own generation in rejecting the Christian idea of beatitude as *fruition*. "There is nothing anywhere but probation" (p. 249). And so, as there can hardly be any probation for minds removed from earthly conditions, he explicitly gives up the hope of individual immortality. I am a little surprised that while rejecting the idea of fruition, he quotes with approval the well-known and exquisite passage from Bradley's book on Truth and Reality. "For love and beauty and delight, it is no matter where they have shown themselves, there is no death, no change; and this conclusion is true. These things do not die, since the paradise in which they bloom is immortal. This paradise is in no special region nor in any given particular spot in time and space. It is here, it is everywhere where any finite being is lifted into that higher life which alone is making reality." There is not a word of this which Plotinus might not have written.

There does not seem to be any very wide difference between Bosanquet and the moderate realists. But when, towards the end of his life, he entered upon a civil correspondence with some of the Italian New Idealists, he must soon have realized that his divergence from them was fundamental. No two attitudes could be further apart than the deification of history in Croce and the rooted distrust of its value which Bosanquet expresses in no uncertain language. "To throw our ideals into the future is the death of all sane idealism." Neither from the past nor from the future did he expect to find much guidance in philosophy. "I do not think history can reform itself except by ceasing to be history" (p. 148).

To Professor Webb he writes: "Jesus is, *qua* human, a part, so to speak, of the incarnation; it is only the special historical tradition that makes him the whole of it" (p. 215). Christians who have any sense of the way in which new

ideas establish themselves in history will be ready to admit the truth of this statement. It takes two to tell the truth, one to speak, and one to hear; and it takes many more than two to found a great religion.

My personal debt to Bosanquet's books is very great. The only doctrine of his which I refuse to swallow is that of the General Will, which seems to me to be metaphysically a figment, and practically a stick for the backs of minorities.

We are very grateful to Professor Muirhead for his labour of love. Bosanquet is secure of his place among the great British philosophers.

W. R. Inge.

The Ethics of Power, or *The Problem of Evil*. By Philip Leon, M.A. (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1935. Pp. 315. Price 10s. 6d.)

We are being told that philosophy is too remote from practice and has too little to say on the pressing questions of the hour. This is a book which neither in intention nor effect is open to this charge. "The fundamental characteristic of our day," writes its author, "is worship of power or greatness," and the task he sets himself is to trace this characteristic to its roots, to expose its fundamental wrongness, and to indicate the only way of escape from it. It is in fact, as he calls it, a "Sermon."

Mr. Leon has hitherto been known chiefly by his articles in *Mind* and *Philosophy*, but these have raised great expectations in his readers which his book more than fulfils. Following Plato's division of the elements in human nature he states his thesis in so many (rather more) words as follows: "Appetition or the desire for processes in oneself or in others yields the egoistic life which includes altruism. Ambition is the desire for position and for processes only as symbols of this. It seeks supremacy, superiority. It makes the egotistic life. The moral desire is for right situations (union, at-oneness) embodying Goodness, and for processes only as ingredients in these. It makes the genuinely moral life."[1] But in the sequel the first and the third of these subjects receive comparatively little attention. The main portion of the book is concerned with the second. It is necessary to remember this, and that the book does not profess to be one on general moral philosophy, as otherwise it would be too like a logic which started with an analysis of negative judgments, or (to borrow a metaphor from Mr. Leon's own picturesque phraseology) like a voyage which started for the Isles of the Blest through the pit of Avernus. What we have is an extremely suggestive study of evil in the particular form of Egotism by the method of what the author calls "cumulative description," giving us a kind of "moral phenomenology" rather than a moral philosophy. He thus is enabled to approach his subject in a thoroughly modernist spirit, but he is too widely read both in literature and philosophy, and too keenly aware of the snares of Modernism to commit himself to the crudities with which in the writings of too many of its leaders it has become identified. Coming at once to the central contention, he has done well in trying to make clear the difference between the two attitudes of concernment with states of the self, in their nature passing, which he calls "processes" and concernment with the self as occupying a certain position, either as an individual or as a member of one or other of the social groups with which the individual "identifies" himself. Whether (*pace* George Meredith's *Egoist* and the *Oxford Dictionary*) he is justified in taking egoism as the right word for a state of the soul, the vice of which is precisely that the idea of

[1] P. 23 (abbreviated).

the ego or self, as a whole of some kind, has simply dropped out, its place being taken by passing likes and dislikes, is another question. For the rest the reader will find a wealth of subtle analysis and admirable literary illustration in the central chapters on "Egotism in Itself," "Collective Egotism" in its various forms, family, class, national and racial, "The Differentiation of Egotism," "Egotism and Morality." These are followed by two chapters on "Egotism and Evil" and "Moral Error and Punishment," one (all too short) on "Rightness and Goodness" and an epilogue on the "Sermon's Moral."

I have already noted the author's adherence to the Platonic psychology. But he makes no secret of his departure from it in one important particular. While Plato attributes to the element he calls "spirit," a secret alliance with "reason," Mr. Leon sees in the corresponding element of "ambition," the very soul of unreason and evil. Which is the truer view? We must, I think, agree that there can be no genuine goodness so long as conduct is egocentric instead of agathocentric. It was because the older definition of the principle of goodness as "self-realization" left so much ambiguity on this head, and required so much pulling about to make it serve the purpose intended, that it failed to find general acceptance. But to remove the idea of self from the centre is one thing, to refuse it any place at all in the good man's consciousness is quite another. On the principle *corruptio optimi pessima* (in the present case *corruptio melioris peior*) is not the very fact that the idea of the self, when corrupted, is more destructive of the good than that of the merely liked or disliked, a sign that it has more of the possibility of good in it? If the idea of being something in oneself and of being true to that self is to be expunged from the moral vocabulary, shall we not have to make our peace with literature, including the Gospels and Shakespeare, as well as with academic philosophy? Taking the same point from the objective side, is there really, we might ask, the discontinuity which the writer, here following Bergson, seems to find between the higher or "open" morality of loyalty to the good and the lower or closed morality of loyalty to a group? True, to escape from the narrowness of family, class, nation, and race, there is needed what the writer calls "conversion" or "substitution"; but through the conversions morality remains essentially social in the sense of implying a "beloved community" of some kind with which the member identifies himself or seeks to be at one. It surely all depends on the depth at which what the writer calls "the organizing spirit of goodness" operates. Perhaps I am here pushing an open door. But one cannot help feeling that if the author had recognized this continuity more clearly, he would have been more on his guard against the note of Carlylean exaggeration, if not cynicism, in such statements as "man's life is mostly folly," "ordinary sanity is simply insanity adjusted to the insanity of others," "the career of civilization, because it is the career of egotism, is the Dance of Death."

J. H. Muirhead.

The Philosophy of Spinoza, Unfolding the Latent Processes of His Reasoning. By Harry Austryn Wolfson. Two volumes. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. London: Oxford University Press; Humphrey Milford. 1934. Vol. I, pp. xix + 440. Vol. II, pp. xii + 424. Price $7.50. 31s. 6d. the two volumes.)

This is undoubtedly the most important work on Spinoza that has appeared in the English tongue since the publication of Professor Joachim's *Study of the Ethics of Spinoza* in 1901, and in its own direction is likely to be as

influential. Professor Wolfson has for long been known to Spinoza-scholars, some portions of the present work having been published several years ago in the *Chronicon Spinozanum*—that much-regretted organ of the *Societas Spinozana*. The appearance of this completed historico-critical study of the *Ethics* is likely to enhance Dr. Wolfson's reputation as a learned commentator and expositor. This is not the place for an extended examination and estimate of the arguments and conclusions of the work, even if I were qualified to undertake it: my business is to give a brief account of its scope, with a personal appraisement of its soundness and worth. Let me say at once that the work is well produced and carefully documented and indexed; I have noticed very few misprints, and apart from a few Homeric nods, to which I will not call individual attention, the diction is sufficiently English to ensure forgetfulness of its transatlantic origin. It is a work of which even the President and Fellows of Harvard College, the owners of the copyright, may be proud.

I think that Professor Wolfson will not deny that he is primarily a scholar rather than a philosopher, and that it is this that determines the special approach adopted, and must guide our estimate of his results. For him the *Ethics* is not so much a great original venture of the creative mind of its author as "a criticism of the fundamental problems of mediaeval philosophy" (to quote the presumably inspired publisher's note on the dust cover), and his method is therefore, as he says in the Preface, to read the finished text of Benedictus, the explicit Spinoza, the first of the moderns, in the light of the largely reconstructed implicit Baruch, the last of the mediaevals with his mind "crammed with traditional philosophic lore" turning ever "along the beaten paths of mediaeval reasoning." From that investigation it must be admitted in the end nothing but good can come, even though Dr. Wolfson's own conclusions may savour more of the Professor of Jewish Literature than of the pure philosopher. Philosophy can always wait, and will profit richly in proportion as it takes advantage of the results of precise scholarship to give an objective interpretation in place of the too frequent subjective or rationalizing estimates that serve only or mainly the ends of the disciple or historian.

In his opening chapter Professor Wolfson has some very wise remarks upon the study of Spinoza in the light of what we know of his personality, and indicates the reaction of his excommunication upon the literary form of his work. "He who among his own people never hesitated to speak out with boldness became cautious, hesitant, and reserved. It was a caution which sprang not from fear but from an inner sense of decorum which inevitably enforces itself on one in the presence of strangers, especially strangers who are kind." "So long had the thoughts of this book been simmering in his uncommunicative mind that it was boiled down to a concentrated essence." "The *Ethics* is not a communication to the world; it is Spinoza's communication with himself" (I, pp. 23–24). It is thus that the real difficulties of Spinoza-study arise, and Professor Wolfson compares the *Ethics* with the Talmudic writings on which Spinoza had been brought up. It presupposes an entire literary background in the absence of which it loses its clarity and becomes obscure and dead like a commentary without a text or a polemical speech in which the speaker's nods and winks and allusions are unnoted or unintelligible. And on the whole, although I am not as yet able to see eye to eye with a great deal in his book, I have no doubt that Professor Wolfson makes out his case. This is what the Spinoza-text requires far more than the texts of other philosophers.

The second introductory chapter under the title: *The Geometrical Method,*

though it contains much of great importance, is to me marred by the uncomfortable feeling that the writer has not himself understood the logical principles involved: a feeling that almost reaches certainty when I read on p. 45 that "the geometrical method of demonstration of the synthetic type is nothing but valid syllogistic reasoning as practised throughout the history of philosophy." Doubtless there is an etymological sense in which "syllogism" can stand for such reasonings in so far as a synthesis of thought is involved; but in the more usual and precise use of the term no geometrical proof is syllogistic except in incidental features such as the quotation of the authority of a prior truth. Indeed this must be so, for *Barbara* that alone can prove a universal affirmative, can only prove a *generic* property.

The remaining chapters (III–XII) of the first volume are concerned with the main topics of *Ethica I*: the distinction of Substance and Mode; the unity and simplicity of Substance; proofs of the existence of God; the Attributes and their infinity; Divine causality; Time and Eternity; Necessity and Purpose. On the doctrine of these chapters I can only make the very slightest and most inadequate, because mainly negative, comment. On the distinction of Substance and Modes I find Dr. Wolfson unsatisfactory; and this arises, I think, from his absorbing interest in mediaeval conceptions. It must surely be incorrect to speak of the relation between mode and substance as that between the individual essence and its genus (I, pp. 75–76), and of Substance as a *summum genus* (I, p. 76) even allowing the distinction of real and nominal universals (I, p. 75). And it seems to me no more than scholastic perversity to interpret the *in se* of Substance and the *in alio* of the mode as implying the relations of instances to their species or genus. Surely the *aliud* of a finite mode is not Substance at all but the mode's finite genetic cause; and Substance is *in se*, i.e. *causa sui*, as a self-maintaining and self-explanatory individual. I may, perhaps, be allowed to refer here also, a little out of the order of exposition, to Dr. Wolfson's comments on the Attributes of Substance. I confess that I find it amazing that anyone should to-day favour the subjective interpretation of this doctrine: "Attributes . . . are said to be perceived by the intellect or the mind in the sense that they are *invented* by the mind" (I, p. 328, author's italics). I am very far indeed from denying that the distinctions of the Attributes are in some manner relative to the intellect, but the doctrine advanced by Professor Wolfson is, it seems to me, wholly indefensible. Consistently, however, with the interpretation that to be perceived by the intellect as constituting the essence of Substance means to be an invention of the intellect, we are also asked to believe that for Spinoza Substance, being conceived through itself, is inconceivable, and its essence unknowable (I, p. 76). Doubtless this is true if the Attributes that constitute the essence of Substance are subjective inventions; but is not Dr. Wolfson nearer the mind of Spinoza when he makes the Attributes "one and identical with Substance", and not in the impossible sense to which he immediately returns: "the Attributes are only different *words* expressing the same reality and being of Substance (I, p. 156, my italics)? On the whole I feel that these distinctions of Substance, Mode, and Attribute have eluded the grasp of our author because he has not realized how remote was the thought of Spinoza from the mediaeval background against which his doctrine was elaborated as an abrupt contrast. I question whether in the whole history of Spinoza-scholarship a more inept analogy has ever been elaborated by a responsible expositor than the one which Professor Wolfson ventures even to repeat: "God or substance is to him an infinite logical crust which holds together the crumbs of the infinite number of the finite modes" (I, p. 398); "His substance . . . is nothing but a logical

shell holding the particular things of the universe together" (II, p. 346)—the figure is not even redeemed by its own grim humour, as is the equally false description of Spinoza's God as "an eternal paralytic" (II, p. 346). In connexion also with the denial that God is knowable I note that the author does not make much of the doctrine of the *Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione* that the idea of the most perfect being is the very standard of truth; and further that he finds the ontological proof a *petitio principii*: no other conclusion is possible on the principles emphasized (though not exclusively) by Dr. Wolfson (cf. I, p. 177).

I am sorry that my review should contain so many points of dissent, but I am afraid that I must confess that the account given in the seventh chapter of the development of Spinoza's account of the Attributes of Extension and Thought out of the Aristotelian distinction of matter and form gives me grave intellectual discomfort. I suppose it must be admitted that the two distinctions must have some kind of relation to each other—even, perhaps, that the second developed out of the first by some obscure dialectical path, but in the finished form in which Extension and Thought appear in the *Ethics* the contrast cuts right across the relative distinction of matter and form which can be applied under both Attributes. How otherwise could Spinoza have entertained the notion of infinite Attributes? Matter and form constitute a finished duality. It is true that Professor Wolfson explains how far the original mediaeval framework had been left behind by Spinoza, but I gravely question whether the account that he gives of the steps of the development is more than the mythical construction of a scholar determined to discover mediaeval architecture and to disbelieve in the possibility of genuinely original thought's finding baroque expression in a verbal masonry of classical and mediaeval fragments.

The remainder of Professor Wolfson's comment on *Ethica I* must be passed over even more rapidly. A very useful chapter on Spinoza's argument for the infinity of Extension is followed by one on God's causality which is likely to be instructive to beginners. I hope I shall not be expected to say that his chapter on Duration, Time, and Eternity cuts much ice. Divorced as it is from the doctrine of the eternity of the human mind (perversely expounded in Vol. II as a doctrine of Immortality), it must fail to advance our knowledge of Spinoza's special teaching. This is, I fancy, one of the most obvious instances of the failure of the historico-critical method of exposition.

Spinoza's doctrine of final causes is generally recognized as rather unsatisfactory even on his own principles, but I think that the two questions of the purposiveness of the *parts* of nature, and the purposiveness of *Deus sive Natura*, should be kept more distinct than has been usual. Spinoza is on very sure ground indeed in the main contention of *Ethica I App.* that God has no ends to pursue, because he is perfect. This is only another assertion of the nontemporal character of the ultimate Real. But whether Spinoza's argument implies in every sense that all final causes are human figments, as he himself says, is another question. Does the mere fact that the end is only effective in so far as we purpose it (or desire it) imply that the conception of purpose is fictitious? And the question is the more pertinent when we remember that for Spinoza the causes of events are not temporally prior events as in the empiricist tradition, but their "specious" grounds or genetic causes. Determination by past causes is as impossible as determination by final causes thought of as future. Is there not room here for a genuine doctrine of finite teleology that Spinoza does not deny?

In the second volume Professor Wolfson turns to the remaining *Parts* of the *Ethics*: Chs. XIII to XVIII on *Ethica II*; Ch. XVIII on *Ethica III*;

Ch. XIX on *Ethica IV*; Ch. XX on *Ethica V*; with a concluding chapter, and a very necessary one, on *What is New in Spinoza*. The opening chapter of this volume might, I think, have been much enriched if the historico-critical method had been made to provide a more extended account of the microcosm-macrocosm doctrine than a mere page and a half of general references. This is precisely the kind of discussion that might prove extremely valuable in the exposition of Spinoza's doctrine where it is absolutely central. It would also have had the effect of vitalizing the discussion of *Ethica II, III, et IV*, which as it stands does not seem to me to advance our knowledge very much, though it is of course a distinct advantage to see how the details of their doctrines stand related to the common mediaeval views in which Spinoza was educated.

I have already referred to Professor Wolfson's interpretation of the important Spinozistic doctrine of the eternity of the human mind: that he understands it as the immortality of the soul—the survival of the individual soul, or part of it, after death (and its existence before birth) in the same time-series as that in which it endures its embodied life. And the immortality is denied not only of memory and imagination, but also of the body itself which has only a limited duration as an individual thing. The soul survives as a soul, i.e. it retains its particular characteristics; the body perishes as a body, i.e. it loses its particular characteristics. This is obviously not the place for an extended discussion of this most disputed part of Spinoza's doctrine, but Professor Wolfson will not deny that there is great difficulty in reconciling such an interpretation as his own with the notion of the mind as the *essentia objectiva* of the body *et nihil aliud* (as Spinoza says); and it does not explain the use of the term "eternity" rather than "immortality" in the second section of *Pars V*. Unfortunately Dr. Wolfson does not find it necessary to discuss these matters at all fully: the historico-critical method holds his attention unflaggingly to the search for analogies and verbal agreements with the past—to the implicit Baruch—rather than to the original elements of philosophic speculation characteristic of the explicit Benedictus. Not that he finds Spinoza to be a mere eclectic or echo of the past: and in the final chapter he enumerates the four cardinal innovations of the system, viz. the materiality of God; the uniformity of *Natura* (*sive Deus*); the inseparability (*sic*) of soul and body in man as in God; and the unreality of human freedom. It is hard to be compelled to lay down the pen without joining issue on every one of these most debatable themes.

H. F. Hallett.

Hume's Theory of the Understanding. By R. W. Church. (London: G. Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1935. Pp. 238. Price 7s. 6d.)

Professor Taylor has recently confessed to a "haunting doubt" whether Hume was "really a great philosopher or only 'a very clever man.'" This doubt must have assailed most readers of Hume, and Dr. Church's book is meant to repel it. His main object is to rescue Hume's philosophy from the position assigned to it by T. H. Green as the *reductio ad absurdum* of English analytic empiricism. He begins with a chapter on Hume's theory of relations and universals which attempts very ingeniously to argue that the acceptance of Berkeley's doctrine concerning general ideas leads him to the view that no impressions are *per se* really related and that all actual relations are the work of the gentle force of association. It is true that this conclusion would also follow from Hume's dogma that whatever can be distinguished can be separated, but here it is made to fill a place in a complete logical theory,

and in a way which clears up the very puzzling distinction between natural and philosophical relations.

Dr. Church continues his rehabilitation of Hume by considering how far his conclusions necessarily depend on his other initial dogma that every idea is derived from a corresponding impression. He admits that this principle enables Hume to dismiss with ease the problems of self, cause, substance, and necessity by demanding "From what impression did the idea arise?" But he maintains that even without the aid of this crude and dubious empiricism, Hume presents a massive system of argument and analysis with which any subsequent philosophy must reckon. On causality, for instance, Hume's argument is not merely or even primarily that we can have no idea of cause because we have no corresponding impression. His main line of thought is independent of this approach. It involves (*a*) a demonstration of the incapacity of reason to defend causal inference, (*b*) a critical analysis of the notion of cause, and (*c*) a positive theory of causal inference as the work of a non-rational associative faculty. All this argument both negative and positive retains its value and interest, even if the empiricist dogma is denied. Dr. Church shows that is true also of Hume's treatment of self and substance, and of the subjective theory of probability and chances which he carefully expounds and elucidates. This central section of Dr. Church's book is very thorough and convincing, though both here and in the first chapter the style is so compact as to make it difficult on a first reading to grasp its full force. The recent articles of Hobart, Kemp Smith, and Broad have done much to rectify the one-sidedness of Green's account of Hume, but this is the first work in English in which the value of Hume's work is shown to lie in all those elements which Green neglected, and in which Hume's achievement in the history of philosophy is shown to be not merely the suicide of sensationalism.

On this part of the book I have only one criticism. Dr. Church does not follow up the distinction he notes (p. 69) between causality and causation. Had he done so he would have revealed a radical flaw in the whole theory. The distinction is drawn by Hume when he says there are two questions to be answered: "First, For what reason we pronounce it *necessary*, that everything whose existence has a beginning, should also have a cause? Secondly, Why we conclude that such particular causes must *necessarily* have such particular effects." Hume proceeds to show that reason cannot demonstrate the first principle—the general law of causality. He then says it would naturally follow to show how experience gives rise to such a principle, but he will "sink this question in the following, why we conclude that such particular causes must necessarily have such particular effects." He adds—and this is the flaw referred to—that "It will, perhaps, be found in the end that the same answer will serve for both questions." To illustrate the difficulty, if I hear a bang there will arise two questions, why I should believe that the bang has some cause or other, and why I should believe that the bang was caused by a squib. Now Hume's answer to the second question is that the belief arises from the association of that particular kind of noise with the particular kind of visual datum we call a squib. But it is surely plain that the same account will not serve for both questions, for how could custom associate a kind of bang with "something or other." What experiences could have given rise to the custom leading to such an expectation? Looked at from another angle, his suggestion that a belief in the general causal law could arise from association is a particular form of the fallacy of supposing that the presuppositions of induction can be inductively established. He might, indeed, have maintained as an alternative to this theory that the general law of causality is not the result of a custom or repetition of particular

experiences, but is itself the general description of the method by which association works. This would have come close to the Kantian answer; and it would also have raised for Hume an insoluble problem, the question whether he is going to regard philosophy itself (or psychology) as a specimen of associative imagination.

Dr. Church goes on in his last chapter to give a general account of Hume's theory of experience and his consequent philosophical position. On the latter question he is vigorous and uncompromising. Hume is an agnostic and not a sceptic. He himself rejects "the total scepticism of the fantastic sect," and he does not deny the independent reality of substances, causes, and selves. He "allows" that there may be material objects, and he asserts that our impressions arise from unknown causes. Dr. Church sees that there is a difficulty in this interpretation if we stress the empiricist principle that every idea derives from a corresponding impression, but he is explicitly making the experiment of ridding Hume's philosophy of this dogma and discovering what remains, so it is obviously unfair to stress this inconsistency. However, the difficulty of making Hume an agnostic and not a sceptic goes deeper than this, for we should have in the end to sacrifice not only the empiricist dogma but also the analysis of cause, and for that matter of self and substance also. If "cause" simply *means* an impression regularly associated with another so that the recurrence of the one gives rise to an idea of the other, and if "self" simply *means* a bundle of ideas and impressions, then unknown causes and permanent selves are self-contradictory notions. Yet this is the position Hume frequently maintains. "Necessity is . . . nothing but an internal impression of the mind." We can find no relevant experience except "that propensity, which custom produces, to pass from an object to the idea of its usual attendant. This, therefore, is the essence of necessity" (*Treatise*, Bk. I, part iii, section 14. Ed. Selby-Bigge, p. 165). Now if we are to represent Hume as an agnostic we must surely take him to be maintaining (1) that we know what we mean by self, substance, cause, or necessity; (2) that we know we do *not* mean bundle of impressions, sequences of impressions contiguous and smoothly successive, ideas regularly associated with impressions or propensities of the mind to pass from one to another; (3) that we do mean permanent spiritual subject, continuing identical object, productive power, or real connection between external objects, but (4) that we can find no warrant for asserting the actual existence of instances of any of these natures. We do not find ourselves able to demonstrate the existence of any actual self or cause or substance or objective necessary connection, or generally of any matter of fact. We find no instance of cause; what we find in its stead is constant conjunction, and so on. Surely this is not the real Hume. Would he not have maintained the contradictory of proposition (2) above, and can we not find in him the progenitor of the modern theory of analysis which maintains that the meaning of a proposition *is* its verification?

One last query. Was Hume entitled to assert the existence of mental habits? Whitehead (as Dr. Church reminds us) says he was not. Dr. Church replies: "It would be a mistake to assert that in Hume's view there is no *internal* impression of habit" (p. 83). Surely Whitehead is right here. The feelings which arise from the habit—expectancy, familiarity, or smooth transition from impression to idea—all these may be directly experienced. But none of these is the habit. For the difficulty here is that ultimate crux for Hume that expectings and transitions simply happen, but a habit endures and develops. (Dr. Church points out elsewhere that Hume can give no account of development.) Hume could only have evaded this difficulty by giving an account of "habit" in terms of his theory of general ideas. A habit would then be the

aggregate of the separate and independent expectings or transitions which are attached each to a similar pair of impressions in a single psychical history. But of the necessity or possibility of such a fundamental recasting of Hume's account of human nature, neither Hume nor his expositor are cognizant.

I have insisted on these difficulties at some length because I believe they are only developments of Dr. Church's method and approach, and I am convinced that this approach is far more fruitful than the older orthodox account of Hume. Dr. Church's essay is very closely reasoned, compact, and coherent. His previous work on Malebranche has enabled him to rehabilitate Hume in another way. He finds in Hume's treatment of causality the culmination, both historically and logically considered, of a continental development which begins with Descartes' doubt and ultimate denial of causal interaction between mind and body, continues through the occasionalism of his immediate successors, and is extended in Malebranche to the denial of all physical causation. Altogether then Dr. Church fully justifies his claim to have worked out systematically the positive side of Hume's philosophy, and to have shown that it is not merely a philosophy worthy of serious consideration, but in many respects a permanent basis for modern theories of induction and analysis.

J. D. Mabbott.

Must Philosophers Disagree? And Other Essays in Popular Philosophy. By F. C. S. Schiller. (London: Macmillan & Co. 1934. Pp. xi + 359. Price 12s. 6d. net.)

The essays and addresses in this volume have for the most part been printed before, several of them in American journals such as *The Personalist*; and all that have hitherto been unprinted were given to American audiences. British readers, therefore, who know what they missed when Dr. Schiller became half a Californian will be particularly grateful to him for publishing this volume, and delighted with the activity of his pen during recent years; for although one of these essays is as old as 1908, and two others appeared before 1920, the great majority are quite recent. Together they give a vivid impression of Dr. Schiller's shrewdness in the wide range of topics to which he has given his mind. As well as pragmatism (or humanism or personalism) and accounts of the discomfiture of Formal Logic, we have here discussions of theology, religion, ethics, psychical research, the Darwinian theory, and eugenics. There is also an account of the examination system in which a very catty member of the feline species, accompanied by certain undeniable truths, is let out of an Oxford bag for the benefit of undergraduates on the Pacific coast.

Dr. Schiller regards himself as a "desperado" with a passion for singeing professorial beards and for unstarching academic bands. In most of these essays, however, he is rather a mellow buccaneer; and, if one chose to imitate his style, one might say that these fireside talks from a former desperado attempted much wit and achieved some wisdom; that, unlike history, they repeated themselves a good deal; and so forth. Such comments, however, would convey an illusion. The breezy desperado of these essays is really a ventriloquist's puppet; and the ventriloquist himself is very much in earnest with a great deal of importance to say.

Philosophers, I dare say, are likely to disagree about the conclusiveness of Dr. Schiller's contentions, but those who suspect they will be unconvinced would be very unwise to neglect these contentions. I must confess, however,

that a part of the fascination of this volume (for me) is the adequacy with which Dr. Schiller seems to answer himself. Thus he tells us on p. 188 that truth is "valid" because and so long as it is "strong," but, criticizing Nietzsche, points out that we have a right to ask the spokesman of the "strong" what precisely he means by "strength." He tells us on p. 8 that in ultimate analysis the "world" is "an artefact, a construction and a fiction," but on pp. 122 seqq. takes Nietzsche to task for saying something very similar. He is fond of stressing the great fact and the inescapability of personal idiosyncracy, but tells us on p. 159 that what is really wanted is a "detailed scientific study" of *how* man "starting from his own individuality, continues to transcend its limitations, and to build up the objects and the institutions of the common world."

Although thinkers are individuals, I confess I cannot see why they are restricted to their own individuality, either at the start or at any other time; but if it were so, many of us would be very grateful indeed if Dr. Schiller abandoned the guerilla warfare appropriate to these essays, but characteristic of all his work, and gave us instead this "detailed scientific study" in its detail. As things are, the suggestions in this volume seem, for the most part, to be provocative rather than fully developed. We are told that knowing is always making and that all "facts" are made; and yet we are supposed to know facts *when made* in a non-pragmatic way, and are not supposed to be remaking them into something different. Similarly, we are supposed to know the results of "testing" in a non-pragmatic way, although, in the pragmatic sense, our tests should always and inevitably be *in the testing* and never out of it. Again, since not all consequences of cognitive states are fitted or are ever intended to be a pragmatic "test," it might be advisable if Dr. Schiller essayed the methods of the Cambridge analysts (whom he ridicules) and explained with greater clarity what sort of "consequences" are selected to be such for pragmatist purposes. Such requests, I suppose, would be dismissed as "verbalism" by all good pragmatists; but until we find a pragmatist who can tell us things without using words it is difficult to see how "verbalism" could be avoided.

JOHN LAIRD.

The Frontiers of Psychology. By WILLIAM MCDOUGALL, F.R.S. (Contemporary Library of Psychology. London and Cambridge: Nisbet & Co., Ltd., and Cambridge University Press. 1934. Pp. xiv + 232. Price 5s. net.)

Professor McDougall, like a true frontiersman, goes well armed, with his finger ready on the trigger. The suspicious characters whom he meets in "the extensive tracts of still unsettled wilderness" around the frontiers of psychology are dealt with firmly in a most readable and provocative book. It is provocative in two senses, for it should excite retort and stimulate further examination of the many problems which it raises. The size of the book limits the author to divergent raids with little attempt at permanent settlement, and from some of his expeditions he returns with slight booty. His encounter with mathematics yields only the scalps of a few mathematical prodigies, and his dealings with philosophy are not much more fruitful. "Philosophy is a matter of wisdom, science a matter of knowledge" (p. 41). So to be a philosopher is to have "sound opinions about the relative values of things," a statement based upon the writer's distinction between knowledge of fact and judgment of values, only the former being concerned with truth, while the latter yields opinions of varying degree of validity. He strenuously

advocates pragmatism, but holds that it does not "pretend to assert a new theory of truth. It accepts the correspondence theory of truth" (p. 27). It would appear at times to accept the coherence theory also, and is, in fact, reduced to its proper sphere of verification by correspondence with expectation, and verification does not affect truth (p. 52). Verification can never be complete in the world of observed fact, so that science cannot attain more than probable truth, a conclusion which presumably holds good of psychology as of other sciences. If so, Professor McDougall has furnished rival explorers with a useful weapon.

For he maintains that psychology is the fundamental science, being the basis even of physics, and, like Professor Whitehead, he is concerned about modern physics. "Physical science has, throughout its development, been perverted by its hasty and false psychological assumptions, and can only be set right by bringing to its aid a less inadequate and less misleading psychology" (p. 152). Observing that recent writers have in fact introduced psychological topics into their expositions, he complains with justice that they have either accepted uncritically the views of the man in the street, or have invented a psychology *ad hoc*. There are some very entertaining passages in which he analyses the statements put forward by certain authors in popular accounts of current physical theory, and his arguments, incisively put, are pertinent. But he gives little guidance on the urgent question whether the abstract theories of physics are to be accepted as descriptions of reality, or only as useful mental constructions for marshalling observed facts. Are they in the end only expressive of the constitutive laws of the human mind? This is a problem well worth the attention of an adventurous psychologist. His chief charge against physical science is that it has excluded teleology, but we cannot see that he has shown any profit which physics, with the best will in the world, could derive from it. It is asserted that, since any science embodies the purposes of the scientist, he is illogical if he rules out purpose from his science. But there is no force in this argument, which assumes that the goal of a purpose must itself be purposive in the same sense. The agent and the instrument which he constructs to accomplish his ends are both describable as purposive, but the adjective has different meanings in the two applications.

There is a rather long and, we think, convincing analysis of the psychological genesis of the concept of energy. But the only things which can matter to the scientist are the nature of the concept as he now accepts it, and the use which he can make of it. We cannot see that psychology can assist him here, except perhaps by making him aware of his own activities.

The concluding sections, dealing with the relations of psychology to history and the other human sciences, are equally stimulating and probably more fruitful.We can only mention here one of the important issues which Professor McDougall resolutely faces. Why has European man progressed so rapidly in knowledge, organization, and kindliness during the last few centuries? Holding to the fundamental principles already stated, Professor McDougall insists that quasi-mechanistic explanations are inadequate, and that the cause must be found in directed mental activity. At certain epochs the impact of new problems upon a fixed society stirs latent mental powers into activity. Convinced by his experiments upon rats that the Lamarckian hypothesis is true and applicable to mental characters, he concludes that the effects of this heightened mental activity will affect later generations by direct inheritance. But the same experiments suggest that some thirty generations are required before the consequences are fully manifest, and this may be the explanation of the alternation of long periods of relative stagnation and of intense activity

and progress in human affairs. If so, the outbreak of intellectual activity at and since the Renaissance is the direct biological consequence of the ferment accompanying the collapse of the Roman Empire. He applies his theory of sentiment to the further elucidation of his problem. A child, brought under the influence of Christian ideals, will form new sentiments with regard to them. "Then, if the Lamarckian principle is valid, the susceptibility to such emotional sympathetic reactions will not only be increasingly exercised in each such individual, but his offspring will be endowed . . . with a similarly enhanced susceptibility" (p. 206).

The argument mainly depends upon the acceptance of the Lamarckian hypothesis, and Dr. McDougall is at least entitled to claim that his truly heroic research has made this once more an open question. But even if its validity be granted, it may still be urged that he has underestimated the importance of cumulative social tradition. In the tightly woven fabric of social man's activities a single chance discovery may initiate revolutionary changes, which will gradually transform all social values and build up a new tradition which decisively affects new entrants into society. The example to which we have referred suggests also that his argument is double-edged. Other children were brought up to accept cruelty as proper and desirable. The same psychological principles would apply to them, and the consequence should be the development within a given territory of two antagonistic societies, becoming more and more divergent in their sentiments and ideals. We wish that the writer had enjoyed more space to work out his theory. And we await the plea of his many victims that since frontiers in wildernesses are notoriously ill-surveyed, trespass is a venial offence, though none of us appear at our best when so engaged.

A. W. WOLTERS.

Books received also:—

D. KATZ, Dr.Phil. *The World of Colour.* London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co. 1935. Pp. xvi + 300. 15s.

H. F. MINNS, JR. *Materialism the Scientific Bias.* New York: The Journal of Philosophy. 1934. Pp. 120. $1.

A. D. OSBORN. *The Philosophy of Edmund Husserl.* New York: The Journal of Philosophy. 1934. Pp. 116. $1.

COL. BARON M. D. A. R. VON REDLICH, Ph.D., LL.D. *Justice for Hungary.* New York: International Courier Publishing Co. 1935. Pp. 15.

DR. R. DREIKURS. *An Introduction to Individual Psychology.* (Foreword by Dr. A. Adler. Tr. by E. G. Fenning). London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co. 1935. Pp. viii + 152. 3s. 6d.

The Pravacana-sāra of Kunda-kunda, Ācārya together with the Commentary, Tattvadīpikā, by Amṛtacandra Sūri. (Ed. with Introduction, by F. W. Thomas. Tr. by B. Faddegon.) Cambridge at the University Press. 1935. Pp. xxiv + 227. 15s.

SIR CHARLES ELIOT, P.C., G.C.M.G., C.B. *Japanese Buddhism.* London: Edward Arnold & Co. 1935. Pp. xxv + 449. 42s.

D. FORTUNE. *The Mystical Qabalah.* London: Williams & Norgate. 1935. Pp. viii + 306. 10s. 6d.

E. A. MILNE, D.Sc., F.R.S. *Relativity, Gravitation, and World-Structure.* Oxford at the Clarendon Press; Humphrey Milford. 1935. Pp. ix + 365. 25s.

P. S. NAIDU. *The Syllogistic Machine.* (Reprinted from the Annamalai University Journal, Vol. IV, No. 1.) Annamalainagar, India. Pp. 120–130.

H. P. Adams, M.A. *The Life and Writings of Giambattista Vico.* London: G. Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1935. Pp. 236. 8s. 6d.

H. Cairns. *Law and the Social Sciences.* London. Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co. 1935. Pp. xiv + 279. 12s. 6d.

E. J. Thomas, M.A., D.Litt. (Editor and Translator). *Early Buddhist Scriptures.* London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co. 1935. Pp. xxv + 232. 10s. 6d.

L. H. Myers. *The Root and the Flower.* London: J Cape. 1935. Pp. 583. 8s. 6d.

Various. *University of Oxford Committee for Advanced Studies: Abstracts of Dissertations for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy.* Vol. VII. Oxford at the Clarendon Press; Humphrey Milford. 1935. Pp. iv + 129. 3s.

W. P. Pitkin. *A Short Introduction to the History of Human Stupidity.* London: G. Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1935. Pp. xii + 574. 12s. 6d.

A. Wolf. *A History of Science, Technology, and Philosophy in the 16th and 17th Centuries.* London: G. Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1935. Pp. xxvii + 692. 25s.

C. Lambek. *Essay on the Foundation of Cognition.* (Tr. A. Kortsen.) Copenhagen: Levin & Munksgaard; London: Williams & Norgate. 1935. Pp. 104. 4s. 6d.

G. B. Brown, M.Sc., Ph.D. *The Limits of Science.* (Reprinted from *Science Progress.*) Pp. 729–748.

C. Lamont. *The Illusion of Immortality.* New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1935. Pp. x + 294. $3.

Sir P. S. Sivaswamy Aiyar, K.C.S.I., C.I.E., LL.D. *Evolution of Hindu Moral Ideals.* (Kamala Lectures.) Calcutta: University Press. 1935. Pp vii + 242. 4s. 6d. Rs. 2.8.

L. Welch. *Imagination and Human Nature.* (Psyche Monographs 3.) London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co. 1935. Pp. 223. 7s. 6d.

K. V. Mulbagala. *The Popular Practice of Yoga.* London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co. 1935. Pp. viii + 238. 7s. 6d.

F. H. Anderson, Ph.D. *The Argument of Plato.* London : J. M. Dent & Sons. 1935. Pp. viii + 216. 10s. 6d.

E. Schrödinger. *Science and the Human Temperament.* (Tr. with biographical introduction by J. Murphy. Foreword by Lord Rutherford of Nelson, O.M., F.R.S.) London: G. Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1935. Pp. 154. 7s. 6d.

H. Straumann. *Newspaper Headlines. A Study in Linguistic Method.* London: G. Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1935. Pp. 263. 10s.

W. G. de Burgh. *The Relations of Morality to Religion.* (Henriette Hertz Lecture, 1935.) London: Humphrey Milford. 1935. Pp. 27. 2s.

M. B. Foster. *The Political Philosophies of Plato and Hegel.* Oxford Clarendon Press; Humphrey Milford. 1935. Pp. xii + 207. 7s. 6d.

Various. *Proceedings of the Tenth Annual Meeting of the American Catholic Association: Philosophy of Religion.* Washington: Catholic University of America. 1935. Pp. 183 + v. $1.50.

C. Fox. *Educational Psychology: Its Problems and Methods.* 3rd edition. (International Library of Psychology and Philosophy.) London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co. 1935. Pp. xii + 442. 10s. 6d.

C. Bailey. *Religion in Virgil.* Oxford at the Clarendon Press; Humphrey Milford. 1935. Pp. 337. 15s.

V. F. Calverton. *The Passing of the Gods.* London: G. Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1935. Pp. xiv + 326. 10s. 6d.

W. A. Robson, Ph.D., LL.M., B.Sc. *Civilisation and the Growth of Law.* London: Macmillan & Co. 1935. Pp. xv + 354. 12s. 6d.

O. DE SELINCOURT. *Art and Morality*. London: Methuen & Co. 1935. Pp. ix + 284. 10s. 6d.

V. BRELSFORD, B.A., F.R.A.I., F.R.G.S. *Primitive Philosophy*. London: J. Bale, Sons & Danielsson Ltd. 1935. Pp. 55. 2s. 6d.

R. GRIFFITHS, Ph.D. *Imagination in Early Childhood*. (Preface by J. C. Flugel.) London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co. 1935. Pp. xiv + 367. 12s. 6d.

A. REY. *Les Mathématiques en Grèce au Milieu du V^e Siècle*. Paris: Hermann & Cie. 1935. Pp. 92. Frs. 18.

H. METZGER. *La Philosophie de la Matière chez Lavoisier*. Paris: Hermann & Cie. 1935. Pp. 48. Frs. 10.

H. HAHN. *Logique, Mathématiques et Connaissance de la Réalité*. (Traduction du Général E. Vouillemin; Introduction de M. M. Boll.) Paris: Hermann & Cie. 1935. Pp. 52. Frs. 10.

P. SERVIEN, D.-ès-L. *Principes d'Esthétique. Problèmes d'Art et Langage des Sciences*. Paris. Boivin & Cie. 1935. Pp. viii + 228. Frs. 18.

Dictionnaire de Spiritualité. Ascétique et Mystique. Doctrine et Histoire. Fascicule IV: "Ascèse, Ascétisme (suite)—Basile (saint)." Publié sous la Direction de M. Viller, S.J.; assisté de F. Cavallera et J. de Guibert, S.J. Paris: G. Beauchesne et Fils. 1935. Pp. 962–1279.

I. MADKOUR, D.-ès-L. *La Place d'al Fârâbî dans l'école philosophique musalmane*. (Préface de L. Massignon.) Paris: Librairie d'Amérique et d'Orient, Adrien-Maisonneuve. 1934. Pp. viii + 254. Frs. 50.

R. LE SENNE. *Obstacle et Valeur*. Paris: F. Aubier. 1934. Pp. 351. Frs. 20.

L. J. BECK. *La Méthode Synthétique d'Hamelin*. Paris: F. Aubier. 1935. Pp. 254. Frs. 15.

G. MARCEL: *Être et Avoir*. Paris: F. Aubier. 1935. Pp. 357. Frs. 20.

A. VALENSIN. *Balthazar. Deux Dialogues Philosophiques suivis de Commentaires sur Pascal*. Paris: F. Aubier. 1934. Pp. 177. Frs. 12.

L. LAVELLE. *La Présence Totale*. Paris: F. Aubier. 1934. Pp. 253. Frs. 15.

S. KIERKEGAARD. *Crainte et Tremblement*. Lyrique-Dialectique par J. de Silentio. Traduit par P. H. Tisseau. Introduction de J. Wahl. Paris: F. Aubier. 1935. Pp. xxvi + 217. Frs. 15.

DR. K. DUNCKER. *Zur Psychologie des Produktiven Denkens*. Berlin: J. Springer. 1935. Pp. 135. RM. 9.60.

N. HARTMANN. *Zur Grundlegung der Ontologie*. Berlin: W. de Gruyter & Co. 1935. Pp. xvi + 322. RM. 9.

E. A. CHÁVEZ. *Dios, el Universo y la Libertad*. Barcelona: Editorial Araluce. 1935. Pp. 191. Ps. 5.

B. CROCE. *Ultima Saggi* (Saggi Filosofici VII). Bari: G. Laterza & Figli. 1935. Pp. viii + 399. Lire trenta.

G. DE RUGGIERO. *La Filosofia Greca: Vol. I: Dalle origini a Platone. Vol. II: Da Aristotele al Neo-Platonismo*. Terza edizione. Bari: G. Laterza & Figli. 1935. Pp. Vol. I 396; Vol. II 346. L. 45 due volumi.

VARIOUS: *Il Cardinale Tomaso De Vio Gaetano Nel Quarto Centenario Della Sua Morte*. Milano: Società Editrice "Vita e Pensiero." 1935. Pp. v + 166. Lire dieci.

MAGISTRI ECKHARDI. *Opera Latina*. II. *Opus Tripartitum Prologi*. (Edidit: H. Bascour O.S.B.) Leipzig: Felix Meiner. 1935. Pp. xi + 40. RM 2.

CORRESPONDENCE

To the Editor of *Philosophy*

EXPOSITION INTERNATIONALE

Monsieur le Commissaire Général de l'Exposition a décidé a l'occasion du Tricentenaire du Discours de la Méthode, d'Organiser une grandiose Manifestation au cours de l'Exposition Internationale de Paris en 1937

Une Commission, que je préside, a été constituée et, en accord avec les Sociétés de Philosophie et les plus hautes Personnalités des milieux intellectuels français, s'occupe de prendre toutes les dispositions, afin que cette cérémonie soit digne de Descartes et de son Œuvre.

Pour que cette Manifestation ait l'ampleur que nous désirons et puisse représenter, le plus exactement possible, le développement dans le monde de la Pensée Cartésienne, il est indispensable que toutes les Nations soient invitées à nous prêter leur concours intellectuel.

La Célébration du Tricentenaire du Discours de la Méthode devant donner lieu également à la réunion de divers congrès, tant philosophiques que scientifiques, il serait utile que les Personnalités compétentes soient prevenues dès á présent afin de leur permettre de preparer à loisir les communications qu'elles désireraient faire à nos congrès.

Les renseignements detaillés sur l'organisation des réunions des Expositions et des Cérémonies qui constitueront la célébration officielle seront adressées personnellement en temps utile à tous ceux qui, désirant collaborer à notre Œuvre, voudront bien nous en manifester le désir.

Les Inscriptions seront reçues dès à présent par Monsieur Leveille, Groupe I, "*Expression de la Pensée.*"

Exposition Internationale de 1937
35 Rue Saint-Didier, Paris (XVIe).

Paul Valery,
de l'Academie Française.

Paris,
le 10 *Avril*, 1935.

To the Editor of *Philosophy*

My Dear Editor,

My attention has been called to the fact that Professor Webb in his too kind notice of my Gifford Lectures in the last number of *Philosophy*, picks out for special approbation a passage which was, in fact, borrowed from another writer. When I wrote the sentence about the *robot* I was not conscious that it came from another source, but as I had not long before read Dr. Oman's book *Natural and Supernatural*, where something extremely similar occurs on page 45, it is obvious that my mind had retained his image and then reproduced it.

I shall be grateful if you will allow me to pass on to Dr. Oman the credit for this illustration which plainly belongs to him and not to me.

Yours faithfully,
William Ebor.

"Bishopthorpe,"
York,
May 2, 1935.

To the Editor of *Philosophy*

MR. DUNNE'S THEORY OF TIME

My Dear Editor,

An initial error seems to vitiate Dunne's theory of Time; two complaints, separately emphasized by two critics, seem to direct attention to this initial error. Newman complains that Dunne ought to serialize Space as well as Time. Broad complains that the infinite regress in Dunne's notion of Time is detrimental to the theory because it is vicious. Broad's complaint seems to be just, and, because it is just, to expose an inherent fallaciousness in Dunne's system. Newman's complaint seems to be mistaken, and, because it is mistaken, to expose the source, or nature, of the fallaciousness.

After counting the six men in a room, the enumerator can rest on his count though there is a number seven beyond the number six, and an infinite series of numbers beyond the seven. Dunne cannot rest on his T(1) in his infinite regress of Times because T(1) requires T(2), nor on any T(n) because it requires T($n + 1$). He is compelled to employ both an Absolute Time and an Observer at infinity, although, as Broad comments, he assumes a last term to a series which cannot have one. He is compelled to end the infinite regress peremptorily at an infinite terminus because he cannot have T(1) without also having T(2), or T(2) without also having T(3), and so on up the series. The enumerator need not pass on to 7 after counting 6; Dunne must pass on to T(7) after considering T(6).

Dunne's serialization, however, is not vicious as an infinite regress of *Times*. He condemns himself to an endless chase after Time, and to an arbitrary claim of capture at the infinite finish, by doing what Newman complains he does not do. He adds to tri-dimensional Space the *spatialized* Time which becomes T(1) in the series. He himself refers to it as "a 'real' fourth dimension, akin to any of the three dimensions of Space." Since Time has been expelled from the world by spatializing it, it must be put back again. T(2) does not put it back again because it too is spatialized. Dunne's T(1) should be changed to S(1), or S′(1), as he passes on to T(2), and so each T(n) should be revised into S(n), or S′(n), as the analysis proceeds. The infinite regress of *Times* is actually a serialized system of spatial dimensions, or of pseudo-spatial dimensions which are more like the three original dimensions of Space than they are like Times. The series of Times is not properly an infinite regress of terms, but a pathway of chase. Dunne must put in the initially excluded Time, but whenever he considers a T(n) it becomes an S′(n): Time itself is continually chased and continuously eludes pursuit by becoming spatial, or pseudo-spatial.

This note does not discuss the general indebtedness of thought to Dunne: this may still be great though the presumed infinite regress of Time is based fallaciously on an illegitimate spatialization. Neither does it intend to correct Professor Broad's careful analysis. It simply directs attention to a seeming initial error—an attempt to convert Time into a kind of Space.

Joshua C. Gregory.

3 Oak Villas,
Bradford, Yorks,
May 20, 1935.

THE BRITISH INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY

(*Incorporated under the Companies Acts* 1908–1917 *as a Company not for Profit but limited by Guarantee.*)

President:

THE RT. HON. SIR HERBERT SAMUEL, G.C.B., G.B.E., D.C.L., M.A., M.P.

Chairman of the Council:

J. H. MUIRHEAD, M.A., LL.D., F.B.A.

Deputy Chairman of the Council:

A. D. LINDSAY, C.B.E., M.A.

Hon. Treasurer:

THE LORD TWEEDSMUIR, C.H., G.C.M.G., D.C.L.

Director of Studies:

SYDNEY E. HOOPER, M.A.

Hon. Secretary:

P. M. ROSSDALE, LL.M.

INSTITUTE NOTES

THE Syllabus of Lectures and Evening Meetings for the Session 1935–36 is now in course of preparation, and will be sent to members in the early autumn.

OBJECTS OF THE INSTITUTE

The British Institute of Philosophy exists to bring leading exponents of various branches of Philosophy into direct contact with the general public, with the purpose of satisfying a need felt by many men and women in every walk of life for greater clearness and comprehensiveness of vision in human affairs.

With this broad educational purpose in view, the Institute—

(1) Provides at suitable times in the day and evening courses of lectures by leading exponents in the more important subjects coming within the scope of Philosophy. All branches of Philosophy are represented—Ethics and Social Philosophy, the Philosophy of Law and of the Sciences, of the Fine Arts and of Religion, as well as Logic and Metaphysics and Psychology. There lectures are free to members.

(2) Issues a quarterly philosophical Journal (free to members).

(3) Proposes to form a philosophical Library.

(4) Gives guidance and assistance to individuals in their philosophical reading.

(5) Encourages research in Philosophy.
(6) There are Local Centres of the Institute at Bangor, Cardiff, Liverpool, Manchester, Newcastle and Durham, and Sheffield.

Further information and forms of application for membership may be had on application to the Director of Studies, University Hall, 14 Gordon Square, London, W.C. 1.

[Suggested]

FORM OF BEQUEST

I bequeath to THE BRITISH INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY the sum of ..... free of duty, to be applied to the purposes of that Institute, and I declare that the receipt of the Honorary Secretary or other proper officer for the time being of that Institute, shall be a sufficient discharge for the same.

George Allen & Unwin Ltd

The Life and Writings of Giambattista Vico

By H. P. ADAMS 8s. 6d.

"The first modern study of him in English. It is a very workmanlike little book, modest but learned, in which Vico's life, thought, and writings are all summarized and judiciously discussed."—*Times Literary Supplement*

"A clear, concise, and scholarly exposition of Vico's life and thought."—*Morning Post*

Bernard Bosanquet and His Friends

Edited by Professor J. H. MUIRHEAD. *With Portraits.* 12s. 6d.

"Dr. Muirhead's collection of the letters written by Bernard Bosanquet to his friends . . . is a welcome supplement to our knowledge of him. . . . In Bosanquet's correspondence there is the same serenity of spiritual poise, the same tranquillity in facing a host of contradictions and assailing doubts that we find in his books."—*Times Literary Supplement*

Hume's Theory of The Understanding

By RALPH W. CHURCH. 7s. 6d.

In this study, Hume's constructive theories of abstract ideas, causal inference, belief in substance, the nature of the self and its differences from perceived bodies, and the nature of knowledge are examined in their own right and in distinction from the negative analyses by which he sought to establish his constructive conclusions as the sole alternative to that total scepticism against which he saw Rationalism to be of no avail.

The Ethics of Power

or, The Problem of Evil

By PHILIP LEON 10s. 6d.

"Mr. Leon is an accomplished scholar, widely read in the literature and philosophy both of the ancient and of the modern world. . . . He has made of it all something indubitably his own, open to criticism no doubt, but strong and substantially true. The book has quite exceptional vitality, and proves Mr. Leon a personality to be reckoned with."—*Manchester Guardian*

MACMILLAN

ABILITY AND KNOWLEDGE. The Standpoint of the London School. By FRANK C. THOMAS, M.A., B.Sc. With a Foreword by C. SPEARMAN, F.R.S., Ph.D., Emeritus Professor of Psychology in the University of London. With an Appendix by ELSA WALTERS, B.A., Ph.D., Lecturer in Education, the Municipal Training College, Brighton. **15s.** net

This book places before the beginner in psychological studies a simple yet adequate and authoritative account of the theories associated with the name of Professor Spearman; and offers the more advanced student a useful compendium of the most important findings of the London School.

THE TWO SOURCES OF MORALITY AND RELIGION. By HENRI BERGSON. Translated by R. ASHLEY AUDRA and CLOUDESLEY BRERETON, with the assistance of W. HORSFALL CARTER. **10s.** net

"The translators have done their work so well that they have captured in English much of the movement and the beauty of the original."—*Oxford Magazine.*

THREE INTERPRETATIONS OF THE UNIVERSE. By PROF. J. E. BOODIN, Professor of Philosophy, University of California. **12s. 6d.** net

GOD: A COSMIC PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION. By PROF. J. E. BOODIN, Professor of Philosophy, University of California. **8s. 6d.** net

MACMILLAN & CO. LTD. LONDON

HEFFER'S BOOKSHOP

FOR the buying and selling of all books, and for expert information about books—new, secondhand, English and Foreign.

Catalogues on all subjects frequently issued, also lists of important forthcoming books.

Are you on our Mailing List?

W. HEFFER & SONS
LIMITED
BOOKSELLERS, CAMBRIDGE

PHILOSOPHY

All applications for Advertising Space should be addressed to

T. G. SCOTT & SON
LIMITED
63 LUDGATE HILL
LONDON
E.C.4

Telephone: CITY 4211
(2 lines)

CONTENTS

PAGE

I. ANNUAL MEETING OF THE INSTITUTE: Addresses by The Rt. Hon. Sir HERBERT SAMUEL and Professor H. F. HALLETT . . . 387

II. FREEDOM IN THE PRESENT-DAY WORLD: Professor R. F. A. HOERNLÉ 394

III. SCIENCE AND THE EXPLANATION OF PHENOMENA: Professor W. T. STACE 409

IV. GREAT THINKERS: (VI) DESCARTES: Professor A. BOYCE GIBSON 428

V. MORALITY AND THE RETRIBUTIVE EMOTIONS: PHILIP LEON, M.A. 441

VI. THE PHYSICAL WORLD AND REALITY: J. GOMBORROW, B.Sc. . 453

VII. TRUTH IN POETRY: M. BODKIN 467

VIII. PHILOSOPHICAL SURVEY: PHILOSOPHY IN ITALY 473

IX. NEW BOOKS 476

X. CORRESPONDENCE 507

XI. INSTITUTE NOTES 509

THE BRITISH INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY

Appeal for New Members and Donations

THE Council appeals to members to do all in their power to introduce new members in order to extend the benefits of the Institute and to increase its revenue.

The Institute has no endowments, and its work, which includes lecture courses and meetings for discussion in the various Centres, as well as the conduct of the JOURNAL, cannot be carried on from revenue derived solely from subscriptions of £1 1s. per annum. The Council, therefore, appeals for donations, small or large, from sympathizers with the Institute's aims.

PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN
BY UNWIN BROTHERS LIMITED
LONDON AND WOKING